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PROF. ORESTE FERRARA 



CAUSES AND PRETEXTS 
OF THE WORLD WAR 



A SEARCHING EXAMINATION INTO THE PLAY AND COUNTERPLAY 

OF EUROPEAN POLITICS FROM THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 

TO THE OUTBURST OF THE GREAT WORLD WAR 



BY 

ORESTE FERRARA 

PROFESSOR of' PUBLIC LAW 
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HAVANA 



TRANSLATED FROM 
THE THIRD SPANISH EDITION BY 

MILDRED STAPLEY 



1918 



AMERICAN— NEO-LATIN LIBRARY 

12 EAST 56th STREET 

NEW YORK, N. Y. 






Copyright, 1917, by 
ORESTE FERRARA 



JAN -4 iSi8 



\ 



4 



^ 



©GIA479842 



/\ * - 



« - fV I 



To 

The Memory 

of the 

Honorable Niel Primrose 

who so frequently 

^discussed with the author 

the ideas for which 

he laid down 

his life. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. The Inevitable War 3 

II. The Significance of 1870 ... 7 

III. France AND Russia 11 

IV. France and England 17 

V. Russia and England 23 

VI. The Triple Alliance 29 

VII. The Mediterranean Agreements 35 
VIII. The Franco- Japanese and Russo- 
Japanese Agreements ... 41 
IX. The Policy of Germany and the 

"Encerclement" ... . . 45 
X. Plans Frustrated ..... 59 
XI. The Various Interests Encount- 
ered 65 

XII. Servians Aspirations and Aus- 
tria's Crime . ,. 79 

XIII. The Violent Method and Its 

Results 89 

XIV. Ante Bellum Public Opinion . loi 

1 



11 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

XV. Efforts of the Various Govern- 
ments 115 

XVI. The General Conflict . . . . 135 
XVII. The Violation of the Neutral- 
ity OF Luxemburg 145 

XVIII. England and the Violation of 

Belgian Neutrality . . . .155 

XIX. The Ultimatum and England's 

Declaration of War .... 185 

XX. Turkey and the Conflict .... 191 

XXL Italian Neutrality 199 

XXII. Italy's Participation 223 

XXIII. Belligerent and Neutral Balkan 

States 233 

XXIV. Belligerents and Neutrals in 

Latin America 279 

XXV, Spanish Neutrality 291 

XXVL Greece's Double Attitude . . . 307 



CAUSES AND PRETEXTS 
OF THE WORLD WAR 



THE WORLD WAR 



CHAPTER I 

THE INEVITABLE WAR 

THE famous maxim si vis pacem, para helium * 
appeared until recently to have found its most 
complete application in Europe; but now it is evident 
that Europe's tranquillity was only an external sem- 
blance. Based on a supposed equilibrium, it was dic- 
tated by exigency and by nothing else. Armed peace 
was bound to lead to war. A pretext, not even a 
cause, sufficed to unchain it. 

Just as in the physiological system an organ must 
function, so in the social system must an army.f 
Therefore it was natural that the conflagration should 
soon spread to all countries which possessed an armed 



* Colonel H. Frobenius in "The German Empire's Hour of 
Destiny" (translated from the German), demands that this 
rendering be substituted for that over the door of the great 
hall in the Peace Palace which reads si vis pacem, para justitia. 

t Arturo Labriola ; "International Disarmament," in the Forum, 
January i, 1915. 

3 



4 THE WORLD WAR 

force to put in the field; but later, since our civiliza- 
tion is a collectivity with overlapping relations be- 
tween its various elements, the conflict became a 
general one. 

Innumerable times has war been avoided because 
the presumed combatants found a solution. Within 
the last twenty years the cases of Fachoda, Agadir, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have followed each other 
and each time diplomacy has prevented war merely 
because the probable combatants had not reached the 
necessary degree of preparation. But more recently, 
in spite of peace conferences, diplomatic declarations, 
and sovereigns exchanging visits and embraces; in 
spite of internal problems, financial penuriousness, in- 
sistent pacifism, threatening socialism, and antipatriotic 
syndicalism — in spite of all this, the increase of arma- 
ments kept presaging the proximity of war. Finally 
a deed sad in itself but unimportant from the inter- 
national point of view precipitated the stupendous 
conflict; and the proportions this has assumed make 
us ask if civilization is a myth. Did the great retro- 
gressions of the past have the same simple causes 
and follow the same direction as this of today? And 
ought this to serve as a future warning to Europe ? 

The civilization of that older part of the globe has 
extended to this fertile America which, more secure, 
with a higher conception of human existence and a 
more ample spirit for social activity, hoped to defend 
unmenaced the brilHant legacy of prosperity which 
the unflagging labor of past generations left her; but 



THE INEVITABLE WAR 5 

the strong inclination of American opinion toward 
those combatants whose ideal was liberty, who were 
least prepared to resist brute force and found them- 
selves the possible prey of the more vigorous and less 
scrupulous combatant, finally crystallized into action. 
The European War became a World War. 




CHAPTER II 

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 187O 

THE war of 1870 turned Germany and France into 
natural enemies. The victory of the former was 
so ostentatious and complete that it offended the public 
sentiment of the latter. On the other hand, although 
the conqueror did not realize it, the conquered was by 
no means annihilated. Bismarck, Teutonic, without 
pity or mercy, believed that the Treaty of Frankfort 
would destroy the national wealth and the integrity 
of the patrie; but this was not so. True, for France 
the humiliation was enormous, the loss of territory 
appreciable, the payment of the exorbitant war in- 
demnity not less serious. It is no wonder that the 
glassy eyes of the septuagenarian Thiers shed tears of 
grief on the night when he and Jules Favre returned 
from Versailles to Paris after the interview with Bis- 
marck.* But resurrection was possible and it came 
unexpectedly soon. Bismarck could not deny that he 
had miscalculated. 

Looking back from this distance we can see how, 



* G. Hanotaux ; "Histoire de la France Conteraporaine," Vol. I. 

7 



8 THE WORLD WAR 

with her three victorious wars, Germany accelerated 
her union, acquired new territories, covered herself 
with laurels, and prepared her hegemony over 
Europe. But these same successes were creating for 
her an implacable enemy whose existence must neces- 
sarily be dedicated to preparing her ruin and putting 
onto her shoulders the weight of too great a glory. 

When one examines the political history of Europe 
for the past century it is easy to trace the upward 
course of the little kingdom of Prussia since 1815, and 
to see that even though Sadowa and Sedan followed 
each other quickly it was not necessarily these deeds 
of blood which brought about the unity of the Empire, 
for this had been a Napoleonic conception before ever 
it became an aspiration of the states composing it. 
It was one of Bismarck's exaggerations to believe, as 
Prokesch-Osten ironically put it, that Prussia was the 
centre of the universe; but it cannot be denied that 
the decline of Austria (whose policy was in feeble 
hands and whose armies were not living up to past 
glories) along with the careful Prussian policy and 
the intellectual and scientific movement of 1850, gave 
Prussia the right to claim the inheritance of Frederick 
the Great. 

The personal temperament of Bismarck and the 
inconceivable errors of the Second Empire as to its 
foreign policy rapidly forced events out of their nor- 
mal course into abrupt moves and finally, war. Nor 
is this surprising when these same French errors 
caused Thiers to publicly exclaim during the famous 



THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 1870 9 

discussion of 1867 that Napoleon III was "the real 
author of German unity" ; and when they caused King 
WilHam of Prussia to say something even more in- 
criminating, namely: that Napoleon III "had been 
working his own ruin ever since 1866 because he had 
failed to attack the Prussian army in the rear." Thus 
the Franco-Prussian War came, and France paid dear 
for her blunders. But Germany's decisive victory, her 
glory acquired through an injury that completely 
crushed the enemy, could not do otherwise than dis- 
til a spirit of revenge in the soul of every Frenchman, 
and at the same time arouse in other nations a senti- 
ment of distrust and even of fear. 

Sedan in 1870 left behind it a sediment of profound 
hatred, of undying bitterness, which Leipzig in 181 3 
had not caused. The great Prussian triumphs had been 
excessively easy. 




CHAPTER III 

FRANCE AND RUSSIA 

CONQUERED and isolated, France's first duty was 
to establish her new republican institutions, rein- 
force her army, and reorganize her finance. All this 
she did more rapidly than was expected. Next she 
sought to establish alliances and in short to isolate her 
terrible enemy. How well she succeeded is demon- 
strated by present events. 

France's most powerful neighbors were Germany, 
Italy and England. Of these the first, ever since she 
defeated Austria at Sadowa, had bound that nation 
to her by skilful international policy of the only sort 
that Germany ever practiced with success; their union, 
moreover, rested upon common racial origin. The 
second, Italy, had twice improved her prospects of 
unity, thanks to Bismarck. The third, England, 
though she appeared indifferent to Continental affairs 
and was absorbed in great work elsewhere, was never- 
theless considered the hereditary enemy, France con- 
sequently could only turn her eyes to Russia and offer 
her an offensive and defensive alliance. The idea was 
not without precedent. It had been advanced by men 
2 II 



12 THE WORLD WAR 

like Chateaubriand and the Duke of Richelieu ; but the 
interior regime of both countries, along with the polit- 
ical mistakes of the Second Empire and the Third 
Republic, had excluded all possibiHty of union. The 
Crimean War and the intervention in Polish affairs 
for instance could hardly serve as links to bind the 
two nations. » As to the Polish intervention, Napoleon 
III himself, as an excuse for not contracting one of 
the best alliances on the Continent, had to affirm that 
the Polish cause was very popular in France.* In 
addition there was the grave crisis of the Commune, 
the new form of government adopted after 1871, the 
popular French approval when Berezowski shot at the 
Czar on his visit to Paris in 1867, the subsequent tol- 
erance which the Republic, respectful of its own laws, 
manifested to the Nihilists. All this would never have 
permitted accord, much less real alliance, between the 
two great powers of Eastern and Western Europe. 

In Bismarck*s attitude toward Russia there was a 
marked contrast. He could be flexible when necessity 
required (as witness his trips to Biarritz before 1866 in 
order to insure Napoleon Ill's abstaining from the war 
he was planning against Austria) and he now used all 
his arts upon the Czar to bring about the alliance which 
he designated "of the Three Emperors" — German, 
Austrian, and Russian. This, to be sure, did not in- 
cline Russia toward Francophilism ; nor did the 
Russophobia of French politicians, products mostly of 
the revolution — men like Grevy, or like Floquet, who 



♦ Discourse of the Crown, November 5, 1863. 



FRANCE AND RUSSIA 13 

in 1867 greeted the Czar in the Palace of Justice with 
the cry, Long live Poland! In face of all this one can 
understand the difficulty of throwing a bridge across 
Germany and uniting the Muscovite Empire with the 
French Republic. 

But necessity is superior to human wishes. It hap- 
pened that Russia was able to do France a signal 
service and this became the first step toward reciprocal 
sympathy and awakened a gratitude of the kind which 
countries long cherish. In 1875 Germany, noting her 
rival's recuperation, and seeing her reorganize her 
army which both the Peace preliminaries of Versailles 
and the Treaty of Frankfort had failed to definitely 
limit, wished again to assault her brutally. Bismarck 
became more threatening than ever; his official organ, 
the Post, spoke openly of war, and other German pa- 
pers followed its lead. Marshal MacMahon received 
warning from two European personages that war would 
break out in the spring. But the Czar understood that 
the moment had come when he could no longer remain 
passive ; through Prince Orloff , Russian Ambassador in 
Paris, and more directly through General Le Flo, 
French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, he gave hope 
and encouragement to the French cabinet. It was 
then that Prince Gortschakoff, commenting on the 
Czar's words to Le Flo and underlining them, first 
hinted at a common action should Germany wantonly 
attack France.* 



* Gabriel Hanotaux ; "Histoire de la France Contemporaine,** 
Vol. III. 



14 THE WORLD WAR 

But neither the good intentions of Czar Alexander 
II, nor the sympathetic expressions of Gortschakoff, 
nor the enigmatic words of diplomats of the old school, 
were sufficient for an alliance. France had to learn 
that she could expect no benefit from the quixotic spirit 
for sentimental intervention which had animated the 
foreign policy of the Second Empire. Such chivalry 
left her lonely, for no other nation was willing to 
commit a similar fatal error. Russia, with all her 
good intentions, could not be expected to draw her 
sword at the opportune moment unless she had a motive 
of self-interest or a previous promise of reciprocal 
utility. While this was slowly dawning on France, 
Bismarck, who knew well this egoism of international 
politics and who besides was a good gambler, hastened 
to offer that which soon might have been demanded — 
a free hand to Russia in Eastern Europe while he 
claimed the same in Western. 

France's uneasiness and consequent desire for a 
union were easy to understand; but Russia's pro- 
French proposals did not go beyond mere words. For 
them to do so the two nations must feel a common 
necessity. Such a necessity confronted them when the 
Austro-German Treaty of alliance was celebrated. It 
directed German policy toward the Orient, or at least 
prevented it from ignoring that question, and the fact 
was intelligently exploited by French politicians, dip- 
lomats, and financiers. An alliance de facto was begun 
in 1880. This culminated in the formal treaty, dated 
August 22, 1 89 1, and signed by Ribot and De Moren- 



FRANCE AND RUSSIA 15 

heim representing the two respective countries. Bis- 
marck had been dismissed the year before, for the new 
Emperor wished no leading-strings ; and the old tiger, 
from his retirement, kept clawing at his successors 
because of this alliance; but he himself could not 
have prevented it. From the day its need first became 
apparent in 1878, when Russia came out worsted from 
the Congress of Berlin, it had been shaping itself as a 
treaty in the minds of all.* 

With France and Russia allied, the equilibrium 
broken in 1870 by the Franco-Prussian War was now 
re-established, and Germany ceased to be the arbiter 
of the destinies of Europe. f 

The rejoicing in France was extraordinary and has 
been sustained with but few intermissions. In fact 
the jubilation was exaggerated to such a point that 
Count de Witte, who should have been far from dis- 
pleased by it, said one day to the distinguished French 
publicist Andre Tardieu: "For ten years now you 
have been making Franco-Russian manifestation both 
in season and out of season." 

These explosions of popular sentiment expressed 
how persistent had been the past nightmare and how 
useful was the new union implying supreme defense; 
but nevertheless there arose in the course of twenty 
years two moments of suspicious reserve. The first, 
when Muscovite prestige was humbled on the plains 



* Gabriel Hanotaux ; "La Politique de Tequilibre," page 124. 

t Andre Tardieu ; "Les questions actuelles de la politique etran- 

gere en Europe"; also "La politique exterieure de rAllemagne." 



i6 THE WORLD WAR 

of Manchuria and thereby weakened in all Europe. 
Immediately the event proved to France the impor- 
tance of a strong ally, for in the period that followed 
she again had to suffer Teuton impertinences. The 
second, and more transitory, during the last Balkan 
War when France followed her own policy independent 
of her ally; that is to say, she furthered her own 
Eastern interests without stopping to think' that how- 
ever considerable these may have been, Russia's only 
reason for keeping up the alliance was that her con- 
cern lay in Eastern Europe, just as France's lay prin- 
cipally in Western. On both these occasions the en- 
thusiasm for the Franco-Russian accord waned some- 
what, but adjusj:ments and explanations were soon 
forthcoming. Russia began the reorganization of her 
army and the costly change of her war material, and 
the two nations with new zest bent themselves toward 
the common defense. If Prussian militarism provoked 
it, they would be prepared to attack their vigilant rival 
at the opportune moment. 



CHAPTER IV 

FRANCE AND ENGLAND 

(I^T^HE Englishman is our hereditary enemy." Un- 
A til recently this classic dictum was on the lips of 
every Frenchman; this was the opinion which the two 
nations separated by the Channel had of each other. 
And the fact is, however much they have tried to ex- 
plain since the Entente Cordiale that the idea was 
erroneous,* it is none the less true that long-standing 
rivalry had kept up intermittent war between them. 
This condition constituted the inheritance of both 
countries and there was no reason why the past should 
not foretell the future. The Hundred Years War ter- 
minated in 1453 ; the War of the League of Augsburg, 
from 1688 to 1693; the War of the Spanish Succes- 
sion, from 1701 to 1713; of the Austrian Succession, 
from 1744 to 1748; the Seven Years War, from 1756 
to 1763; the American troubles from 1778 to 1783; 
the Continental Wars from 1793 to 1802, and again 
from 1803 to 181 5 — this long list together with the 



* Ives Guyot ; "L'Entente Cordiale au point de vue 6conomique,* 
in the Journal des Economistes, May 15, 1914. 

17 



i8 THE WORLD WAR 

friction and threats of the Restoration Period, the 
Monarchy of July, the Second Empire, and the Third 
Republic, justifies the old belief in hereditary enmity; 
nor could suspicion be dissipated by brief periods of 
friendship such as occurred in 1830, 1840, and 1872, 
'74, and 75. 

The attitude, moreover, is explicable on other 
grounds. Because of her geographical situation Eng- 
land's safety demanded the supremacy of the seas. 
This she had maintained by fighting against Spain, 
Holland, and France; to maintain it to-day she must 
fight against Germany. Back in 1762 after the Dutch 
and Spaniards had lost their naval power and Ger- 
many's had not yet loomed on the horizon, the Earl of 
Chatham outlined England's policy in unequivocable 
terms when he declared: "His Majesty's ministers 
must never forget this great principle — this directing 
principle of all our policy ; namely : the only thing that 
England need fear in the world is that France should 
become a maritime, commercial, and colonial power." 

These words have always expressed English public 
spirit, for supremacy on the seas also meant political 
strength and national wealth. 

In proportion as France increased her colonial acqui- 
sitions and her maritime strength, the hereditary ene- 
my's aversion to her increased. It was considerably 
aggravated when the minister Jules Ferry launched 
his country on the road to conquest, an initiative which 
even Bismarck favored, being only too delighted to 
see the French armies turn in some other direction 



FRANCE AND ENGLAND 19 

than the eastern frontier. Although French prudence 
sought to make known the national projects to Eng- 
land and to obtain from her a certain approbation, 
still every acquisition was fraught with danger. It is 
known that at the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury 
almost counseled the conquest of Tunis to Waddington, 
First French Plenipotentiary (or at least he counseled 
intervention which in African affairs is the same 
thing). The taking over of Madagascar was recog- 
nized by England in the treaty of August 5, 1890. 
The same with Senegal, Dahomey, and the Congo, 
where "French interests were in constant opposition 
with British and where peace was established only 
with difficulty." * Yet there were moments of grave 
crisis, produced apparently by insignificant causes, but 
whose real roots ran deep in the colonial policy in gen- 
eral and the African in particular. "For twenty years 
the world watched a veritable steeplechase; especially 
between France and England."t Africa, considered 
the res nulUus of political law, was marked off by 
geographers, explorers, and above all by officials 
charged with important missions. Every aspiration 
grew into an interest and every interest into a right. 
England won the steeplechase, but was not able to 
prevent her rival from occupying those portions of 
second-rate quality or which were not included in the 
preestablished imperial plan. France had to suffer 



* E. Lemonon ; "L'Europe et la politique brittanique/* Paris, 
1912, page 87. 
fRene Millet; "Politique exterieure," 1898-1905, page 155. 



20 THE WORLD WAR 

humiliations such as Fachoda, which, though no more 
serious than others, is better known because of the 
enormous noise made over it in the French press. 

In 1898 when Delcasse replaced the eminent Gabriel 
Hanotaux as foreign minister, there was a radical 
change in French policy. This statesman succeeded, 
whenever an opportune moment presented itself, in 
pacifying animosities and drawing nearer to the cab- 
inet of St. James; thus he turned international rela- 
tions into another channel and rescued France from 
her traditional policy of troublesome aggressions, petu- 
lant reservations, and never-ending discussions. Del- 
casse it was, also, who dedicated his efforts to the 
isolation of Germany, leaving her the only ally con- 
grous with racial affinity and geographical situation. 

The ultimate state of things was a triumph for this 
minister and King Edward VIL 

Little by little England saw France, while not re- 
linquishing colonial transactions, resigned to accept- 
ing her, England^s, vast imperial horizons. A sympa- 
thetic policy was initiated in 1898 which culminated 
in the treaty of April 8, 1904. This treaty regulated, 
or we might say liquidated, all colonial difficulties and 
permitted the union of the two countries. France had 
finally comprehended that England's friendship in 
Europe was worth more than any strip of African or 
Asiatic territory, and those nationalists who had in- 
tended to protest on Edward VII's arrival in Paris in 
1903, instead applauded. The hereditary enemy had 
been converted into a sincere friend; but this could 



FRANCE AND ENGLAND 21 

never have happened had not Germany acquired a mar- 
itime and commercial power greater and more danger- 
ous than France's; and the friend could never have 
been changed into an ally had not the Russian troops 
suffered one defeat after another on the wide plains 
of Manchuria. 

To-day the immutable field of Waterloo gazes with- 
out amazement on other allies than those of a century 
ago. 




CHAPTER V 



RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 



THE Anglo-French entente encountered one very 
grave obstacle. France had an ally, Russia, who 
nursed no end of grievances against England and Eng- 
land against her. With the v/hole question of Asia 
between them it was impossible to be opposed to each 
other there and allied to each other in Europe. In the 
Mediterranean, in the Persian Gulf, in far-off India, 
Muscovite power threatened British ; England saw that 
all that immense Asiatic empire which she had consoli- 
dated with so much labor might be lost. Hence her 
traditional attitude of distrust toward Russia. Al- 
though the more direct struggle for Asiatic influence 
developed between 1894 and 1907 it can be said that 
Russia was competing there ages before. In Persia she 
had been able, through London* s blunder, to establish 
a clever and profitable policy about the time mentioned. 
She filled the impoverished Persian exchequer with 
rubles while England refused to lend a shilling, and her 
reward was a constantly growing commerce and a 
promise from the Persian government to give no rail- 
road concessions without the consent of St. Petersburg. 
But not even all this adroit diplomacy could palliate 

23 



24 THE WORLD WAR - 

the bad impression left by an unsuccessful war; and 
so it happened that the defeats in Manchuria cost Rus- 
sia her Asiatic prestige, and the fact was skilfully ex- 
ploited by the English to their own benefit.* 

This by no means accomplished Russia's expulsion, 
however. In the north of the extensive region under 
consideration she continued to dominate in spite of 
internal political fluctuations, while the British held 
sway in the Persian Gulf region. After checking a 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan the limits of the Rus- 
sian frontier were determined by a treaty signed by 
the two on March ii, 1895. That Russia had directed 
herself eastward before considering a more definite 
expansion north and a more favorable one south, the 
occupation of Turkestan and the laying of the Trans- 
caspian Railroad are conclusive evidence; and as for 
Afghanistan, in spite of St. Petersburg's declarations 
of disinterestedness in 1869, 1874, and 1883, it is 
nevertheless true that she had sporadically acted to 
the contrary. England always vigorously upheld her 
own advantage in Afghanistan even to assuming its 
defense, by the treaty of 1893, in case it should be at- 
tacked by a foreign nation. This was an effort evi- 
dently to reaffirm the British protectorate and to ex- 
clude Russia from all sphere of influence. f When Rus- 
sia tried the same expansion in Thibet the same English 
measures opposed her. 

*L. de St. Victor de St. Blancard; "L' Accord anglo-russe 
du 31 Aout, 1907," in the Annales des sciences politiques. 
t"L' Accord anglo-russe," page 49. 



RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 25 

Thus were the great Russian interests in Asia — may 
one say appetites ?^ — in opposition to British ambitions. 
Just as a check was put by Great Britain on territorial 
or commercial expansion in the south, so toward the 
north when Russia tried to hold Manchuria, to aspire 
to Korea, and to have decisive influence at the court 
of Pekin; all of which Russia was doing in order to 
augment her trade with the Celestial Empire and later 
consider it as an enormous Russian dependency. But 
England thereupon urged Japan to defend her inter- 
ests (and England's own) with a result that is well 
known. Bismarck had previously said, satisfied at see- 
ing Russia engaged in other affairs than European, 
"There is nothing for Russia in Europe but nihilism 
and other diseases. Her mission is in Asia. There 
she stands for civilization." The old wolf, knowing 
well Russia's weak spot, held the image of nihilism 
before her eyes to serve his own ends. Obviously a 
Russia absorbed with Asiatic expansion signified a 
Germany unmenaced at the back and free to concen- 
trate on western Europe. 

And yet Russia had a legitimate right to mix in 
European affairs, or more strictly speaking, in Balkan 
affairs. A common origin, commercial relations, con- 
tiguity, the navigation of the Black Sea, and most of all 
Russia's Mediterranean aspirations, all called her in 
that direction. But the Congress of Berlin in 1878 
foiled her. It prevented her from enjoying the fruits 
of her recent victory over the Turks, and definitely 
fixed her situation in southern Europe. After this, dis- 



26 THE WORLD WAR, 

illusionized perhaps, and finding outlet in increased 
Asiatic activities, she kept aloof from the turbulent 
peninsula, only to find when she came back that the 
situation had radically changed. It was no longer 
England she had to face. It was Austria who, to 
Russia's discomfiture, had powerfully established her- 
self there while Germany was directing covetous 
glances toward Turkey, both European and Asiatic. 

Thus in short time and in the natural course of 
events it ceased to be England and France who 
thwarted Russia in her Balkan policy, and Austria and 
Germany took their place. This is precisely one of 
those variations which international policy frequently 
exhibits. The Crimean War was now a thing of the 
remote past; and of the remote past also was Bis- 
marck's contemptuous remark, "The whole Balkan 
question is not worth a Pomxranian soldier's solid 
bones." 

The natural sequel was the treaty of August 31, 
1907, which established the entente between England 
and Russia. The Franco-English treaty had prepared 
the way for it, England's moderate attitude toward 
victorious Japan made it possible, and the conversa- 
tions between Count Cassini and Sir Arthur Nichol- 
son during the Conference of Algeciras shaped it. As 
finally signed it comprised, besides a general declara- 
tion, three distinct conventions relative to affairs in 
Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and a declaration by 
Sir Edward Grey concerning the Persian Gulf. Thus 
were the English-Russian quarrels of so many years 



RUSSIA AND ENGLAND 27 

adjusted and future ones eliminated as far as the 
human mind could forestall them. Once more exigency 
had been stronger than tradition. Between the former 
rivals in Asia and the Balkans had risen Germany; 
curbing the boundless Asiatic ambition of Russia were 
Mukden and Tsushima; disturbing the one dream of 
English statesmen was the ever-increasing naval force 
of the Central Empire. Result, the Anglo-Russian en- 
tente. 

England could now be tranquil; the road to India 
was not to be so quickly- traveled.* 



♦Andre Tardieu; "La France et les Alliances." 



*0 




w 




CHAPTER VI 

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 

AS already stated, the Alliance of the Three Em- 
perors had been a Bismarckian idea. This logical 
conception was quite worthy of the great statesman, 
since it would make Germany mistress of the Euro- 
pean situation, and Europe in his scheme was the only 
important field of action. By it she would give her 
moral support to Russia's Asiatic aspirations — moral 
support only since Germany was then far from possess- 
ing a fleet that could hinder England's policy in that 
same continent. By it, Austria having been conquered 
and excluded from the Germanic community, could 
return only by means of a treaty which would make 
her recognize the supremacy of Prussia and which 
would command Austrian aid in Prussia's Balkan 
policy. By it, both Russia and Austria would serve 
to maintain the German hegemony over all continental 
Europe and keep out England ; the territorial conquests 
granted by the Treaty of Frankfort would be con- 
solidated; and lastly this alliance of the three empires 
would have a salutary effect on internal order and 
do away with those revolutionary flickers with which 

29 



30 THE WORLD WAR 

the restless and frothing Latin world had contaminated 
the Saxon and the Slav. 

But logical though it all appeared, Bismarck had to 
be content with uniting only two of the desired three. 
The Triple Alliance came later but with Italy, not 
Russia, as the third power. 

The union of Germany and Austria concerted in 
1879 was the fruit of the Great Chancellor's genius and 
France's traditional policy of errors (not yet reformed 
by Delcasse). Prior to it Bismarck, having realized 
the difficulty of bringing the three great empires under 
one single policy which would assign Asia to Russia, 
the Balkans to Austria, and the Occident to Germany, 
had been oscillating between Austria and Russia. As 
the latter was growing ever stronger while Austria 
appeared to be growing weaker, the chancellor in- 
clined more to the Czar. Emperor William I also had 
undisguised preference for the Russians. But when 
in 1875 the Czar and his chancellor Gortshakoff pre- 
vented Germany from again attacking France and 
completing the inadequate work of 1870, the conse- 
quence was the hostile German attitude revealed in the 
Congress and Treaty of Berlin. This ended all hopes 
of a treaty with the Bey had occupied Tunis, and the 
appointed were the Russian reactionaries who expected 
that the union would put a curb on nihilism. 

Bismarck soon managed Austria, and Count An- 
drassy decided to accept the German advances.* On 

* S. L. Driault; "Problemes politiques et sociaux," Paris, 191 1, 
page 259. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 31 

October 7, 1879, was signed the secret and merely de- 
fensive treaty by virtue of which if one of the two 
empires should be attacked by Russia the other was 
to help with the totality of its forces; and if one of 
the two should be attacked by some other power sup- 
ported by Russia the unattacked must help with its 
whole army; but if one of the two were attacked by 
some other power not aided by Russia the unattacked 
must maintain a benevolent neutrality. 

Two years later Italy became a party to this agree- 
ment. Not all the causes which brought her into such 
an unpopular alliance are known. France in pursuance 
of a treaty with the Bey had occupied Tunis, and the 
act was considered in Italy not only as an aggression 
but as an indication of a future policy of violence and 
violation. Yet this could hardly have been the only 
or even the principal cause of her joining Austria. 
Though she considered that France had defrauded her 
of a territory over which she claimed historic rights, 
elsewhere she was forced to see even more legitimate 
hopes crushed or at least postponed. Under the none 
too gentle rule of Austria were living great numbers 
of Italians in extensive tracts that were both geograph- 
ically and historically an object of aspiration to the 
new Italian kingdom. One of the most widely ac- 
cepted h)npotheses regarding the Triple Alliance is that 
Bismarck, by friendly advances to the Holy See, made 
the Italians fear that the Roman question would come 
up for reconsideration. Be this as it may, Italy be- 
came part of the Triple Alliance in 1881 and it was 



32 THE WORLD WAR 

Austria, her ancient enemy, who brought it about. 
That is to say, the negotiations were carried on /by 
Count Kalnoky, the Austrian Minister, and Pasquale 
Stanislao Mancini. 

Although this AlHance forced Italy into greater ex- 
penditures than her economic condition warranted, it 
nevertheless guaranteed the as yet unstable national 
unity. 

For many years the policy of the Triple Alliance 
was the policy of Germany. Only recently did Italy 
emancipate herself and try to make new ententes on 
the margin — a proceeding which caused Von Biilow 
to exclaim that they had permitted her to take a waltz 
turn with France. Delcasse meanwhile was telling 
France that she need never fear aggression from Italy. 

The Triple Alliance, renewed whenever it was about 
to expire, was always a defensive alliance and as 
such superior to the Franco-Russian, the Anglo- 
French, and the Anglo-Russian. But so far as Italy 
is concerned, she was in recent years harping more 
on the letter of the bond and forgetting its spirit. 
The Central Empires, on the contrary, kept identifying 
themselves more and more with a common international 
policy which was almost a precursor of national union 
in case of a victorious war. It was even said of the 
late Archduke that his Pan-Germanic tendencies were 
so pronounced that he seemed more German than 
Austrian.* While Italy, by means of accord with the 



♦Andre Cheradame; "England, France, and Russia," in the 
Quarterly Review, October, 1909. 



THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 33 

Mediterranean powers, continued emancipating her- 
self from Berlin, Austria kept drawing nearer till the 
relationship came to signify a phenomenon of Pan- 
Germanism rather than an alliance in the strict inter- 
national sense. 




CHAPTER VII 

THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS 

REVIEWING the conditions which induced Italy to 
fall into the arms of the Triple Alliance, thus 
subordinating herself to Germany and becoming the 
friend of Austria, we find that Bismarck*s strategem 
had made her apprehensive of finding herself forsaken, 
especially with regard to the Papal question. But how- 
ever unpopular the new bond was, as long as England 
looked upon it with not unfriendly eyes, Italy remained 
secure and satisfied. The newly unified nation found 
herself guaranteed on land by the armies of the two 
great Central Empires; while the equilibrium which 
England maintained in the Mediterranean conceded 
free Italian action in the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas. 
To be sure it also gave France a certain hegemony 
over the western Mediterranean (far from contenting 
Gambetta, however, who aspired to make it "the theatre 
of French action'*) ; but the reassuring fact was that 
England was still prime arbiter in the whole extension 
of those waters which had been the great highway of 
Phoenicians and Carthaginians, and the mare nostrum 
of the Romans. 

35 



36 THE WORLD WAR 

The friendship between England and Italy was tra- 
ditional. Gladstone, with that noble policy which could 
recognize the aspirations of idealists and at the same 
time keep his country in contact with realities — Glad- 
stone, it will be recalled, had given the Italian patriots 
full approval by affirming that the Bourbon rule in 
Naples was "the negation of God." English cruisers 
looked on indulgently when the celebrated Expedi- 
tion of the Thousand sallied out from Cuarto under 
the orders of Garibaldi, to land in Marsala. From 
that British intervention which helped to win Palermo, 
to the official recognition of young and growing Free 
Italy, the British spirit had been saturating the people, 
and the friendship which then sprang up has always 
been strong enough to withstand all strain. France, 
too, helped in these difficult moments; but the effect 
was very different. England risked nothing in favor- 
ing Italian unity ; France, on the other hand, gave her 
blood, her money, and her honor in a cause from 
which she could expect no benefits. But she did it 
with many reservations. Napoleon IIFs Treaty of 
Villaf ranca, for instance, came as a cruel surprise after 
a whole series of helpful victories; likewise Minister 
Rouher^s "Never;" likewise the whole Catholic agita- 
tion in favor of maintaining the temporal power of 
the Pope. In face of so many sad disillusions, the 
benefits received from France paled beside England's 
less positive, but less meddlesome, sympathy. 

When England decided to occupy Egypt she urged 
Italy to accompany her; but the latter declined on the 



THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS 37 

ground of not being prepared for colonial activities 
and not understanding the art of intervention in for- 
eign countries (she who herself had been the scene 
of so much intervention!). Upon the statesmen who 
rejected this gratuitously offered opportunity, many 
reproaches have been heaped; but such judgment re- 
sults from inappreciation of the conjuncture of events 
at that time. 

Bismarck always kept in mind England's friendship 
for Italy. The old statesman was accustomed to re- 
solve all his problems within a narrow circle (soon 
snapped for better or worse by the nation he built up) ; 
and apart from his argument that the unity of the Ital- 
ian peninsula was in Hne with his own project for a 
great central empire, his thorough estimate of British 
power would alone have predisposed him to favor 
Italian unity. 

With such importance and honor did Italy regard 
England's friendship that in 1896 Premier Rudini 
affirmed with satisfaction that the English compact 
completed the system of Italian aUiances.* In 1897 
Italy gave up Kassala which she had recently wrested 
from the Dervishes, in order that the British might 
consolidate the conquest of the Sudan. In the light of 
such long-standing and cordial feeling the clouds which 
formed over the question of Tripoli, or when Chamber- 
lain's imperialism dreamed of changing the language 
of Malta, were quickly dissipated. 

That the Entente Cordiale between England and 

♦ E. Lemonon, "UEurope et la politique brittanique," page 189. 



38 THE WORLD WAR 

France should serve as a basis for a Mediterranean 
entente between France and Italy was in the course 
of things. But even on this point Bismarck wished to 
keep the two countries apart and wrote accordingly 
to Giuseppe Mazzini : "The Mediterranean constitutes 
an inheritance difficult to divide among the heirs." 
And so it happened that France and Italy with so many 
historic memories in common, so many reasons for 
uniting, continued to suffer the consequence of the ex- 
clusory policy of their respective governments. Under 
this influence, the masses in each indulged in recipro- 
cal acts of hostility* and it was some time before mis- 
givings and suspicions were quenched by a flow of 
satisfactory explanations. As already mentioned, the 
credit of putting an end to this useless and ignoble en- 
mity, and of initiating an epoch of peace and mutual 
understanding, is due to Delcasse. The good relation- 
ship he was able to create heralded Italy's benevolent 
attitude at the outburst of the present war and her sub- 
sequent entrance into it on the side of the Allies. 

The accord between Italy and France determined the 
action of one and the other in the cases of Tripoli and 
Morocco; and so sure was Delcasse of the good-will 
both of the Italian people and their government, that 
at the very time when the Triple Alliance was being 
renewed in 1902, he did not hesitate to affirm from the 
tribunal of the Chamber that "neither directly nor in- 
directly is the policy of Italy, as a consequence of her 
alliances, directed against France. In no case will her 



* A. Billot, "La France et I'ltalie. 



THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS 39 

policy constitute a threat for us, either in diplomatic 
form, or in protocols, or in international military stipu- 
lations. In no case, nor in any form, can Italy be the 
instrument of, or a party to, an aggression against our 
nation.* 

And, in effect, Italy kept her pledges when the in- 
cident of Morocco gave France reason to fear an 
attack ; and again at the Conference of Algeciras, where 
her chief delegate, the aged Marchese Visconti-Ven- 
osta, gave France a support which was doubly useful 
because in addition to representing a factor of the 
Triple Alliance, he was a diplomat of great prestige. f 

France on her side fulfilled her obligations during 
the Italian-Turkish war. There were momentary diffi- 
culties over the steamer Manouha, but these had no real 
importance, and indeed the question would never have 
been raised had the present president of the Republic, 
who was then foreign minister, been animated by the 
same conciliatory feeling as his predecessor Delcasse. 

In addition to the Manouha incident there was the 
pro-Greek sentiment born of the Balkan War, when 
Italy for a moment united with her allies in aggressive 
action as to Albania and Epirus; but the rancor in- 
spired by Austria, more powerful and threatening than 
ever, brought into relief the solid base on which the 
Italo-French accord had been built up. 



* Cited by Andre Tardieu in "La France et les Alliances." 
t Andre Tardieu ; "La Conference d' Algeciras." 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE FRANCO-JAPANESE AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE 

AGREEMENTS 

ENGLAND was also back of the Franco- Japanese 
and the Russo-Japanese agreements. English 
statesmen understood that the British nation could not 
defend its enormous empire if engaged in a European 
war. The increasing naval and military force of 
Japan, as revealed in the latter's wars against China 
and Russia, gave them considerable uneasiness; they 
saw that even were England victorious in a war in 
Europe her Asiatic empire might be endangered ; hence 
the Anglo- Japanese Treaty of 1905. This treaty was 
exclusively Asiatic. By virtue of it the two powers 
were to reciprocally defend the territories thus far 
obtained and tonmamfain the integrity of China. It 
guaranteed occupations already made and left China 
exclusively under the influence of the English and 
Japanese. When, in the present war, England author- 
ized Japan's offensive against Germany, the treaty was 
made to exceed its original well-known intent; but 
such action it will be observed was limited to Asia, for 
England probably did not care to awaken future mis- 

41 



42 THE WORLD WAR 

givings in the United States nor to set a precedent for 
calling the yellow race into Europe. 

In the Russo-Japanese enmity England would have 
found another problem difficult of solution in case of 
war. Her treaty with Japan would have missed its 
perfect application, for while England was allied to 
Russia and France in Europe, Japan could not be their 
foe in case of a general war in Asia. Out of these 
considerations were evolved the Russo-Japanese entente 
of July 30, 1907, and the Franco- Japanese of June 10, 
1907. It appears at first glance impossible that Russia 
should have so soon forgotten her defeat at the hands 
of Japan; but since that disastrous war she had been 
giving signs of wiser foreign policy, and besides, the 
treaty of peace did not take advantage of her van- 
quished position. In short the accord which was bound 
to develop under the aegis of England was anticipated 
by the Treaty of Portsmouth. 

On June 13, 1907, was signed the first agreement 
between Japan and Russia. In July of the same year 
the treaty, of a political order and "fortifying the 
peaceful, amicable, and neighborly relations which have 
been so satisfactorily reestablished between Russia and 
Japan, and avoiding the possibility of future misin- 
terpretations" was signed by Iswolsky, Russian Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, and Motone, Japanese Am- 
bassador in Petrograd. It bound the two nations 
to respect their own territorial integrity and that of 
China, and also to maintain the so-called "open-door" 
policy in that country. 



THE FRANCO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT 43 

The accord between France and Japan was easier of 
consummation because the friendship of the two na- 
tions was traditional. True, it was distressing in the 
trying days of the Russian and Japanese War, for 
France to see her ally suffer one defeat after another, 
and the aid which she gave to the fleet of Rodjestwensk 
in his difficult voyage through the French possessions 
appeared likely to cause complications; but the an- 
cient good feeling survived it. The convention was 
signed on June 10, 1907, by Kurino, Japanese Ambas- 
sador in Paris, and Pichon, French Minister of For- 
eign Affairs. It promised mutual aid in preserving 
the security and peace of territories occupied by either 
in the Asiatic continent, and like the previously men- 
tioned treaty, it guarded the integrity of China and 
the open-door system. 

With peace thus assured in the Far East, the three 
nations, France, England, and Russia could better 
focus on their European interests and more solidly 
uphold the Triple Entente to their common good. 

Germany also had understood the importance of 
having, if not an ally, at least a friend in the Far East. 
Innumerable times had she tried to establish closer 
associations with Japan. By publishing newspapers 
in that empire and sending professors and military men 
there she had impressed the educated classes ; but even 
though she succeeded for a spell in weaning them away 
from the French influence which had inspired their 
first steps in the acquisition of European culture, she 



44 THE WORLD WAR. 

never succeeded in winning over the Japanese govern- 
ment. 

English diplomacy, more subtle and uniform, never 
left the field free to Germany for a single moment. 




CHAPTER IX 

THE POLICY OF GERMANY AND THE "eNCERCLEMENT" 

WHILE these events were transpiring and matters 
were shaping for a European conflict, Germany 
was applying herself to getting the necessary strength 
for the decisive moment. This she accomplished not 
only by foreign arrangements and compacts, but also 
by creating a formidable army and navy of her own. 
Her concern for foreign support was limited to Aus- 
tria, Italy, and in more recent times, Turkey. The 
advances made to the last named had in reality a double 
object; they were both military and economic, for 
Turkey not only represented a military spirit of the 
highest order and was the leader of the Islamic world, 
but she was also the highway of Asia ; she led to Per- 
sia immediately and perhaps to India later. A proof 
of this assertion — the double interest — may be seen in 
the difficulties Germany was willing to face in order 
to construct the Bagdad Railroad across Ottoman Asia 
and thus unite the North Sea with the Persian Gulf. 
The very rails themselves seemed to indicate the path 
of Greater Germany."^ But unfortunately for both 



*B. Combes de Patris; "De Berlin a Bagdad," in the Revue 
des sciences poUtiques, June 15, 1914, page 357 

45 



46 THE WORLD WAR 

countries, the sixteen years or so that Germany has 
devoted to coaching Turkey have been the most dis- 
astrous in the latter's existence. Turkey, as German 
statesmen conceived it, was to balance the ever-grow- 
ing miHtary force of Russia and serve as a brake to 
England. If Russia could swell her regiments with 
the rude, ignorant peasants of her outlying regions, 
just so surely could Turkey summon the Mohammedan 
hordes; it was merely a question of organization. It 
followed logically that Turkey, in order to be efficient 
as an ally, would have to be guided in her internal 
policy and to have her army put into shape. These 
two points attended to, she could be of extraordinary 
usefulness. Therefore Baron von Marschall, the flower 
of German diplomacy, was sent to Constantinople, 
while Baron von der Goltz (who has since played in 
Belgium the same sorry role as the Duke of Alba) 
dedicated himself to the development of Turkish mili- 
tarism. His sympathy during the war against Italy, 
and the counsels which he gave to the Turkish officers 
through the medium of the Neue Freie Presse of Vi- 
enna will be recalled. In the meantime Germany, ex- 
ploiting the cupidity of the French financiers, counseled 
the Turkish government to borrow largely from them 
with a view to bettering her war material, which was 
furnished mostly by Krupps'. The end was that Tur- 
key found herself definitely tied to the chariot of the 
German Empire. 

Results, however, were not commensurate with the 
efforts made. At home the Young Turk party did not 



THE POLICY OF GERMANY 47 

know how to overcome the racial tendency to dejec- 
tion nor did they find the reorganization of the state 
on an improved foundation an easy task ; and abroad, 
two unlucky wars were all they could show for their 
military and diplomatic preparation. These left Tur- 
key reduced to a minimum of European territory, and 
the poorer by the loss of two vast African provinces. 

Yet in spite of defeats she never lost faith in her 
ally and protector. Staking her national life, her all, 
on a single card, she has continued to be guided by 
the Central Empires. Perhaps the game was not un- 
welcome to Enver Pasha whose personal ambition, like 
Teutonic audacity, acquired great force in any environ- 
ment favorable to it. 

By this time we see the policy of the Great Chan- 
cellor completely abandoned. The Orient which Bis- 
marck despised had become an object to covet; the 
colonial policy was now the chief concern of states- 
men, while the fleet received the Emperor's special so- 
licitude. And in the anxieties of all, England and Rus- 
sia had supplanted France. In other words, Bismarck's 
policy had completed its cycle, and a newer and ampler, 
aiming at all the continents instead of merely western 
Europe, had taken its place. 

After 1870 Germany applied herself to develop- 
ing her industries and increasing her commerce. 
Gifted with extraordinary tenacity and genius for or- 
der she got every possible advantage out of her military 
successes ; and as to her foreign affairs the Triple Al- 
liance appeared to be the Holy Ark in which she took 



48 THE WORLD WAR. 

shelter. "Germany shut herself up within the Triple 
Alliance as if in a fortress, and lived securely. Even 
the Franco-Russian agreement did not alter her sense 
of quiet. On the contrary it was amusing that her 
natural rivals should take the trouble to guarantee her 
own conquests to her, and should bind themselves by 
the most terrible oaths to stay at home."* 

Equally indifferent was Germany to the subsequent 
Franco-Italian agreement on Mediterranean questions. 
Chancellor Von Biilow who had referred to it as *'a 
waltz turn'* said in more serious and official mood: 
"We should congratulate ourselves that France and 
Italy, each with great and important interests in the 
Mediterranean, have come to an understanding con- 
cerning them." The next accord, the Anglo-French, 
also left German serenity unruffled. No one saw that 
this settlement, by putting an end to an age-old conflict 
between the two nations, might serve to set up another 
against a third party; which third party could be no 
other than Germany, natural enemy of France and rival 
of England. A few days after it was signed, that is 
to say on April 12, 1904, the same chancellor with the 
same imperturbability affirmed that, so far as German 
interests were concerned, there was nothing to object 
to in the said treaty, f 

In fact, with regard to France, the nation which was 
aspiring to the hegemony of Europe preferred that the 

♦ Rene Millet ; "France, Allemagne, Maroc," in the Revue 
politique et parlamentaire, June, 1907. 

! Andre Tardieu ; "La France et les Alliances," page 191. 



THE POLICY OF GERMANY 49 

statu quo should not alter : she was therefore disposed 
to extend every sort of neighborly courtesy. At each 
disaster or misfortune — the death of General Mac 
Mahon, of Sadi-Carnot, of Marshal Canrobet, of Jules 
Simon ; on the occasion of the Charity Bazaar Fire, the 
shipwreck of La Bourgogne, and innumerable other 
lamentable events, — the Kaiser always tried to be the 
first to send condolence and to have his ambassador 
persuade the afflicted of his sympathetic sentiments.* 
The Treaty of Frankfort had given Germany the de- 
sired frontier and had served to complete and con- 
solidate her unity; to maintain its clauses and to do 
nothing that would interrupt her ever-increasing com- 
merce and industry were the chief desideratum. Any 
difficulty with France would mean a relapse. Hence 
the significance of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's ex- 
clamation in the Reichstag : "I do not care to go over 
the past any more than is necessary to know the fu- 
ture." 

Germany might well be satisfied, for until the 
Franco- Russian Alliance this state of things had meant 
her absolute domination on the Continent, a domina- 
tion which took a new lease of life when the defeats in 
Manchuria showed how ineffectual was the Russian 
army. To counteract this domination France had to 
direct all her acts; likewise England, when the day 
came on which Germany, forgetting the counsels of 
dead and gone statesmen, took a place, and took it with 



* Andre Tardieu ; "La politique exterieure de I'Allemagne, 
page 63. 



50 THE WORLD WAR 

unequalled vigor, among the maritime and colonial 
nations. 

Up to this time Germany^s relations with France 
had been the pivot of European politics; now it was 
her relations with England. To go a step further, the 
former were influenced by the latter. England saw 
German commerce increasing and penetrating into 
those far-off seas where British commerce had never 
before met a rival ; she saw the German fleet increasing 
and threatening that supremacy which had always safe- 
guarded her progress and her wealth;* and above all 
she saw jeopardized her ancient prestige which, as Lord 
Roseberry had declared, formed the base of England's 
grandeur. 

Then there came a moment of severe trial, when 
England perceived that just as Spain, Holland, and 
France had threatened her in the past, so was Germany 
threatening her in the present. This moment was the 
Transvaal War, which put British resources to a hard 
test.f 

She understood that the supreme effort of her his- 
tory must be made, that it was one of those crises in 
which great world questions must be decided, and that 
she must find out which way the scales inclined. To 
wait would be to give the enemy more time to prepare. 
The doctrine of "splendid isolation" had had its day. 



♦ Rene Pinon ; "La rivallte de TAllemagne et de TAngleterre," 
in the Revue des deux mondes, March i, 1909. 
t Victor Berand; "L'Oeuvre d'Edouard VII." 



THE POLICY OF GERMANY 51 

Edward VIFs reign merits a eulogy for having 
known how to interpret the signs of the times.* After 
a tentative accord with Germany which never material- 
ized and which was attributed to Chamberlain, a 
marked hostility to that nation took shape in England. 
If only past history could serve as a guide, this feeling 
would appear inconceivable; for just as surely as it 
shows us that England was the hereditary enemy to the 
Frenchman, it shows her as the ancient ally and con- 
stant friend to the Prussian. 

In Germany the sentiment was returned, even antici- 
pated, as revealed on such occasions as the German ap- 
proval of Russian domination in Manchuria, the ques- 
tion of the Bagdad Railway and all it meant for 
German dreams of expansion, and the attacks on 
Chamberlain in 1901, when hard and even vulgar terms 
were applied to him in the Reichstag. All these re- 
vealed, as was said, a state of hostility, and could not 
but initiate that current of suspicion and prevention 
which precedes all great crises. 

Applying Von Billow's famous axiom, "When one is 
not sure of making himself loved he should make him- 
self feared," Germany proceeded to augment her 
marine, for as Baron von Marschall expressed it, "We 
must sharpen the German sword on sea as well as on 
land.'' So vigorously was this done that the English 
themselves were stupefied. It endangered their mari- 
time policy of the "two power standard." Nor were 



* Rene Pinon ; "France et Allemagne," in the Revue des deux 
mondeSj part i for April, 1912, page 657. 



52 THE WORLD WAR 

their misgivings calmed by the discourses of Emperor 
William II. 

From the year 1901 when the silent antagonism 
began between these two nations, France, prompted by 
England, asserted herself more positively in interna- 
tional politics, and in serious matters sought the opin- 
ion of the Cabinet of St. James. And that same year 
began the isolation of Germany, the encerclement 
whose success is so manifest in the present moment; 
then, too, began la revanche and the decline of the Ger- 
man hegemony. In all this silent cumulation, the only 
noisy interruption was the aggressive tone which 
Germany directed to France in 1904. 

The Morocco incident roused her out of her tran- 
quillity and gave her the first positive and unmistakable 
sign of the hemming-in policy. That Germany should 
not be gratified at seeing France plan a vast Mediter- 
ranean empire is natural, for it was at the expense of 
Germany's own aspirations; moreover, in it would be 
recruited a warlike colonial army which could be 
brought into Europe at the required moment to serve 
as a balance against the great Teutonic military con- 
tingents. To Algeria, long since conquered, France 
had added Tunis; and next she penetrated slowly but 
decidedly into Morocco. The Kaiser resolved not to 
tolerate any expansion whatever and gave his neigh- 
bor many a start by way of advising her of his 
feelings ; this produced the desired uneasiness. On his 
trip to Tangiers he saluted the Sultan with a speech 
in which he dwelt with immoderate emphasis on his 



THE POLICY OF GERMANY 53 

host's quality of independence. "It is to the Sultan in 
his capacity as an independent sovereign that I am 
paying a visit/' he said ; and again, "I hope that under 
the sovereignty of the Sultan, Morocco will remain 
free, open . . . without annexation, and on a footing 
of absolute equality . . . for I consider the Sultan a 
completely free monarch." All these insistent declara- 
tions and phrases are comprised in a short discourse 
of less than seventy words. This time France did not 
heed the hint; but when Delcasse, more radical, 
did not wish longer to remain foreign minister and 
suffer the imperial prosiness, France consented to the 
calling of a conference sure, as well she might be 
through her ententes, of its result. 

The Conference of Algeciras was a complete 
triumph for France. Russia stood by her ally reso- 
lutely; Spain, except for a few waverings on the part 
of the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, was chivalrous and 
obliging to her neighbors across the Pyrenees ; Sir Ar- 
thur Nicholson, the English plenipotentiary, firmly and 
courteously upheld her ; Italy, represented by the Mar- 
quis Visconti-Venosta, was prodigal in her praise (re- 
calling the treaty which had opened the road to Tripoli 
for Italy, and which later she, in her turn, had to faith- 
fully uphold) ; and the United States was not behind in 
sympathy. Germany, on the other hand, argued, 
changed about, retraced her steps; followed in it all 
by her faithful Austria who had neither opinion of her 
own nor special interest in the matter.* By forcing 

* Andre Tardieu ; "La Conference d' Algeciras." 



54 THE WORLD WAR 

this diplomatic fencing competition, Germany hoped, 
as Von Billow later expressed it, to deal France a 
riposte. The result was a counter-riposte. 

The Conference of Algeciras made Germany under- 
stand her true situation, even though the press of the 
country preferred not to admit the defeat suffered. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the English fleet, di- 
rected as it evidently was against the empire of the 
Kaiser, the visits of Edward VII to the Mediterranean 
states, the frigidity of the meeting between William 
and Edward, all confirmed Germany in the belief that, 
she was surrounded by a sentiment of mistrust. 

Soon it began to be evident that Italy was separating 
markedly from the Triple Alliance. For twenty years 
the Italian people had been indulging in irredentist 
meetings in favor of Trieste and Trent, and in Novem- 
ber, 1908, and May, 1909, they gave even greater in- 
dications of enthusiasm, driven to it by Austria's blun- 
ders in domestic policy. 

By this time the Irredentist Movement had passed 
out of the hands of young students like Giuglielmo 
Oberdank who had offered his blond young head on the 
Austrian scaffold, and had become the concern of 
statesmen. Then, too, Russia had entered into Italian 
politics; and with the visit of the Czar in 1909 to 
Racconigi, the summer residence of King Victor Em- 
manuel III, a current of sympathy had been set up 
between the two countries. Nor must it be forgotten 
that Victor Emmanuel's romantic love-match was pre- 
pared in the Russian court. 



THE POLICY OF GERMANY 55 

Austria's brusk annexation of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina was a blow to both Russia and France; both 
nations, and England with them, realized that they 
must close in their ranks and prepare for the inevitable 
war. Thus in 1908 England offered to put two divis- 
ions at France's disposal in case of an immediate war 
on the Continent. By this it will be seen that they 
were exceeding the letter of their agreement. 

To such a point did interest side-track conscience 
that words no longer had their normal meaning but 
appeared to say something different and even contrary. 
Emperor William in an interview of November, 1908, 
tried to tranquillize the English people, and instead the 
English people gave quite an opposite interpretation to 
the imperial words. The same Emperor tried inces- 
santly to be on good terms with France, but always, 
naturally, within the limits of the Treaty of Frank- 
fort, to maintain which he believed that Germany must 
stake her honor, lose her last man, and spend her last 
penny. So he said to everybody high and low; and 
when France would not respond to his advances he 
exclaimed to one of the ambassadors accredited to 
Berlin : "I fear for next summer. I am tired of hold- 
ing out my hand to France and having her ignore it." 
This was in 191 1. 

Evidently the Teutonic amiability was not all pure 
generosity. 

To return to the Triple Alliance. At the inspiration 
of German diplomats it had acquired in the last two 
years more solidity than at the time of the Italo-Turk- 



56 THE WORLD WAR 

ish war. Italy, although the German press had cried 
aloud against her enterprise in Tripoli, was neverthe- 
less indebted to Germany for the temporary possession 
of the islands in the ^Egean Sea; and to Austria for 
having defended the statu quo in the Adriatic during 
the Balkan War, or at least for having prevented a 
power which might some day become strong from oc- 
cupying one of its shores. France, on the other hand, 
had thrown onto her shoulders the defense of the 
Greek cause. But soon Italy, irritated by the Trieste 
incidents which the governor, Hohenlohe, provoked, 
again showed herself hostile to Austria. 

In the years 19 12 and 19 13 armaments were every- 
where augmented. Germany raised the number of her 
soldiers to 900,000 in time of peace, so that at a given 
moment she could dash over any frontier; France imi- 
tated her by increasing the term of military service to 
three years, though to do so cost the most violent dis- 
cussions in Parliament. Russia went on enthusiastic- 
ally with her army reorganization, and England pushed 
ahead with her marine; the standing armies of both 
Italy and Austria were raised and their naval construc- 
tions hastened. Meanwhile the chiefs of the various 
General Staffs exchanged visits, perhaps to prepare 
the attack or to communicate the plans for it. In 
short, by 191 3 war appeared certain. 

The forthcoming incident of Sarajevo was, it is 
evident, a pretext and not a real cause. 

Germany did not intend that the encerdement 
should be complete. She knew her own strength, she 



THE POLICY OF GERMANY 57 

felt ready. Once more, in order to maintain her fron- 
tiers and to realize her ambitions (certainly none too 
modest), she would be forced to fight, even though to 
do so meant an offensive war. Her pride in her new 
naval power impelled her to give battle. Her greatness 
was at stake. The loss of that position in Europe 
which had formerly been so absolute, obliged her to 
deal the supreme and decisive blow. Only a noble 
resolution on her part not to dominate the world would 
have avoided the conflict; but such a decision was not 
part of her program. 




CHAPTER X 

PLANS FRUSTRATED 

VON MOLTKE'S plan for 1870 in case Prussia 
should be attacked in the rear was to throw an 
army rapidly on France, deliver a crushing defeat, and 
then turn and defend himself against the other bellig- 
erent. And now after forty years this was still the 
best strategy, especially as the Austrian ally could keep 
Russia in check, and Italy could engage a large part 
of the French army by an assault on the south of 
France. England, though an enemy, could not do 
much damage on land if she decided to stand by France 
and Russia ; but there was always the chance that she 
would leave them to fight alone, for had not the Brit- 
ish foreign minister. Sir Edward Grey, said to the 
French ambassador, Cambon, that England was not 
obliged to cooperate in case of war? 

All was foreseen but that which, according to the 
ancients, lay on the knees of Jupiter. Obstacles of the 
sort that defy even the profoundest human calculation 
upset the German plans. In the first place England 
was war-inclined. She knew that another German 
triumph would not be at the expense of France but 

59 



6o THE WORLD WAR 

of herself. As expressed in a pamphlet by the well- 
known English socialist, Robert Blatchford, "The 
problem of British defense is the defense of France." 
In former days Albion was not addicted to drawing 
her sword for others; but Albion, perfidious though 
her reputation, was never so to herself. Everybody 
in England knew that Germany was a successful com- 
petitor in every field, and that a war which left her 
victorious would do more harm to England than to 
any other nation. 

The next unforeseen obstacle was Belgium's ener- 
getic defense of her neutrality. German diplomatists 
and strategists had believed that she would limit her- 
self to vehement protests, or perhaps would sacrifice 
a few brigades in order to comply with the obligation 
of defending herself against invasion. But instead 
the Belgian soldiers held up the march of a whole 
powerful army and thus enabled the French to con- 
centrate on the most important points of their unex- 
pectedly invaded frontier. 

Then to further frustrate German diplomatic, and 
more especially military, prevision, came Italy's re- 
fusal to participate in an offensive war. As already 
pointed out the Triple Alliance had been undergoing 
some readjustment during the previous few years. 
Italy was still bound officially to Germany and Aus- 
tria but the people had never given their soul to the 
alliance. Long before the coalition the aged premier 
Agostino Depretis, in order to excuse certain neces- 
sary concessions to Austria, had confessed, that in his 



PLANS FRUSTRATED 6i 

youth he had taken part in a plot to kidnap the Aus- 
trian Emperor ;* and Crispi, the statesman most favor- 
able to Germany, used to say that necessity had driven 
him into union with the Central Powers when affection 
would have drawn him to France. 

When the present storm was brewing Italy had only 
recently finished a war with Turkey and still had 
troops in Africa. The worst or at any rate most im- 
mediate consequences of the conflict would have fallen 
upon her; for Germany and Austria having but little 
coast line could easily defend themselves whereas she 
would catch the brunt of all the naval attacks. She 
would suffer a rigid blockade and would have to aban- 
don, and perhaps lose, her newly acquired colony of 
Tripoli. Therefore as the treaty, strictly speaking, 
did not bind her to participate in offensive warfare she 
turned it into the instrument of an unpleasant surprise 
for her expectant allies, and this without breaking any 
given pledge. Their paths further diverged when 
King Victor Emanuel listened, as had his illustrious 
grandfather, to the groans of the Italian Irredentists. 
He decided to unsheathe his sword but not on the side 
that twenty years of mutual aid and guarantees would 
have indicated. 

From the course of this war we learn how com- 
pletely a whole series of previously outlined hypotheses 
can fall short of application. For instance the pacifist 
tendency which it was believed would deeply influence 
the contending parties at the crucial moment, became 



* Salvatore Barzilai ; "Vita parlamentare." 



62 THE WORLD WAR 

a dead letter — ^hardly more than the talk of a few 
newspapers; the same with the revolutionist and syn- 
dicalist tendencies and the great general strike which 
was to be declared the minute war burst. All were 
swept away by an avalanche of resurging patriotism, 
more sanguinary to-day than ever in past centuries. 
Jaures, whose fine spirit and profound perception had 
forced him to affirm that the Triple Alliance was a 
necessary counterpoise to French Chauvinism, was shot 
down in Paris, one of the first victims of the war. 
German socialists marched in the first ranks just as 
the aged Bebel had said they would, a few years be- 
fore in the Reichstag. French socialists did the same, 
and Guesde, high-priest of French Marxism, became 
a minister without a portfolio. 

The beginning of this twentieth century saw more 
Peace Congresses and Peace Conferences than any 
other period of history; it heard the word peace re- 
peated more often probably than all the centuries of 
humanity put together; and yet to-day it is looking 
upon the most bloody war ever recorded. Such are 
the contradictions of destiny, the ironies of fate. 

And to what has all the preparation led thus far? 
Germany having had to abandon her plan of rapid 
entry into Paris, has fallen back on her previously out- 
lined plan of a tenacious resistance; and in her own 
strength she still confides, chanting her war-song of 
Deutschland uber Alles. 

Notwithstanding, the final result of the war is be- 
yond all doubt. England having instantly made her- 



PLANS FRUSTRATED 63 

self mistress of the seas, the enormous merchant fleet 
which Germany so lovingly and carefully built up lies 
idle in her own ports or worse still, plies in the service 
of the enemy. She can use only her submarines whose 
victims have been all too often innocent non-combat- 
ants and whose material booty, while enormous, can- 
not bring the hoped-for victory. This is a condition 
which no end of brilliant land engagements can out- 
weigh. 

Alone of the great personages who played a leading 
role in the tragedy of 1870 survives the Spanish-born 
ex-Empress of the French, Eugenie ; and she, of them 
all, must have least interest and least consolation in 
the revanche. Widow, inconsolable mother, dethroned 
empress who waited in vain for the husband of heroic 
name to reinstate her, she will witness the triumph of 
that Republic which forced her to flee in humiliation. 
Perhaps she is thinking that the son whom the Zulus 
sacrificed might have obtained the revenge. But she 
must recognize that the odious Republicans have known 
better how to prepare alliances and armies than the 
husband whose surrender at Sedan was the occasion 
of her Homeric words to his mesenger : "You lie, sir ; 
you mean that he is dead !" 

The Republic has succeeded where the Empire 
failed. France's success has been the product of fif- 
teen years of wise and sure diplomacy. The isolation 
policy against Germany initiated by Delcasse has borne 
its fruit. Even Gabriel Hanotaux will have to compli- 
ment his fortunate rival and revise his latest writings.* 



♦Gabriel Hanotaux; "La politique de Tequilibre.*' 



CHAPTER XI 

THE VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 

HOW much cause and how much pretext there may 
be in human disagreements is difficult to de- 
termine, especially when the contending minds are 
cautious and of high calibre. This truth, applicable in 
all wars, stands out most prominently in the present 
one; for in spite of all the literature the catastrophe 
has brought forth we are not yet able to agree unani- 
mously as to which were specific causes and which 
were mere pretexts. 

Nor is this strange. In certain far less complicated 
international conflicts all the facts have come out later 
and yet have failed to produce a concordant opinion. 
The Franco-Prussian War for instance — and this is a 
reference we are justified not only in making but in 
reiterating because of its relation of cause and effect 
to the present — the Franco-Prussian War was un- 
doubtedly desired by Bismarck as a necessary step in 
German progress as he conceived it; yet to many it 
still appears rather as a consequence of French Chau- 

6s 



66 THE WORLD WAR ■ 

vinism. Bismarck himself frequently said so and 
many agree with him. But analysis shows that how- 
ever patriotic his motives may have been his share of 
the responsibility was very grave ; and this without de- 
nying French errors and weaknesses, nor the indeli- 
cacies and vanities of the Emperor and Empress, of 
Olivier and Grammont and Benedetti; to say nothing 
of the reactionary party who were a dominant factor 
in spite of the change in the political regime of the 
Empire. If opinion is not yet unanimous regarding 
the war of 1870, how much less so could it be regard- 
ing the war of 1914. 

There is no denying that the present crisis had a 
warlike preparation based on well-defined interests. 
Facing each other stood Germany and Russia, the 
latter threatened in her European prestige through 
having lost her Asiatic, the former powerful on the 
sea, pushing her maritime commerce whither she 
wished, maintaining a colonial policy and defending, 
in union with Austria, a Balkan policy of conquest and 
domination ; and beyond them both stood England and 
France, the one waylaid on the ocean highways, the 
other watching for her revenge. War had to break 
out, and many a time did its sinister phantom appear 
on the horizon. 

Everything that could preclude war had happened 
in Europe. The various interests had been delineated 
by the grouping of states into two great bodies, for 



VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 67 

every member of which the future struggle constituted 
a hope; in its final result every one was seeking the 
satisfaction of some clearly felt necessity. The de- 
velopment of one of the groups, or of one of the 
principal nations dominating it, represented danger 
for the other. The turning-point had to come in this 
international chess game. When? How? This no 
one could know. But each player hoped it would 
come at the moment when his moral and material 
preparation was best. Each one thought of his own 
interests, although with different degrees of inten- 
sity ; and nobody for a moment forgot his own advan- 
tage through a platonic love of peace. 

In international matters, as in physics, expansion 
must produce shock. There was England with her 
mercantile imperialism — ^had not Chamberlain said 
that empire and commerce were one? — the product of 
centuries of constant effort and seemly procedure. 
And there was Germany with her expansion of vio- 
lence, a porcedure which time had crowned with suc- 
cess. (Far back in Mirabeau's day he had said that 
the national industry of Prussia was war.) Germany 
wished, in revolutionary manner, to strike other na- 
tions who by the slowness of their effort had been 
disguising that lust which economic imperialism im- 
plies, while her own greed, precisely through the op- 
posite or rapid method, was made to appear un- 
bounded. 



68 THE WORLD WAR 

France, aided by her admirable financial organiza- 
tion and impelled by her enormous bureaucracy, had 
formed two empires, one in Asia and one in Africa. 
The vanquished of 1870 found easy that which the 
conqueror was not able to achieve. Even Italy, least 
powerful and least populated of the Triple Alliance, 
least in commerce and military force, had managed to 
conquer for herself vast African territories and mag- 
nificent Mediterranean positions; and the same with 
Russia, whose breast had only recently begun to throb 
with economic aspirations, and the same with Austria. 
This last-named, for every colonial conquest, had to 
break the cord drawn tight around her, and yet she had 
captured the road to the port of Salonika. 

Outside facts throw but little light on underlying 
causes. It matters very little, for instance, whether 
the Kaiser one day embraced his royal English cousin 
or his imperial Russian cousin, and whether one of 
these returned the embrace with more effusion than 
the other; nor does it matter whether on some other 
day this same Kaiser extended his hand to France, and 
she, to use his own picturesque phrase, pretended not 
to see it. It is not expressions of affection which are 
to be examined, but great national interests. It did 
not help the international situation for the Kaiser to 
hold out his hand to France and at the same time 
insist on the Treaty of Frankfort by which she had lost 
two provinces and suffered the greatest humiliation of 



VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 69 

her history; nor did it help matters to talk of family 
ties and past links in the court of Russia, while the 
Slavs in the Balkans were being harrassed to the great 
detriment of Muscovite prestige. Fine words, need- 
less to say, never distracted the eyes of utilitarian Al- 
bion from the enormous German fleet ; and vice versa ; 
Germany in full hegemony and with her people trained 
to the point of megalomania in thinking and talking 
of grandeur, was not going to limit her political, mari- 
time, economic, and financial expansion just to please 
her adversaries. She had to threaten the rivals which 
her own greatness was creating, and to refuse every 
status quo which signified enforced but unmerited in- 
feriority, heedless of the truth that historic conse- 
quences must be respected unless a nation deliber- 
ately wishes to provoke war. 

For England the present struggle is just such an- 
other phase in her time-honored policy as that which 
brought her into conflict with Spain, Holland, and 
France; just such as in future will bring her against 
any power who tries to take from her the maritime 
dominance which insures her national existence. 

For Germany the war signifies the inevitable com- 
plement of William IFs political scheme. If he had 
not kept in mind an armed action which would give 
the backing of force to his Oriental and maritime ex- 
pansion, all the effort — chiefly economic — of twenty- 



70 THE WORLD WAR 

four years, from his 1890 journey to Constantinople 
to the present day, would have been useless. 

When Bismarck was sent into retreat everybody 
thought it was a coup de tete of the new Emperor, the 
act of a young man who could not brook the presum- 
ing authority of his chancellor. To a few it signified 
a necessity of domestic policy; and still fewer watched 
from then on for a radical change in foreign policy. 
Bismarck was content with the past and in its security 
he expected to live long years of tranquillity. Prussia 
dominated in Germany and Germany in continental 
Europe, and this was his serene aspiration and his 
beatific reality ; he was willing to leave far-off colonial 
vanities to others. William II, however, was dream- 
ing of greater glories. The past did not belong to 
him. For him it was necessary to be as strong on sea 
as on land and even to lift his eyes to that Orient 
which was the object of general European covetous- 
ness. His must be the task to beat down the wall 
which hemmed in the Teuton race. He must extend 
his policy of hegemony. From Occidental Europe 
he must go to Oriental, and from there he must look 
higher and acquire even greater authority over the 
world. Was it not perhaps on the tomb of "his illus- 
trious ancestor Charlemagne'* that he was inspired to 
pronounce that memorable discourse so imbued with 
medieval policy? 

The grandeur of Germany dictated to him the line 



VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 71 

of conduct he must follow; it obliged him "to grasp 
the trident of Neptune along with the sword of Fred- 
erick the Great"; it opened to him the doors of the 
luxurious and much-coveted Orient. In short, Ger- 
man grandeur interpreted by German mentality meant 
war. And now that this has come we see with what 
ingenuousness German statesmen and writers declare: 
"They denied us that which we had a right to de- 
mand; our power was superior to our opportunity." 

Ever since 1890 German foreign policy has been 
indicating the ideas which to-day are openly upheld. 
The fleet which was constructed, the army which was 
enlarged, and the military organization which was 
held in readiness, as if, to use ex-Chancellor Von 
Bulow's expression, * war might break out the follow- 
ing day — all this was to serve not for guarding a favor- 
able statu quo and warning off adversaries, but to offer 
itself some day on the international market and bid 
for a greater part of that booty which the powerful 
states, under the pretext of civilization, were accumu- 
lating at the cost of the little and less fortunate ones. 

France, Russia, and Austria were all revolving 
around an unsettled policy. France, in the name of 
the past, should have been more partizan of war than 
the others. For them the greatness of the neigh- 
boring empire represented a future danger only; 



♦Count Von Biilow; "Imperial Germany." 



72 THE WORLD WAR 

for her it represented an unhappy past as well. Add 
to this the proud spirit of the Frenchman which a 
glorious history had quickened to a higher pitch than 
normal. For forty-four years he had been champing 
the bit and longing for the day when Sedan might be 
avenged, Metz reconquered; when the statues of the 
lost provinces would be a living reality to the masses 
who crossed the Place de la Concorde, instead of a dead 
hope. And so it was that France, moved by the two 
opposing sentiments of past injury and present well- 
being, desired war yet maintained peace. Thus when 
the Kaiser offered friendship to the nation which had 
been forced to accept the preliminaries of Versailles 
with tears in the eyes and groans in the soul, insult 
was added to injury; the compassion of the victor 
humiliated the victim. Granted the antagonism, both 
peoples knew that whatever conflict arose, it would 
drive them against each other. Evidently destiny had 
put them on opposite sides forever, and each knew 
what its future position must be. Such being the 
collective psychology, the mind of the masses and the 
preparation of the youth, the tension of the two gov- 
ernments in question can be easily understood. This 
tension, never relaxed for a single day, was the cause 
of the alliances in continental Europe. It united 
France to Russia and it formed the Triple Alliance. 
Russia, nevertheless, had oscillated in her inter- 
national policy. Friend and loyal ally of France she 



VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 73 

remained after signing the treaty; but for some time 
she gave scant attention to France in particular or 
Europe in general. Pushed by her geographic con- 
figuration towards the vast continent of Asia, she 
mixed in the affairs of China, Thibet, Turkestan, 
Afghanistan, and above all Korea, Manchuria, and 
Persia. So absorbed was she in these that she some- 
what forgot the Balkan States, their Slavic popula- 
tion, and her influence in Turkey. Lured by the Pa- 
cific she forgot her dream of being a Mediterranean 
power. But so far as Asia was concerned, her disas- 
trous Asiatic war and the Anglo-Russian and the Rus- 
so-Japanese treaties all clipped her aspirations ; she then 
went back with greater freedom and calm to that Euro- 
pean policy which represented so great a part of her 
diplomatic and military life. 

On returning, however, she found her adversary 
better prepared, with greater influence and more de- 
fined ambitions. Austria was still under the sceptre 
of Francis Joseph (to whom longevity had made a con- 
cession in order that he might live through innumer- 
able family and state afflictions), but the aged Em- 
peror was subject to the influence of the Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, his heir. This young man opposed 
his tendencies with all the energy of his fiery charac- 
ter and expounded the system for a Greater Austria 
based not on economic development and intellectual 
progress, but on a big fleet and a war-trained army. 



74 THE WORLD WAR 

And in truth it was the heir-apparent and not the 
Emperor who represented the true current of public 
opinion. The whole army of which he was generalis- 
simo approved his plans. Intimate of the Kaiser he 
received, by reflection as it were, all the favor of the 
Pan-Germanists and was considered the representative 
of Austrian militarism and imperialism — an adversary 
to be feared by Russia. His audacity of character 
made him less of a Hapsburg than a Bourbon, from 
which house he inherited abundantly, both as to tem- 
perament and political-religious tendencies.* 

Balkan difficulties no longer bore the timid aspect 
of years ago. No longer were they the motive for 
formal international congresses or for an exchange 
of notes between European governments. Instead, 
events were violent. Bosnia and Herzegovina, annexed 
in face of international stupor, are an example; like- 
wise the expulsion of Montenegro and Servia, and 
later Greece, from certain parts of the Adriatic shore ; 
and lastly, the repeated threats of war or annexations 
made to the smaller Balkan States. 

Russia's return to intensive Balkan activity was not 
marked by success. On the contrary her humiliations 
were continuous and she lost considerable prestige 
among those of her race who for so many years had 
looked to her for aid and protection. 



* R. W. Seton Watson ; "The Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 
in The Contemporary Review, August, 1914. 



VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED 75 

War was on the point of breaking out at the end 
of 1908, at the beginning of 1909, and again in 191 3, 
for causes almost identical with the present: that is 
to say, because of friction between Austrian and Slav 
interests in the Balkans. The first cloud gathered 
when the official newspaper of Vienna published on 
October 7, 1908, the following documents: a procla- 
mation by the Emperor to the inhabitants of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; a letter to the statesmen represent- 
ing the powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin ; and 
an Imperial rescript directed to the premiers of Aus- 
tria and Hungaria. In these documents he proceeded, 
in spite of Servian and Montenegran interests, in spite 
of Russian prestige and of the fact that he was violat- 
ing a treaty signed by many governments, to annex 
the two provinces mentioned. 

The new^s went out to an unsuspecting world. None 
of the powers knew of the intention until after it had 
been consummated. Then, as in the incident which 
provoked the present war, English initiative, sup- 
ported by France, suggested that the concerted powers 
should act in some form yet to be determined in order 
to obtain from Austria and Servia a solution to the 
question. But Germany opposed. War between Aus- 
tria and Russia, precursory to a more general one, 
appeared on the point of breaking out; but as Rus- 
sia was not fully prepared the matter was arranged 
in the best manner possible, thanks to Sir Edward 



76 THE WORLD WAR 

Grey.* Nevertheless, in order to justify the present 
conflict and limit Austria's responsibilities, it is now 
being published that Russia knew Austria's intentions 
in 1908 and approved them; but subsequent events 
plainly disprove these tardy statements. As Joaquin 
de Bartoszewicz justly says in La Vie Politique dans 
les deux mondes (1909- 19 10), "At the time of the 
Turkish revolution of the twenty-fourth of July which 
changed the whole aspect of the old Balkan question, 
again on the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, 
and later on the annexation by Austria-Hungary of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia showed herself singu- 
larly reserved ; she was visibly impotent to dictate her 
point of view in these questions which nevertheless 
touched her so closely." 

Because of the death of Archduke Francis Ferdi- 
nand, Austria repeated her high-handed acts. She dealt 
with the small Balkan nations directly without the 
intervention of Europe, as if their existence and their 
line of conduct had not always been imposed by the 
great powers without any one disputing their right to 
do so. But this time Russia did not turn away her 
eyes. Instead, she admitted the appeal of the racial 
tie; Germany stood firm by her ally; France followed 
the road which both honor and interest pointed out; 
and the aged Emperor Francis Joseph known for his 



* Achille Viallate ; La vie politique dans les deux mondes, 
for the year 1908-1909, page 312. 



VARIOUS INTERESTS ENCOUNTERED ^^ 

aversion to war,* though freed now from the militar- 
istic domination of his nephew and heir, nevertheless 
prepared his own grave by opening many others. 



♦Demetrius C. Boulger; "The Emperor Who Made War/* 
North American Review, September, 1914, page 368. 




CHAPTER XII 

servia's aspirations and austria^s crime 

^T^HE tragedy of Sarajevo is well known. In com- 
•*■ pany with his wife, the ex-Countess Sophia 
Chotek, who had been elevated to the dignity of 
Princess of Hohenberg on her marriage, the Arch- 
duke Ferdinand was visiting that city when a young 
Servian, Gabrilo Princip, killed them both. Princep 
was driven to the act by a blind patriotism which made 
him see in the future heir to the Austro-Hungarian 
throne the embodiment of all the difficulties which 
beset his country in its unlimited ambition for ag- 
grandizement. 

The form in which the affair was carried out was 
sufficiently unique. As it was well known that the 
Archduke was going to be the object of an attack, 
that a plot had been made and men were ready to 
execute it, public opinion throughout Europe indicted 
the Austrian police. The first attempt was on the 
day of his arrival in Sarajevo; soon after occurred 
the second, and the royal pair were obliged to leave. 
It is said that the Archduke himself declined courting 

79 



8o THE WORLD WAR 

further danger but the poHce assured him there was 
nothing whatever to fear. 

Like many of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons, Fran- 
cis Ferdinand was a man without poise and easily- 
given over to violence. At court he was little liked, 
having imposed there a wife whom strict court eti- 
quette repudiated. Who can say what mysteries may 
not lie back of their tragic deaths ! And yet this was 
not the first time that an heir-apparent, or a political 
chief, or the head of a royal or imperial family, had 
lost his life by the homicidal bullet of a fanatic. While 
it would be unfair to attribute the responsibility to 
the Servian nation or government, it would be par- 
tial to consider the murder within the narrow limits 
of an individual action. It is evident that Gabrilo 
Princip was not actuated by the same motives as the 
starving Caserio who threw himself at President Car- 
not's coach ; or the poor distracted Lucchesi who killed 
the luckless Empress of this same Austria. To have 
reproached Italy with the deeds of these two Italian 
subjects would have been as unjust as to have blamed 
her for the audacity of William Oberdank when he 
tried to force the Julian Alps; nor did the respective 
governments concerned ever think of making such an 
accusation. But in the present case there can be no 
doubt that a Servian organization, permitted or toler- 
ated by that government, armed the young man and 
urged him to his terrible act without the least shud- 



SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS 8i 

der as to its effect on the excitable, almost hysterical, 
masses. Indeed there was a general and secret satis- 
faction shown at the death of the prince who was 
preparing the transformation of the dual monarchy 
into a triple by adding a Slavic kingdom to the Ger- 
manic and the Hungarian. Had Francis Ferdinand 
lived to accomplish this, it would have been the death- 
blow to that Servian aspiration, or to speak more ex- 
actly, ambition, which aimed to put Servia at the head 
of a Pan-Slavic Balkan movement; moreover it would 
have prevented all future Russian intervention in the 
name of the Slav race. To frustrate him was one of 
the objects of the Narodna Odbrana, a society deeply 
rooted in the hearts of the Servians, and to which 
Princip belonged. All the ardent patriots and heroes 
of the wars against Turkey and Bulgaria were mem- 
bers; and with much the same feeling that a cautious 
army looks to its intrepid vanguard, the Servian states- 
men who were aspiring to make their country an 
Adriatic power looked toward this society of fanatics. 
And yet the time when the Servian King Milan ran 
to the Emperor Francis Joseph to pay his debts was 
not very remote. Only with the assassination of King 
Alexander and Queen Draga in 1903 did the Servian 
Government definitely change its inclinations. First 
Austrophile, it soon began to debate between this and 
the Russian tendency. Under the influence of Pas- 
chitch, a Bulgarian by origin but prime minister of 



82 THE WORLD WAR 

Servia, it became completely Russophile, which, of 
course, meant completely anti-Austrian. 

Giving international relations their just values, it 
must be admitted that Servia got no benefits what- 
ever from the Austrian friendship. It was purely 
commercial, w^hile that with Russia was sentimental 
and racial.* To depend upon the former signified 
subjection; to be bound to the latter constituted de- 
fense. In the article cited, Dumba, the Austrian am- 
bassador to Washington when the war began, writes 
with much exactitude on the Servian agitation against 
Austria and what a troublesome little neighbor Servia 
was because of it; but when he comes to the Musco- 
vite predominance, so great, he says, that the Russian 
minister in Belgrade was almost a viceroy, he loses 
his equanimity and misses thereby the just estimate of 
Servians Russian tendency. He fails to see it as a 
policy which, ever since the tragic death of King 
Alexander, has been more in harmony with the in- 
terests of the nation. Neither Alexander nor his pre- 
decessor Milan represented the national policy of Ser- 
via. Vicious and of petty souls, they were far below 
the moral height of their nation which was saturating 
itself with the new spirit of civilization. The Austria 
to whom these monarchs turned was not a good guide 



* Constantin Theodor Dumba ; **Why Austria Is at War with 
Russia," in the North American Review, September, 1914, 
page 346. 



SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS 83 

for small nations, and had never brought happiness 
to those who depended on her or were in her sphere 
of influence. This the Servians knew only too well; 
they saw themselves restrained in all their expansionist 
desires, and left to content themselves with a reality 
that offered no hope; hence the change of policy on 
Alexander's death. 

Without believing that the Servian government was 
cognizant of the Sarajevo murders, or that it had 
armed the assassins, it is nevertheless true that the 
motive for the regrettable act can be found in the 
great patriotic agitation; and that this, justifiable or 
not, imperiled the neighborly relations of the two 
countries. 

In Austria it was believed absolutely that the attack 
had been prepared in Belgrade and that it was offi- 
cially inspired. All the press gave this version, and 
the unwarranted, or at least exaggerated, Austrian de- 
mand that Viennese officials should investigate the 
crime, shows how the belief had penetrated govern- 
ment circles. It cannot be supposed that here there 
was any preconceived idea of intervention, for the 
deed was unexpected ; nor can we admit the hypothesis 
that grief had so distracted the directing spirits of the 
nation that it drove them to proceed in an abnormal 
manner. That the Servian government was respon- 
sible for the crime is also the argument upheld in the 
German White Book. "The investigations begun by 



84 THE WORLD WAR 

the Austro-Hungarian authorities show that the plot to 
assassinate the Archduke, heir to the throne, was 
hatched, prepared, and matured in Belgrade; that per- 
sons in official positions cooperated, and that the weap- 
ons with which it was executed came from the state 
arsenals of Servia." * 

To thrash out the matter is not easy, but it is evi- 
dent that Austria, deeply moved by the Sarajevo 
crime and fully aware of Servia's continued hostility, 
wished to take advantage of the moment and destroy 
or at least humiliate the little frontier state. Nor must 
it be forgotten that in the brief period of six years 
Servia had provoked grave international troubles and 
was now provoking one of exceptional importance 
within Austria. It was in this belief and in this state 
of mind that the ultimatum was sent which brought on 
the war; but likewise it must be remembered that the 
war favored Austria^s interests. In the German 
White Book an illuminating confession is made with 
certain Saxon ingenuousness, namely: that the Ber- 
lin government knew Austria's intentions of making 
war on Servia and approved and encouraged them. 
The exact text is as follows : 

Given the circumstances Austria could not but decide 
that it was incompatible with her dignity and with the 



* Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany 
and Russia; official publication, page i. 



SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS 85 

preservation and stability of the monarchy to continue 
contemplating passively the happenings on the other side 
of her frontier. The Imperial and Royal Government 
informed us of this, her opinion, asking ours. 

With all sincerity we were able to declare to our ally 
that we agreed with her estimate of events, and to assure 
her that we would approve of whatever action she con- 
sidered necessary to put an end to the movement initiated 
in Servia against the stability of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy. On making this declaration we knew per- 
fectly well that a possible armed attack by Austria-Hun- 
gary on Servia was likely to provoke action on the part 
of Russia and involve us in a war. But recognizing that 
the vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake we 
could neither recommend a condescension incompatible 
with her dignity nor deny her our aid in such a difficult 
moment.* 

In this we see the explanation of the attitude as- 
sumed by the German Government regarding posterior 
events. It is a pity that the White Book does not 
publish the text of the notes exchanged between Ger- 
many and Austria. Who can say whether in them 
we might not encounter more than approbation to the 
Dual Monarchy, instigation even? The vindications 
of the White Book appear to suggest this by admit- 
ting that Servians attitude threatened not only Aus- 
tria but also Germany, which is tantamount to say- 



* Guglielmo Ferrero appears unaware of this part of the 
Official Memoir of Germany in his book, "La Guerra Europea." 
In such a careful writer the omission is strange. 



86 THE WORLD WAR 

ing: Our government had to defend itself in order 
not to perish caught in the meshes of a diplomacy at 
once subtle and dangerous ; we had to cut the Gordian 
knot and force Servia to abandon forever her aspira- 
tions of aggrandizement.* 

From documents published, from certain statements 
encountered in the English White Book, and from 
official declarations of the Italian Government and 
the general clamor of the Italian press, it appears that 
the third ally in the Triple Alliance was as much sur- 
prised by events as were the other powers. The Ger- 
man White Book reveals that within the Triple Al- 
liance there had been another, closer still, which did 
not extend to all the powers who had signed the pact; 
and the revelation, along with other official docu- 
ments at hand, justifies the neutrality immediately 
assumed by the kingdom of Italy. There can be no 
doubt that had Italy been previously consulted she 
would have advised greater prudence and would have 
sought a solution of the difficulty as she had done on 
other occasions, notably in 19 13. But Austria pre- 
ferred other advice; for having followed which she 
will certainly not go down in diplomatic annals as a 
model of perspicacity ; for, admitting all the extenuat- 



*The Austrian Red Book throws no light on the previous 
pourparlers between Germany and Austria which the German 
Memoir confesses. The very omission implies a confession — 
"excusatio non pertita accusatio manifesta." 



SERVIANS ASPIRATIONS ^7 

ing circumstances and justifications, admitting the 
troublesome attitude of Servia and the constant provo- 
cations she offered, the ultimatum which Austria sent 
her on July 23 was without doubt an egregious error 
and a deliberate incitement to war. 




CHAPTER XIII 

THE VIOLENT METHOD AND ITS RESULTS 

BISMARCK once wrote that "Even governments 
most inclined to sophism and violence do not 
wish openly to break their word; that is they try to 
keep it if predominating interests do not enter into 
play." He might have said more. He might have 
said that governments prefer always to execute the 
most violent and arbitrary actions under the cloak of 
a high moral duty or of a pressing national interest. 
But Austria did not even seek this cloak. Without 
the subtlety of international formalities or the suavity 
of diplomacy she bruskly faced Servia with a prob- 
lem, and in doing so committed one of the most au- 
dacious acts of modern times — audacious because it 
ignored the fact that Europe had been exercising con- 
tinuous tutelage over the Balkan States ; audacious be- 
cause it threw down the glove to Russia; and more 
than audacious because it disregarded Servians national 
rights by dictating over and above the political con- 
stitution of that country the fiat of Austria's sovereign 

89 



90 THE WORLD WAR 

will. However well prepared public opinion may have 
been, the Austrian note of July 23, 191 4, surprised 
the world. Only Germany remained tranquil, cog- 
nizant as was later revealed by her own confession, of 
what was about to develop. 

The note from the Imperial and Royal Government 
of Austria to the Royal Government of Servia de- 
manded within forty-eight hours an acceptance of the 
following exorbitant terms : 

First. To suppress every publication which excited 
hatred or disrespect for the Austro-Hungarian mon- 
archy and whose general tendency was against the 
national integrity of the same. 

Second. To immediately dissolve the society called 
Narodna Odbrana and every other of the same patri- 
otic tendency, and to prevent them from continuing 
under some other name or form. 

Third. To immediately eliminate from the public 
schools all men and text-books that might serve to 
foment the propaganda against Austro-Hungary. 

Fourth. To dismiss from military service and 
from the administration in general such officers and 
functionaries as the Austro-Hungarian Government 
should accuse of anti-Austrian propaganda. 

Fifth. To accept the collaboration in Servia of 
representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government 
in the suppression of the subversive movement di- 



THE VIOLENT METHOD 91 

rected against the territorial integrity of said Govern- 
ment. 

Sixth. To open a judicial investigation against the 
accessories to the plot which had as its consequence 
the assassination of the hereditary prince; in which 
investigation delegates of the Austro-Hungarian gov- 
ernment would take part. 

Seventh. To instantly condemn to prison Captain 
Voijac Tankositch and also Milan Ciganovitch, Ser- 
vian employees found compromised by the results of 
the magisterial inquiry already held in territory of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Sarajevo) against the 
authors of the crime of June 28. 

Eighth. To prevent by efficient means the partici- 
pation by Servian authorities in the illicit traffic of 
arms and explosives across the frontier and to dismiss 
and severely punish those functionaries on the Scha- 
batz and Loznica frontier who were guilty of having 
aided the perpetrators of the crime of Sarajevo by 
facilitating their passage across the same. 

Ninth. To give the Imperial and Royal Govern- 
ment explanations of the unjustifiable attitude of high 
Servian functionaries who in spite of their official 
position did not hesitate after the crime of Sarajevo 
to publicly express themselves both in Servia and 
abroad in a manner hostile to the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 



92 THE WORLD WAR 

Tenth. To report wtihin forty-eight hours the exe- 
cution of the preceding measures.* 

These clearly expressed demands were preceded by 
others of a general sort. After accusing the Servian 
government of culpable tolerance and declaring this 
to have been the cause of the crime of Sarajevo, it 
demanded that a declaration be published on the first 
page of the Official Gazette condemning not only Pan- 
Servian aspirations but also confessing that state func- 
tionaries had abetted the acts directed against Austria- 
Hungary. 

The foregoing note was delivered to Servia by the 
minister resident in Belgrade, and on the following 
day it was ordered that it should be communicated to 
the other governments with explanations of the rea- 
sons which the Dual Monarchy had for proceeding in 
such a manner. These explanations consisted in for- 
mulating an accusation against Servia for having 
failed in the obligation imposed upon her by the treaty 
of March 31, 1909, in which she recognized the rights 
of Austria-Hungary over Bosnia and Herezegovina, 
and committed herself to maintain neighborly rela- 
tions and to change her previous policy of protest and 
opposition. There was further talk of the attacks in 
Servian newspapers, of the plotting by Servian poli- 



* Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany 
and Russia. German official publication, page 22, et seq.; also 
English White Book, document number 4. 



THE VIOLENT METHOD 93 

ticians, and, it goes without saying, much talk of the 
benevolence and forbearance of the Imperial and Royal 
Government. This note to the European pov^ers ter- 
minated by stating that Austria-Hungary was con- 
vinced that the measures she had adopted would be in 
full accord with the sentiments of all civilized na- 
tions; and she offered for their inspection all the pro- 
bationary documentation of the Servian conspiracy 
and of its connection with the crime of June 28 which 
cost the hereditary prince his life. 

The impression which this note produced in the Ser- 
vian and other cabinets, especially the Russian to which 
it was sent with intentional delay, is easy to imagine. 
Putting aside the sentiment of grief naturally felt for 
the victims, and even condemning the attitude of Ser- 
via, it must nevertheless be admitted that the Austrian 
note outraged all the rights of an independent state 
and overstepped the limits of international law; fur- 
thermore, that its drastic form was in itself a provo- 
cation. For the purpose of avenging a crime or put- 
ting an end to a harmful state of things, armed inter- 
vention would have appeared more logical. Unfor- 
tunately for humanity international relations are not 
regulated by the famous Scales ; yet even violence has 
its limits. It is undeniable that in recent years we 
have witnessed the formation of colonial empires 
piratically seized, but it is nevertheless true that in 
such cases the pretext has been one of purely inter- 



94 iTHE WORLD WAR 

national order, since to secure the emoluments of a 
determined territory it was necessary to occupy it, as 
was done. Deplorable as it certainly is to admit such 
a procedure in the field of international interests, it is 
quite different from the case under consideration, 
where the internal laws of a constitutional European 
state were violated. With much exactitude could Sir 
Edward Grey exclaim in the note sent to Sir Maurice 
de Bunsen, English Ambassador in Vienna, on that 
same 24th of July : "Never before have I seen one state 
direct to another independent state a document of such 
formidable character." * 

Austria, in short, claimed governmental rights in 
Servia. Although limited as to form and time these 
signified nothing less than a concurrence in the ad- 
ministration of Servian justice. This virtually con- 
demns her; it destroys state sovereignty. 

On the arrival of the formidable note the effect in 
Servia was enormous. From the first moment the 
government knew what it meant and prepared to 
transfer the capital from Belgrade, which was too 
exposed, to Nisch. Paschitch, the Prime Minister, 
returned precipitously from an electoral trip, and the 
Austrian note received an answer which was tran- 
quil, serene, adjusted to the rights of nations, very 
conciliatory, and sufficiently submissive. 



* English White Book, correspondence respecting the Euro- 
pean crisis, page 9. 



THE VIOLENT METHOD 95 

It began by declaring that Servia had fulfilled her 
promises of 1909, that the protestations of former 
times had not been renewed, and that she had made 
great sacrifices in order to maintain the peace of Eu- 
rope at the cost of her own legitimate aspirations. She 
agreed in its totality to the amende honorable which 
Austria insisted should be published in the Official 
Gazette, but in that part where she had to regret the 
cooperation of Servian officials in anti-Austrian pro- 
paganda she desired to add the modifying words "ac- 
cording to the communication of the Imperial and 
Royal Austro-Hungarian Government." She de- 
clared herself ready to comply with all the points enu- 
merated, demanding definite proofs in individual 
cases; but she could not accept the fifth clause re- 
ferring to a judicial investigation by functionaries of 
that government; instead she answered submissively: 
"The Royal Government declares that it does not ex- 
actly understand the meaning and aim of this demand, 
by which it must bind itself to permit delegates of the 
Imperial and Royal Government to intervene in its 
dominions; but it is disposed to accept all cooperation 
in conformity with the principles of international law 
and criminal procedure, and of good neighborliness." * 

Servia evidently wished to avoid war. Even if the 



* Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany 
and Russia; official German publication, page 26, et seq.; also 
English White Book, document number 39. 



96 THE WORLD WAR 

body of the document did not so indicate the ending 
was irrefutable proof. To prevent the Austrian note 
from having the importance of an ultimatum, and 
the planting of a consequent casus belli in case Austria 
was not satisfied, Servia terminated with the following 
proposition: "The Royal Servian Government be- 
lieves that it is to the general interest not to precipitate 
the solution of this affair; for which reason should 
the Austro-Hungarian Government not be satisfied 
with this answer the Servian Government will be dis- 
posed to accept a pacific solution either by referring 
the decision of the question to the International Tribu- 
nal of The Hague, or by leaving it to the great powers 
who cooperated in the note of explanation given by 
the Servian Government in March, 18-31, 1909." * 

In normal times the most exacting government 
might have been appeased by this reply ; but the Vienna 
cabinet had not sufficient tranquillity or independence 
to choose the road it ought to follow. Some powerful 
cause, not yet completely known, launched Austria on 
a previously traced-out path of violence, and the note 
of July 23 was but a milestone. The Austro-Hun- 
garian Minister at Belgrade withdrew and diplomatic 
relations were severed. This, if not actually constitut- 
ing a state of war in itself (and Japan had to accept it 
as such on an analogous occasion in 1904) was a sure 



♦The two dates are of the two different calendars used, the 
one in Orthodox countries and the other in Western Europe. 



THE VIOLENT METHOD 97 

announcement of the proximity of war. And in fact 
in another few days the Danube was tinged with 
blood. 

Austria's note and her subsequent attitude were in- 
terpreted with great gravity by nations and statesmen. 
At last the pretext for a European war had been 
found. Many times had the conflict been provoked 
and many times avoided ; always reciprocal fear or the 
desire of the opposing parties for better preparation 
had changed the course of events. 

In the conduct of Austria-Hungary two extremes 
are to be noted : first, that she consulted with her ally 
Germany on the note of July 23; and second, that 
she hardly gave any news of it whatever to her other 
ally, Italy. This fact is symptomatic because it meant 
one of two things : either the Vienna government be- 
lieved from the very first moment that the conflict 
would be general and consequently serious and should 
therefore have warned those nations whom she ex- 
pected to aid her; or, she believed that it was merely 
a diplomatic question between two nations, or at most, 
a circumscribed casus belli, in which event her con- 
sulting Germany was completely unnecessary. Her 
doing so was in fact suspicious and appears even more 
so when we recall that the German White Book in- 
genuously confesses that Germany too felt herself 
threatened by the Slav attitude, that she feared it 
might weaken Austria-Hungary, and that she saw 



98 THE WORLD WAR 

with concern that it might open a breach in the Triple 
Alliance on that side. Germany makes it clearly un- 
derstood that Austria's conduct was dictated not only 
to protect the Dual Monarchy but also Germany's own 
interests. In fact, but little is lacking to make a full 
confession that the violent act of Austria was dictated 
by her. 

As we have already said Servia understood that 
Austria wanted either war or complete hegemony over 
her. Therefore, at the same time that she was giving 
the best explanations possible and try to adapt Austria's 
claims to the exigencies of her own sovereign rights — 
all of which meant to delay events — she began pre- 
paring her forces for defense and soliciting outside 
help as well. 

Mobilization was ordered at once. The archives 
and the public offices were transferred to Nish and 
the Skupshtina was convoked there. Paschitch ad- 
dressed the powers, imploring them to defend the inde- 
pendence of Servia and declaring "if war is inevitable 
let them make it." * His Royal Highness, the Prince 
Regent of Servia, addressed the Emperor of Rus- 
sia, telling him of the Austrian affair and the 
measures Servia was taking, and begging aid in the 
following terms : "At the expiration of the time con- 



* Russian Orange Book; communication of the Russian 
Charge d' Affaires in Belgrade to the Russian Minister of For- 
eign Affairs, document number i. 



THE VIOLENT METHOD 99 

ceded we may be attacked by the Austro-Hungarian 
army, already on our frontier. It is impossible for us 
to defend ourselves and we supplicate Your Majesty 
to send aid as soon as possible. Your Majesty's good 
will, so often manifested in our favor, gives us the 
firm hope that once more our appeal will be heard by 
the generous Slav heart. In these difficult moments I 
interpret the sentiments of the Servian people in im- 
ploring that Your Majesty may interest yourself in 
the fate of the Kingdom of Servia." * 

This tragic people had a presentiment of war; they 
looked back on successive subjugations, and now, with 
apprehension, they saw one more, perhaps the final. 
A new Kossovo, which battle did not favor valor and 
which delivered Servia for five centuries to Ottoman 
oppression, might deliver her for another five cen- 
turies to that of Austria. The promising work of 
national rehabilitation sung by the bards and paid for 
by the blood of her warriors was on the point of 
crumbling. The many dramas of the court would 
have no national objective. The last reconquest of the 
kingdom by the Karageorgeovitch line would be made 
void; the victories of General Putnic, barren; the 
economic and financial independence obtained by enor- 
mous sacrifices in the face of acquisitive Austria, 



* Russian Orange Book; telegram of July 24 from H.R.H. 
the Prince Regent of Servia to H.M. the Emperor, document 
number 6. 



100 THE WORLD WAR 

ephemeral; the Balkan League, product of the efforts 
of Paschitch, nothing but a dream. All would fall in 
one moment through an tinforseen and inexplicable 
event. How many times had the little kingdom taken 
a chance without meeting such sudden peril! Nor 
could her last hope be her own effort as it has been 
in remote times under Duscian, the ancient hero, or 
Kara George the modem martyr. The cannon would 
decide forever whether the Obrenovitch line calling 
on Austria, or the Karageorgevitch calling on Russia, 
had been most useful to Servia. 




CHAPTER XIV 

ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 

THAT the Servian incident would have grave con- 
sequences was plain to European opinion from 
the first. The press of the different countries fash- 
ioned its point of view according to the interests of 
its nation and undoubtedly received the mot d'ordre 
from its foreign minister. In France it assumed that 
tone of gravity the French are so fond of but which 
they never maintain very long. Le Temps on July 23 
and 24 was giving considerable space to the Caillaux 
trial and the English crisis brought about by Ulster* s 
resistance to Home Rule. In the issue of July 25 
(published the preceding evening) it took up the 
Austro-Hungarian threat and straightway declared 
that out of the ten stipulations there was one which 
Servia could not possibly accept without destroying 
her independence^ — the one admitting Austria* s inter- 
vention in judicial processes. On July 2y and 28, with 
fuller information, Le Temps attributed all the conse- 
quences of the difficult situation and all the blame, 

lOI 



I02 THE WORLD WAR 

should it lead to war, to Germany, since she could 
have avoided it with a single word in the ear of the 
Austrian cabinet.* 

Le Matin, in spite of its extensive news service, did 
not know the Austrian intention nor even the nervous 
state which preceded the tempest until July 24. Only 
on July 25 did she awaken and, echoing European 
opinion, she noted the sudden drop on the exchange, 
especially that of the French national debt to three 
per cent, the lowest in thirty-five years. The follow- 
ing day the same newspaper expressed its faith edi- 
torially in the news that the German foreign minister, 
Herr Von Jagow, and the German ambassador in 
Paris, Baron Von Schoen, had both solemnly declared 
that Austria did not consult Berlin as to the Servian 
note. Le Figaro, so absorbed at that moment in the 
Caillaux trial, foresaw war and called France to union. 
Even Le Gaulois, the reactionary sheet, exclaimed: 
"On the banks of the Seine and in all France there 
is one identical sentiment — that of a national respon- 
sibility which will rise to whatever height events may 
demand." In short, this was the tone of all the press 
small in circulation but large in political importance — 
Le Rappel, Le Radical, La Lanterne. In this class 
only UHumanite, Jaures* paper, was contrary to the 
common journalistic opinion. Popular newspapers of 



*L^ Temps, July 27, 1914; "L'Allemagne veut-elle la guerre?" 
The same, July 28 : "Du role de TAllemagne." 



ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 103 

big circulation joined in the general chorus. Le Petit 
Journal recalled another historic date on which Aus- 
tria provoked war with the same violence. "Today 
the cabinet of Vienna confronts Servia in precisely 
the same way and with the same self-justification as 
she did the Piedmont in 1859. That is to say, after 
breaking diplomatic relations on March 22, 1858, she 
concluded by sending to Turin on April 21, 1859, a 
peremptory order of disarmament within three days, 
and set forth the long and unexampled forbearance 
of which she had given proof during three years and 
in presence of repeated provocations. This is pre- 
cisely the attitude and language adopted to-day. But 
the same action of 1859 blasted all the hopes to which 
it had given birth. Europe rose with almost universal 
condemnation. Cavour rejected the ultimatum in the 
name of national dignity. Napoleon III did not hesi- 
tate to come to his side. Austria found a great power 
ready to fight with the adversary she had hoped to 
crush; and Austria, instead of triumphing, lost two 
provinces." 

This apt bit of history unearthed by the French 
newspaper had probably slipped the memory of Aus- 
trian statesmen. Certainly they had forgotten its sad 
lesson. 

In Russia public sentiment was even more roused. 
Internal troubles ceased as if by magic. Newspapers 
and public all understood that the shot aimed at Servia 



I04 THE WORLD WAR 

had struck full in the Russian breast. Instantly there 
were hostile manifestations against Austria, which 
had to be repressed. La Novoie Vremia, the official 
organ, exclaimed: "The Russian government clearly 
understands that the ultimatum is really directed to 
Russia, and Russia will answer not only with words 
but with deeds. Servia shall not stand alone. If 
Austria does not withdraw her ultimatum Russia will 
not be a mute witness of the violence committed. . . . 
We want peace, but if war is forced upon us official 
Russia and all the people will take part in it." The 
following day the same newspaper affirmed in concert 
with the French press that peace was in the hands of 
the German government and that she could easily pre- 
serve it. The Gazette de la Bourse, of Petrograd, de- 
clared that Russia in 19 14 was not the same as in 
1908. The reminder was very apropos because at that 
date the same sort of conduct on Austria's part humil- 
iated Russia and left her conquered without having 
fought a battle. Perhaps Austria herself, and Ger- 
many too, knew that she was not the same as in 1908, 
but preferred the Russia of 19 14 to that of 19 18. The 
Courrier went a little farther toward inflaming its 
readers: "The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum," it de- 
clared, "proves that Austria either wants war with 
Russia or else no longer considers Russia a great 
power." In another issue the same newspaper added 
that "the only answer worthy of Russia is the mo- 



ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 105 

bilization of her troops on the Austrian frontier." 
Statesmen, and in fact all functionaries, were no 
less agitated than the journalists. All classes felt the 
same. The Austrian blow had been deliberately aimed 
at Russia and the general belief was that Austria 
wished war or else their humiliation. On July 24 the 
cabinet met. Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
announced what had happened, and General Suchom- 
linoff. Minister of War, explained the situation of the 
army. Russia from the first moment considered the 
war a necessity. 

Of the nations composing the Triple Entente, Eng- 
land, as was to be expected from her character, was 
least excited. Those who once more accused perfidious 
Albion of having wished war at that moment be- 
cause all her alliances were prepared, ignore the great 
tranquillity displayed in the early moments by the 
public, the press, and the government. The Times, 
although surprised at the language used in the Aus- 
trian note, pronounced the form to be courteous; and 
admitting the moment to be difficult it exclaimed: 
"All who love peace must ardently desire that Aus- 
tria-Hungary has not said the last word in the note 
to which Servia must give answer this night." The 
Morning Post tried from the beginning to make the 
public see the importance of the event and to rouse 
it out of a general apathy which was incompatible 
with the world's alarm. "It is indispensable that the 



io6 THE WORLD WAR 

English people should be made to see how grave is 
the situation in Europe. At any moment war may 
break out and no one can say whether it will be pos- 
sible to localize it. There is a tendency here to con- 
sider that the fate of the Balkan States has no interest 
for this country, . . . Can England contemplate Eu- 
ropean questions with indifference and decline to take 
any responsibility, or must she decide to play the part 
which History has reserved for her? This is the 
problem we put without indicating the ansv/er. . . ." 
But the Morning Post's fears were not shared by other 
newspapers, nor by the Foreign Office, nor by Sir 
Edward Grey, in spite of his good intentions and 
great prudence. It is very certain that this sagacious 
minister was of those whom the Morning Post cen- 
sured for believing that Balkan affairs did not interest 
England. 

Let us now take up the countries of the Triple Alli- 
ance where, excepting Italy, opinion was just as grave 
but in a different direction. From the first moment 
Italy began to have doubts; the perplexities of the 
government in face of an unforeseen conjflict were 
reflected by the public. Certain conservative and 
clerical newspapers like the Corriere d'ltalia and the 
PoJ)olo Romano believed that Austria was not far in 
the wrong, and that the Servian attitude had been a 
continuous offense to the name of friendship; others, 
liberal or nationalist like the Messagero^ the Vittoria, 



ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 107 

and the Trihuna, considered the Austrian note im- 
moderate. In examining either judgment, it must be 
kept in mind that Italy was predisposed against Ser- 
via, whose exaggerated pretentions to expansion 
threatened Italy's Adriatic interests. Italy, and espe- 
cially before Austria aspired to be a naval power, al- 
ways looked upon the Adriatic as a lake, all her own. 
Had it not been the direct field of action of the glori- 
ous Venetian Republic whose ancient splendor was 
the dream of renascent Italy? Sentiment aside, the 
nearness of the opposite coast constituted a real peril, 
and Italy could not look with kindly eyes on Servians 
unconcealed efforts to widen her confines, particularly 
toward the sea. This she aspired to as a consequence 
of her victories over Turkey and Bulgaria; and this 
Italy along with Austria had evoked all her diplomacy 
to avoid. 

Public opinion in Berlin and Vienna, however, was 
almost unanimous in favor of the Austrian act. In 
Vienna it was apparent that the note had served to 
give satisfaction to an anxious public and in Berlin it 
was apparent that it had served German ends. In the 
joyous chorus of the press, the angry voice of certain 
newspapers crying in vigorous Teutonic fashion for 
war or the humiliation of Servia, was at first dis- 
cordant; but in proportion as events developed there 

appeared a uniform communis opinio influenced by, 
8 



io8 THE WORLD WAR 

and owing to, the counsel given by Wilhelmstrasse and 
the Ballplatz. 

The Neues Wiener Tagehlatt set forth this alterna- 
tive: "Either Servia must consent with good grace 
[sic] to renounce her dreams and the manner in which 
she tries to realize them, or we will oblige her to. We 
are determined to preserve the integrity of that which 
we already possess and not to separate ourselves from 
the sea through the ambition of a small neighbor. If 
Austria does not force the Pan- Servian ideal to abdi- 
cate, Austria herself will have to abdicate." 

The Fremdenhlatt reflecting entirely governmental 
opinion went even further than the Neues Wiener 
Tagehlatt; it suppressed half the dilemna, leaving only 
one of its horns — war. "War is an ugly word not 
easy to pronounce when one feels its full responsi- 
bility; but this time it is absolutely necessary. . . . 
We do not know whether at the last moment when 
our soldiers are ready to pass the frontier our neigh- 
bor will be more reasonable. War does not yet exist, 
but we are preparing for it. We have reached that 
point where there can be neither mediation nor arbi- 
tration. It is not a question of summoning our mortal 
enemies before a tribunal of justice, but of convincing 
them before the tribunal of history that they have no 
case ; that the future does not belong to the Pan- Serb 
ideal but to our monarchy and that it is not Pan- 
Serbism which is the stronger, but that spirit which 



ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 109 

for centuries has kept Austria-Hungary united." 
The words of the Fremdenhlatt are virtually those 
pronounced in Budapest by Count Tisza, Hungarian 
Prime Minister (whose cabinet it will be remembered 
had no responsibility in foreign affairs). Speaking 
before parliament the Count said: "No one can re- 
proach us with having sought war. I may say even 
more, that we went to the extreme limits of patience 
[loud cheers]. Convinced that our action is due to the 
vital interests of the Hungarian nation we are ready 
to face all the consequences." [Loud applause from 
all sides.] Count Andrassy, leader of the opposition, 
forgot those differences and even old rancors always 
so abundant in the turbulent Hungarian Chamber of 
Deputies, and insisted that the Servian attitude was 
intolerable and called upon Hungarians to unite and 
do their duty.* The Chamber, as in similar critical 
situations when resolutions are left to the executive 
body, suspended its sessions. 

Among all the Austrian newspapers only the social- 
ist organ, the Arheiter Zeitung^ was out of tune. In 
its issue of July 24 it declared that Austria was trying 
to take advantage of a weak neighbor, forcing her to 
rebel against unjust demands so as to later lay at her 
door all the responsibility of a war. 

As a consequence of newspaper propaganda and 



* Session of July 24, 1914, of the Hungarian Chamber ol 
Deputies. 



no THE WORLD WAR 

military preparation came the agitation in the street. 
In Vienna the masses began crying "Down with Ser- 
via y and ended with "Down with Russia" correlative 
terms in the subtle instinct of the masses. In front 
of the German Embassy they sang the Wacht am 
Rhein and other national songs, and sensed in the very 
act that the time had come to make good the grandiose 
pretentions of the ringing Teutonic hymns. 

In Berlin during the first moments the press had no 
fixed orientation but soon found one. For instance on 
July 24, the Vossische Zeitung, a liberal newspaper 
of great importance, on learning of the Austrian note, 
felt obliged to comment as follows : "It cannot be 
denied that every paragraph of this note is an attempt 
on the sovereign rights of the Servian state. We con- 
sider it very unlikely that Servia will submit to such 
conditions." But when on the following day it learned 
that Russia had asked for an extension of time in 
behalf of Servia (a petition which in normal circum- 
stances would not have been considered unfair espe- 
cially by the party who had pronounced Austria's 
claims beyond the limits of international law), the 
Zeitung expressed itself quite differently: "Yesterday 
brought us the gravest of news. Russia asks Austria 
to delay. Austria cannot accept a condition which 
would in any way permit Servia to take shelter be- 
hind a diplomatic wall." Than this a more patent 
contradiction could not exist. 



ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION iii 

Immediately after, the road was left free to those 
newspapers of well defined opinion, and hesitating ones 
like the Post or the Rhein and Westphalia Gazette were 
silenced. The matter passed into the hands of the 
military party so strong in Berlin, staunchly upheld 
by the whole army, and led by no less a person than 
the heir to the throne. When the Post, following the 
then general opinion to the effect that Germany had 
not been consulted on the note, said : "If advice con- 
cerning such a serious affair is not asked from an 
ally there is no reason to expect her aid," the Berliner 
Lokal Anzeiger, the official periodical, at once an- 
swered: "The German people feel better on seeing 
that finally the Balkan situation is to be cleared up** ; 
and further declared that Germany "congratulates her 
ally on the strong decision taken and will give her 
proof of fidelity and sympathy in the course of the 
grave hours which are probably to be passed through.** 
Identical are the sentiments of the popular Berliner 
Tageblatt: "The Austro-Hungarian note admits of 
no diplomatic negotiations. In spite of the desire of 
the whole civilized world to keep the peace it must be 
admitted that Austria could not act in any other man- 
ner. She may count on the aid of her allies/^ With 
even greater precision the principal ultra-conservative 
organ indicated to Austria that Germany would fight 
by her side : "The German people are ready to fulfill 
the duties to which their alliance binds them. It is 



112 :rHE WORLD WAR, 

well that it should be known abroad that Germany 
will not vacillate a single instant in deciding to march 
shoulder to shoulder with her Austrian ally." The 
Berliner Nachtrichten took its own view and setting 
aside all question of alliance came out on July 25 with 
the following philosophic observation: "If we must 
have a European war it is better for us that it should 
be this year and not 191 7. By that date, Russia would 
have terminated her military reform and France would 
have filled the gaps pointed out by Senator Humbert." 
This is a reference to the criticisms made by the 
French senator on the deficient military organization 
of his country; but the Prussian newspaper forgot 
that when he made them, the whole German press 
would not admit the gaps but alleged that it was 
merely a pretext to augment war preparations. 

More dangerous for the people were the semi-offi- 
cial communications proceeding now from some high 
military personage, now from some high civil em- 
ployee; and more exciting for them was the financial 
news. Influenced by one and the other the crowds 
filled the streets singing that hymn which embodies 
all their hopes — Deutschland uber Alles. 

Diplomacy did its work under the influence of pub- 
lic opinion somewhat as follows : Russia decidedly irri- 
tated; Austria ready for the worst; Germany pre- 
pared to defend her and make common cause with 
her; France aflame and serious; Italy taken by sur- 



ANTE-BELLUM PUBLIC OPINION 113 

prise and anxious not to be dragged for another's ad- 
vantage into a position contrary to her own national 
interest; England hoping to prevent the conflict and 
knowing that if it should break out she must depart 
consciously and voluntarily from her state of "splen- 
did isolation." Only a great collective effort, only 
the good will of all, could have prevented the war 
made so imminent by the Austrian note. But only 
in those who had least reason to be interested in a 
struggle between Germans and Slavs did the good will 
exist. 




CHAPTER XV 

EFFORTS OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS 

WHEN the war broke out the internal poHtical 
situation of the various countries was most 
pecuHar. Only Austria and Germany had no diffi- 
cult problems to solve. In England the Irish ques- 
tion was assuming alarming proportions; the last 
effort at a solution by means of a conference of lead- 
ers of the two parties had just failed.* The Ulster 
fight was about to recommence with greater violence 
than ever and no one could foresee the result. In 
France the Caillaux trial kept the public in such a 
ferment that not a few believed there would be a repe- 
tition of the difficult period of the Dreyfus case. In 
the course of history French sentimentality has fre- 
quently proven that small causes can take possession 
of the public mind and produce disproportionate ef- 
fects. 

In Russia, according to a German authority,! they 
were entering on a new period of strikes which threat- 
ened a repetition of the revolutionary agitations of 



* The London Times; July 25, 1914. 
i[ Berliner Nachtrichten; July 25, 1914. 

"5 



ii6 THE WORLD WAR 

1905 which, it will be recalled, led to bloodshed in the 
principal cities. In Italy they had not yet healed the 
wounds of violent labor troubles which took place 
chiefly in the turbulent Romagna ; and worse still rail- 
road employees were preparing a new strike which 
would shortly paralyze the commercial life of the 
kingdom. A writer of great psychologic insight, Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu, accuses Germany of having taken ad- 
vantage of these conditions so propitious to her plans. 
"In Russia," he says, "there were disorders which as 
usual were exaggerated abroad. Great Britain was in 
difficult circumstances because of the antagonism be- 
tween an Irish province largely Protestant and the 
other three largely Catholic. In France the major- 
ity in the Chamber of Deputies, made up of Socialists 
and united Radical- Socialists, though it was but a 
weak majority, appeared to foreign eyes to indicate a 
diminution of military tendencies and of the spirit of 
sacrifice. On the other hand Humbert's declarations 
in the Senate on supposed deficiencies in our arma- 
ment and in our general war preparation were inter- 
preted abroad with visible exaggeration as a sure in- 
dication of the weakness of our army. This conjunc- 
tion of facts appeared to furnish Prussia who had 
long been lying in ambush with the occasion so fer- 
vently desired." * 



*"La Guerre" in I'Econoniiste Frangais, August 3, 1914, 
page 202. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 117 

Besides all these perturbations there was another 
state of things unfavorable to a rapid military adven- 
ture. The President of the French Republic, Ray- 
mond Poincare, accompanied by the Prime Minister, 
Rene Viviani, was in Russia singing hymns to the 
alliance of the two nations. The Kaiser was off on 
one of his favorite maritime excursions. Ambassa- 
dors were away from their posts; at the Servian capi- 
tal the Russian ambassador had recently died and the 
French was ill. 

It is difficult to affirm with due impartiality that 
these convenient conditions induced Austria to deliver 
her blow against Servia. Up to the present we do 
not know the correspondence which Austria had with 
her plenipotentiaries. Time will undoubtedly reveal 
things which it would be venturesome to say to-day. 
But the internal political condition, especially of the 
nations composing the Triple Entente, is hardly a sure 
basis for assuming that Austria was taking advantage 
of their situation. For years past they had all been 
suffering these crises in their respective periods of 
transformation. England, before facing the difficul- 
ties of Home Rule, had experienced those no less seri- 
ous occasioned by fiscal measures ; in Russia there had 
been the terrorist agitations; in France the anti-mili- 
tarist disturbance, etc. 

In examining the diplomatic acts of the present bel- 
ligerents it is of the greatest importance to know how 



ii8 THE WORLD WAR, 

the Berlin government was consulted as to the famous 
Austrian note and how much influence it exercised. 
Everyone is now aware that the contents of the note 
were known and approved in Berlin. This explains 
Germany^s subsequent attitude when she was so little 
concerned over approaching events that she did not 
care to advise the Ballplatz cabinet, although sure that 
any prudent counsel given there would have found a 
favorable echo. That Berlin knew what Austria was 
about to do and the seriousness of its consequences 
there can be no doubt, for Germany has publicly con- 
fessed as much in the paragraph of the official memoir 
to which we have already alluded. The advice to pro- 
ceed violently against Servia was consciously given. 
"On making this declaration we knew perfectly that 
a possible armed action by Austria-Hungary against 
Servia would provoke intervention on the part of Rus- 
sia and involve us in a war." * 

Nor can it be doubted from the language of the offi- 
cial publication just referred to that it was the Ger- 
man government and not the Kaiser who was con- 
sulted ; and we can only suppose that the statements of 
Von Jagow, German Foreign Minister in Paris, and 
Von Schoen, German Ambassador, in which they af- 
firmed, July 25, that they did not know the Austrian 



* Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany 
and Russia, official publication, page 5. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 119 

note* were due to Germany's not wanting it to be 
understood that the incident had been especially ar- 
ranged in order to provoke a war. Judging from the 
view upheld by German diplomacy during the brief 
negotiations that lasted until August i, Germany 
wanted the world to believe that she was trying to 
reduce the importance of the question and to localize 
the conflict between Austria and Servia. The plea 
of localizing the war could hardly have been defended 
had it been known that Austria, fully aware of the 
importance of the case, had previously consulted her 
ally; and much less if in those early moments the true 
attitude of the German Empire and the proportions 
which it expected the conflict to assume had been 
known. How serious Germany considered it was later 
defined in the following oflicial words : 

"If Servia had been permitted any longer to en- 
danger the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- 
archy with the aid of Russia and France, the conse- 
quence would have been the gradual destruction of 
Austria and the bringing of the whole Slav race under 
the sceptre of Russia; and Russia in turn would have 
made untenable the position of the Germanic race in 
the center of Europe." f 

It is to be supposed that identical reasons induced 



* Le Matin, July 26, 1914. 

t Memoir and documents relating to the war between Germany 
and Russia, official publication, page 5. 



I20 THE WORLD WAR 

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, 
to declare to Sir Edward Grey that "the German 
Government had not been informed of the text of the 
Austrian note." * In this case the false statement 
takes on greater importance because it has a completely 
official character. 

Dr. E. J. Dillon affirms that the Kaiser had in his 
hands the draft of the note and after reading it made 
suggestions emphasizing its severity, which sugges- 
tions were accepted by Austria, f This well-known 
publicist was representing the Daily Telegraph on the 
Continent during the crisis; his reliability in giving 
news is well known and he asserts that he did not 
merely suppose or deduce the foregoing, but that he 
knew it to be a fact. 

German intervention, whether to the extreme of 
counselling Austria to intensify the note, as Dr. Dil- 
lon affirms, or whether only to the point of consider- 
ing the matter her own, as the German government 
admits in the official publication, can be explained by 
the disturbed equilibrium of Oriental Europe resulting 
from the last Balkan War. Germany, as described, 
had made great efforts to attract Turkey within her 
sphere of influence. All the splendid work of Von 
Marschall during long years, all the military labors of 



* Russian Orange Book, document number 20. 
fDr. E. J. Dillon; "Causes of the European War," in The 
Contemporary Review, September, 1914, page 319. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 121 

German tacticians including Von der Goltz, had had 
for result the double defeat of Turkey in Africa by 
Italy and in Europe by the Balkan League. The bal- 
ance against increasing Russian force which Germany 
had sought in an entente with Turkey was neutralized 
by the latter' s decrease in territory, especially as she 
was left with only one foot in Europe; and among 
other causes was the growth of the Servian military 
spirit and the powerful French influence in Greece, 
which overcame even the desires of the king of that 
nation. The European balance having thus inclined 
towards the Triple Entente, it was necessary to raise 
the stock of the Triple Alliance — to reestablish the 
equilibrium, if not the supremacy. 

German diplomacy has never been addicted to tran- 
quil preparations and insidious occupation of new 
positions. On the contrary she has always been the 
nation of hard blows, violent threats, and brusk move- 
ments. Nations, like individuals, follow their favorite 
tactics. 

After the establishment of the new Servian mon- 
archy the relations of the Russian minister in Belgrade 
were of the most intimate (we have already mentioned 
that the Austrian ex-Minister Dumba compared him to 
a viceroy) . When the Austrian note arrived, the post 
being vacant through the death of the last incumbent, 
Strandtman was at the head of the Russian Legation. 
On the 23rd he communicated to the minister of for- 



122 THE WORLD WAR 

eign affairs at Petrograd that Patchou, Servian Min- 
ister of State, had in the absence of Pachitch ac- 
quainted him with the contents of the Austrian note 
received at six o'clock that same afternoon. Servia, 
he said, would not yield to Austria's demands and ap- 
pealed through him for Russia's aid.* 

Servia had conjectured aright in expecting the aid 
of the great Slavic nation. The appeal of the Prince 
Regent found an echo in the heart of the Czar and 
that of Patchou in the heart of Sazonoff. There was 
to be no repetition of 1908 when Russia, helpless, had 
to witness Servia's humiliation and the ruin of her 
own prestige. 

Sazonoff immediately communicated with the 
charge d'affaires in Vienna (the ambassador being tem- 
porarily absent) and asked him to solicit more time in 
which to consider the ultimatum, so that the powers to 
whom it had been sent might, if they deemed wise, 
counsel Servia to accept at least some of Austria's de- 
mands, f At the same time the governments of Eng- 
land, J France, Italy and Servia were informed that 
this petition had been made. While making every 
effort to obtain the postponement Russia did not hide 
the gravity of the situation. The ministers were as- 
sembled and an official communique was given out to 



* Russian Orange Book, documents i and 6. 
f Russian Orange Book, document number 4. 
% English White Book, document number 13. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 123 

show the concern of the Czar's government, and fur- 
ther, that an Austro-Servian clash would not find it 
indifferent.* 

The extension of the forty-eight hours granted to 
Servia in which to answer appeared necessary even to 
less interested nations; that is, if a peaceful solution 
was to be found. Naturally neither Russia nor the 
other powers pretended to wish such extension out of 
a simple desire to satisfy Austria's demands a few 
hours later ; but neither did they ask it for the purpose 
of stealing a march on her and accelerating their own 
preparations. It would be as unjust to suspect this 
second malicious intent as it would be ingenuous to 
believe in the first. 

What all sincerely desired was a more adequate 
term for studying the serious and fulminating Euro- 
pean situation. Russia did not wish the humiliation 
of Servia. Perhaps she wished it even less than Ser- 
via herself, for while the latter would have to submit 
because of the military disparity between herself and 
Austria, Russia could not advance the same reason 
without abdicating her post as a great power; the be- 
littling of Servia would be that of Russia. Russia 
nevertheless made every effort to find a way out of 
the difficulty just as any nation would do on finding 
herself unexpectedly involved. Even the most ag- 



^ Le Temps, July 25, 1914; also Russian Orange Book, 
document number 10. 
9 



124 THE WORLD WAR 

gressive state, like the most aggressive man, prefers 
to select his own moment for combat. 

Sir Edward Grey was of the same opinion as Sazo- 
noff regarding the impossibility of an instantaneous 
solution; more than this; on July 23, when he first 
learned from the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in 
London that such a note was to be sent and that it 
would demand an answer in forty-eight hours, he re- 
marked that it was practically an ultimatum.* That 
such an ultimatum was out of reason and without po- 
litical antecedent is evident for if Austria had believed 
it necessary to send a copy of the note to other powers, 
and if these had always intervened in Balkan affairs 
and had exercised over those states a collective pro- 
tectorate, it was only just that the respective govern- 
ments who received the copy should have time to study 
it in order to answer and take action. Nor should it 
be forgotten that Austria, to her own interest and 
with but scant courtesy, delayed in sending the text 
of the note to Petrograd, so that this government 
had not even forty-eight but only thirty-one hours for 
deliberation. t Thus while England from the first was 
given to understand through the German and the Aus- 
trian ambassadors how grave was the situation (this 
with the hope, as will presently be shown, that Ger- 
many might make sure of England's non-participation) 



* English White Book, document number 2. 
■tE. J. Dillon; article cited, page 462. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 125 

Russia, whose preponderating influence in Servian 
affairs was well known, was kept in darkness. 

Sir Edward Grey on insisting on more time made a 
suggestion that might have led to a solution, namely: 
the mediation of England, France, Germany, and 
Italy.* But Germany in answering this put the mat- 
ter on other grounds. "It is impossible to summon 
our ally in her conflict with Servia before a European 
tribunal ;" and the chancellor in a telegram to the Ger- 
man ambassador in London expressed himself to the 
effect that Germany desired above all to localize the 
conflict ; that Austria must be given a free hand against 
Servia, that Russia must not commit any act of hos- 
tility against Austria nor even partly mobilize her 
troops, for if she did so Germany would not abandon 
her ally. Such words could only mean a European 
war. This evidently was desired, for no solution was 
forthcoming and the matter remained enclosed in a 
circle of iron. There was but one way out — ^the 
lamentable one finally resorted to. 

Later Germany tried to twist Sir Edward Grey*s 
suggestion into an entirely different meaning, and 
offered to accept mediation in case of an Austro-Rus- 
sian conflict but not an Austro-Servian. This dis- 
tinction was never intended by Grey and logically could 
not be made, for Russia had no disagreement with 



* English White Book, documents lo and ii; also German 
White Book, documents 12 and 13. 



126 THE WORLD WAR 

Austria other than that which rose out of Austria's 
with Servia. To settle one without the other was 
impossible, and however great and clever the resources 
of diplomacy, to give affairs this turn was a jest 
shorn of all mirth. Sir Edward Grey had shown from 
the first that while the Austro-Servian conflict did not 
interest him its far-reaching consequences did; there- 
fore he would be obliged to weigh carefully. This 
was about the same as saying that if the rest were 
content with what Austria was doing with Servia, 
England, having no direct Balkan interests, would be 
silent ; but if any of the great powers intervened, Eng- 
land too would enter into the fray. 

And the fact is that this same minister, even after 
the forty-eight hours had expired, asked that military 
operations be delayed in order to give time for a 
settlement. This he did on the ground of the Aus- 
trian ambassador's statement that the ultimatum and 
the withdrawal of the Austrian plenipotentiary from 
Belgrade did not signify war. 

The two ways of understanding the conflict were, 
then, face to face. On the one side, Germany and 
Austria wished to localize the combat in order that 
Austria might more easily hurl herself against Servia 
with detriment to Russia and to the countries of the 
Entente in general, after which the Balkan States might 
once more be made into a prop for the Triple Alliance 
instead of the danger they then were. On the oth^i; 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 127 

hand, the Entente, and along with them one of the 
Triple Alliance, Italy, who had been taken by sur- 
prise, wished to have more time in order to find the 
as yet unknown solution. These made every effort to 
obtain from Germany the desired extension of the 
forty-eight hour limit, and did their best to prevent a 
declaration of war and to urge the acceptance of 
mediation. But the prompt declaration of war which 
followed Austria's ultimatum to Servia put an end 
to all possible solution. The die was cast. So Russia 
understood it, and so Germany, and the remaining steps 
consisted merely in maintaining the customary good 
form incident to such occasions, and disavowing the 
more direct responsibilities of the approaching catas- 
trophe. 

Germany showed that she was ready to accept medi- 
ation between Austria and Russia in order to localize 
the war; and when war was declared she admitted 
that certain claims in the Austrian note, on which 
by her own confession she had been consulted, could 
not easily be accepted by Servia.* Russia on her side 
had no doubts as to her conduct. The mobilization 
already ordered in Austria was a sure sign of immedi- 
ate war. The telegrams between the two Emperors 
were of no avail; deeds weighed more than words. 

There has been much discussion as to who mobilized 



* English White Book, document number 46. 



128 THE WORLD WAR 

first. In reality this has no importance since the mo- 
bilization was the consequence of diplomatic attitude 
in the respective countries. Russia more than all con- 
sidered that she must accept war as due to her prestige, 
even though she did not want it and was not pre- 
pared, as later events have well demonstrated. Dur- 
ing the course of negotiations Sazonoff understood, 
just as it was understood in Rome, Paris and London, 
that their fate lay in the hands of Berlin. If in that 
city peace was wanted, peace would be maintained. 
If not, the European conflagration would burst forth 
in all its frightfulness. Sazonoff on July 28, the day 
that Austria declared war on Servia, lamented to the 
Russian ambassador in London that Berlin had not 
taken a definite stand at the very beginning of the 
crisis;* and later in the same day he pointed out to 
the same ambassador the need of England^s appealing 
to Austria not to crush Servia and thus make pacific 
solution impossible.! Even after the declaration of 
war he kept urging all the ambassadors to appeal to 
their various governments, and this he continued to 
do in spite of the communication received from the 
Russian ambassador in Vienna to the effect that the 
government of the Dual Monarchy was not inclined to 



* English White Book, document number 54. Russian Orange 
Book, document number 43. 
1[ Russian Orange Book, document number 48. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 129 

exchange ideas direct with the Imperial Russian 
Government. 

It is certain that the German government echoed 
Sazonoff's good intentions but more than intentions 
they never were, since no practical solution had any 
chance of acceptance from her. The German theory 
was to give Austria a free hand against Servia, to 
prevent Russia's acting to save her Balkan prestige 
(the loss of which meant the loss of her European 
prestige) ; and, this accomplished, to show her great 
affection afterwards. Evidence against Berlin may 
be seen in the fact that Servia's sufficiently conciliatory 
answer to Austria was not published on July 28 by a 
single news agency or newspaper throughout the Ger- 
man Confederation; obviously because it would have 
diminished the bellicose humor of the masses. In 
this, Germany followed her old system of 1870 — ^to 
exacerbate the people into ready and enthusiastic 
soldiers. 

On July 29 the future belligerents knew that they 
would meet in combat. Russia notified France, and 
Germany notified Russia.* The latter, making a su- 
preme effort at the last moment sent the following to 
Berlin: *Tf Austria, now recognizing that the Aus- 
tro- Servian question has assumed the character of a 
European question, will declare herself ready to elim- 



* Russian Orange Book, document number 58. 



I30 THE WORLD WAR 

inate from her ultimatum those points which consti- 
tute an infringement on the sovereign rights of 
Servia, Russia will cease her military preparations." 
But Germany declared this proposition unacceptable 
without even consulting Austria.* Gabriel Hanotaux, 
French ex-minister of foreign affairs, has declared 
that Austria was ready to accept this Russian offer. 
"I am in a position to affirm," he said, "and will fur- 
nish proof should it not be encountered in the forth- 
coming French Yellow Book whose publication is impa- 
tiently awaited, that Austria-Hungary, perhaps seized 
with vacillations in presence of events whose terrible 
consequences she began to foresee, announced herself 
ready to adhere to the Russian initiative which would 
present an honorable way out for all." f Later, in his 
Histoire de la Guerre, Hanotaux again insisted that 
at the last moment, after Germany had declared war 
on Russia, the Austrian government tried through 
Berchtold to avoid the stupendous climax. However 
in this book the celebrated author is less positive than 
in the Figaro article previously cited. The foregoing 
should be considered in conjunction with Pierre Ber- 
trand^s affirmation that the current opinion as to Aus- 
tria's having repented at the last moment was a fiction 
pure and simple. Austria, he says, never thought of 



* Russian Orange Book, documents 60 and 63. 
fG. Hanotaux; "Les responsabilites allemandes," in Le Ft- 
g^roj September 26, 1914. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 131 

taking such a step and never recanted in the least.* 
Sazonoff again modified his compromise in order to 
make it more acceptable but in Berlin the foreign min- 
ister broke off conversations with the Russian ambas- 
sador. This happened July 30, and the following day 
Sazonoff told Sir Edward Grey that the only solution 
could be found in London. f 

But there was no longer a way out. 
Germany, who had not wished to duly deliberate 
with Austria, wished on the other hand to forestall 
Russia's action and make impossible the conduct the 
latter was bound to follow. Germany pretended to 
see an aggression in what was merely the natural con- 
sequence of multiple contributory causes; she believed 
herself attacked because Russia was preparing; she 
investigated the Russian mobilization but would not 
admit that she herself was preparing with greater 
intelligence and eagerness, and certainly with greater 
efficacy; for, considering the careful organization of 
her army, her proclamation of a state of war was 
more practically effective than the Russian order of 
mobilization. $ With Teutonic violence she hurled at 
Russia a sort of ultimatum demanding the suspension 
of all military activity within twelve hours ;§ and at 



* Pierre Bertrand ; "L'Autriche a voulu la grande guerre/ 
Paris, 1916. 
f Russian Orange Book, document number 63. 
t German White Book, addition number 11. 
§ German White Book, addition number 24. 



132 THE WORLD WAR 

the same time sent a declaration of war to Petrograd 
to be delivered in case this demand was not complied 
with by five o'clock on the afternoon of the first of 
August. This declaration was presented and the state 
of war began. 

In connection with this declaration of war a curious 
and extremely significant anecdote is published by 
Tomaso Tittoni who, as former Italian ambassador in 
Paris and also former foreign minister, had every 
opportunity of knowing both great international ques- 
tions and small diplomatic incidents. According to 
him. Count Pourtales, German ambassador in Petro- 
grad, after pronouncing the fateful words to Russia in 
the person of Sazonoff, laid on the latter' s table the 
written declaration, as is usual in such circumstances. 
On his withdrawal the Russian minister of war picked 
up the terrible instrument which was to be the death 
warrant of so many thousands of human beings, and 
found to his surprise that it contained nothing but 
friendly words. It conveyed, in fact, Berlin's thanks 
to Russia for having acceded to her demands. While 
Sazonoff was still staring in amazement Pourtales re- 
turned to explain that he had made an error, and sub- 
stituted the written formal declaration of war for 
the paper Sazonoff was reading.''' 

Evidently the Berlin cabinet had provided against 
every eventuality. Either submission or defiance on 



* T. Tittoni ; "Nuova Antologia," Rome, September i6, 1916. 



EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS 133 

Russia's part had been prepared for ; but the excessively 
cautious German cabinet had not counted on the am- 
bassador's carrying the double correspondence in his 
pocket when he made his final visit to Sazonoff. 

It is strange that Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of 
the German Empire, a statesman esteemed for the rec- 
titude of his aims and for his broad and clear mind 
opposed to all Chauvinism, a sound pacifist in the 
sense that he realized how the benefits of peace were 
vivifying the spirit of the nation — it is strange that 
he should be the one called upon to accept what the 
German document calls the challenge of Russia. Beth- 
mann-Hollweg declared the war and on doing so all 
the constructive work of forty years crumbled. 

History makes some unconscious revelations. 
Among them it is to be noted that in this incident 
which appeared to be provoked by Austria, the first 
of the great powers to send a declaration of war to 
another great power was Germany. 

How surely do internal and hidden forces work up 
to the surface! 



A 



CHAPTER XVI 



THE GENERAL CONFLICT 



THE general conflict was initiated as we have 
seen by Germany's declaration of war on Rus- 
sia, preceded by an ultimatum sent suddenly and 
at the very moment when hopes of peace had 
been renewed. Germany, attacking Russia, could 
no longer talk of localizing the quarrel, and this the- 
ory upheld by her in the case of Servia and disputed 
by Russia in the diplomatic field, was trampled under 
foot by her own acts. She knew the treaty obliga- 
tions which bound France to Russia; therefore she 
knew that the war would be general. Once started, 
she had to anticipate events for it would have been 
bad policy to await them. Germany's attitude toward 
France, then, was logical, considering the first bad 
step taken, and as the theorists of the early nineteenth 
century would have said, it was in the natural order 
of events. 

France proceeded with tact during the negotiations, 
and on hearing the trend of the Wilhelmstrasse govem- 

135 



136 THE WORLD WAR 

ment counseled the greatest prudence. In unison with 
England and Italy she made every effort to maintain 
peace. Wounded by the humiliation of forty-odd 
years France wanted war whenever it was spoken of 
in the abstract or whenever patriotic hymns and 
speeches revived her past grief; but whenever danger 
presented itself she preferred peace and strove for it. 
Alsace and Lorraine, separated from the nation, were 
a constant call to war; Sedan and Metz were two in- 
sults which constantly cried for satisfaction; but so 
greatly had the French people prospered without Alsace 
and Lorraine, and so vigorously had they conquered a 
place in the industrial and financial world that, 
though they had not forgotten, an intense desire for 
peace animated them all. To the military and 
aristocratic regime of monarchical, especially Napol- 
eonic, days, had succeeded the regime of the great 
middle class. Its small tradesmen, manufacturers, ag- 
riculturists, and modest financiers all enjoyed greater 
well-being in France than in other countries. Of a 
peaceful nature, little inclined for adventure, desirous 
of glory when not fraught with danger, fond of their 
own wealth, they asked only that their well-being be 
indefinitely prolonged. The upper classes, the high 
financiers and men of big business, had followed the 
middle class in these pacifist tendencies. Four decades 
of economic prosperity had wrought a change in French 
opinion, had wrested the directing of it from the aris- 



THE GENERAL CONFLICT 137 

tocratic class who found glory in the arts of war, and 
given it to business men who found in peaceful pur- 
suits the only means of augmenting the national wel- 
fare. Along these lines, and in the interest of blissful 
tranquillity, the possessors of great fortunes had be- 
come pacifists outwardly and socialist-radicals in- 
wardly. It is only in this way that one can explain 
the long-enduring patience of so many French cabi- 
nets in face of German irritations and provocations, 
as well as the course recently followed in face of the 
questions brought up by the Austro- Servian note. 

Germany for a moment endeavored to rob the alli- 
ance which bound France to Russia of its fruit. By 
trying to force the former into a dispute with the 
latter, she hoped that French advice would not be 
followed and the nation thereby absolved from keep- 
ing the Russian compact. That is what Iswolsky, 
Russian Ambassador in Paris, heard on hastening 
back from his interrupted vacation. He got it from 
the lips of Bienvenu Martin, minister of justice, and 
also ad interim minister of foreign affairs. Martin 
had seen through the plan and communicated his 
analysis of it to Petrograd.* This circumstance dis- 
proves Baron Von Schoen's pretension that France 
suffered herself to be led into common cause with 
Germany; on the contrary, in all the preliminary dip- 
lomatic proceedings, and these, beyond all question, 



* Russian Orange Book, document number 35. 



138 THE WORLD WAR 

focused on a casus helli, she removed the only pre- 
text she could possibly have had for breaking the 
alliance, and decided to unite herself to Russia should 
the bellic moment arrive. This was confirmed to 
Iswolsky by Premier Viviani the very day he re- 
turned to Paris: and in order that Germany might 
have no illusions on the subject it was also confirmed 
to Von Schoen. In Petrograd the French ambassador 
was saying the same, but even more precisely, for 
his words to Sazonoff were that Russia could count 
on the armed aid of her ally.* 

This solidarity had to be. The two countries were 
united by such strict treaty, by so many necessities of 
defense (involving no few monetary sacrifices for the 
one on the part of the other) that to separate in this 
trying moment would have been suicidal. Moreover, 
mere circumstance had just prepared them for closer 
union than ever. Had not the President of the Re- 
public, Raymond Poincare, and the Premier, Rene 
Viviani, just returned from Russia with all the flat- 
tering speeches pronounced, all the kindnesses received, 
all the promises of mutual help and reciprocal de- 
fense, fresh in their memory? On this visit both 
governments saw that they must make their contracts 
clear, especially with regard to the grave Oriental 
question — a precaution more or less necessary because 



* Russian Orange Book, document number 55; also French 
Yellow Book, document number loi. 



THE GENERAL CONFLICT 139 

in preceding years doubts had arisen in France as to 
her part. She had not always sustained her ally, 
alleging that she had her own interests in Oriental 
Europe and that these were contrary to Russia's. For 
this reason Viviani and Sazonoff, acting in their re- 
spective capacities, gave out on the 24th of July an 
official communication both clear and to the point: 
"The visit just paid by the President of the French 
Republic to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia has 
offered an occasion when both governments, friends 
and allies, could satisfy themselves as to the identity of 
their views on various problems arising from a mutual 
solicitude for the general peace and the balance of 
power in Europe, especially Eastern Europe." * 

In spite of these specific matters, as well as the 
treaty of the Double Alliance, being known to Ger- 
many, she made a last effort before the French Gov- 
ernment on the day she declared war on Russia; she 
charged her ambassador to ask France's intentions; 
and he, having done so, was able to report that very 
same day, August i, that France would follow her 
ally. The answer was laconic and left no room for 
doubt. Baron Von Schoen gave it as follows in a 
telegram to his government: "On my inquiring di- 
rectly and repeatedly whether France would remain 
neutral in case of war between Germany and Russia 
the premier declared to me that France would act in 



* Le Temps, Paris, July 25, 1914. 
10 



I40 THE WORLD WAR 

accordance with her interests/'* On the arrival of 
this telegram in Berlin war on France was decided 
upon, and the postponing of the declaration until Au- 
gust 3 was probably due to the fact that neither of 
the two parties, either because of international agree- 
ments or because of certain moral formalities, cared 
to be the first to make it. And so the two ambassa- 
dors, Jules Cambon in Berlin and Baron Von Schoen 
in Paris, kept up their visits to the ministers of foreign 
affairs. t But Germany had already decided to begin 
immediate war not only on the western front, as said 
above, but also on the eastern. 

On August I the French cabinet took counsel, 
President Poincare presiding and General Joffre be- 
ing present. Mobilization had already begun, and the 
necessary economic measures for carrying on a war 
were arranged. Germany too was mobilizing, and on 
two frontiers; and the Kaiser was announcing to his 
people that he was unsheathing his sword "to fight 
an enemy who has been hemming us in while we were 
living peacefully in every sense of the word." 

On August 2 Germany violated the first treaty — 
that which guaranteed the neutrality of Luxemburg as 
signed in London in 1867. Against the protests of the 
government of the Grand Duchy she penetrated into 



* German White Book; also French Yellow Book, docu- 
ment number 125. 

tPaul Leroy Beaulieu; "La Guerre," in UEconomiste Fran- 
gats. 



THE GENERAL CONFLICT 141 

it with armored trains. More than that, she pene- 
trated that same day into French territory at various 
points although there had not been any declaration 
of hostilities. Yet the following day it was Von Schoen 
who entered a protest that the French had violated 
German soil, an allegation which the French premier 
denied most emphatically. However, these frontier 
incidents to which great importance was given at the 
moment have little bearing on the real case. The 
outstanding fact is that Germany prepared the more 
rapidly and that the violation of Luxemburg suited 
her plans, as stated by the ministers of the Duchy 
who certainly had no partiality for the French. But 
let it be repeated, these discussions are prolix now 
that we can look back upon the whole series of events. 
As soon as war was declared against Russia it was 
evident that France intended to aid her ally and thus 
make it necessary for Germany to fight on two fron- 
tiers. Further accuracy in war-time, and in comment- 
ing on a modern country which admitted the medieval 
axiom that "necessity knows no law," would be 
superfluous. Germany^s advantage lay in rapid action ; 
she was following the same hypothetic plans as in 
1870 when she assumed an attack on two frontiers, 
to wit: rush upon France and obtain a prompt and 
decisive victory and then turn her forces on the other 
enemy. Germany's every manoeuvre on the French 
border responded to her urgent necessities, and the 



142 THE WORLD WAR 

delay in declaring war on her ancient adversary can 
be explained only by her wish not to appear too ag- 
gressive in the eyes of England, whose neutrality she 
still hoped for, and of Italy, whose aid she counted 
on as almost certain. 

On August 3, Von Schoen, having first packed up 
all the effects of the embassy, repaired somewhat osten- 
tatiously to the Quai d'Orsay at 5.45 in the afternoon, 
and declared war; and the French nation knew that 
the hour of the great duel had sounded, and that vic- 
tory was a peremptory necessity. 

That France was forced to war at a moment when 
she was striving desperately to maintain peace is un- 
deniable. Until the very moment when the discon- 
certed Von Schoen, without cause and without ani- 
mosity, delivered the challenge, she had acted as if 
doubting that the storm would really burst. With 
much exactitude Bienvenu Martin could say that 
"neither act, appearance, nor word other than pacific 
and conciliatory could be imputed to France/'* And 
with no less truth, or at least with certain right inas- 
much as the cabinet then in power was concerned, could 
Rene Viviani, the premier, say in the same session: 
"Germany has nothing to reproach us with. In the 
interests of peace we have made a sacrifice without 
precedent, for throughout half a century we have si- 



* Session of the Senate of the French Republic, August 4, 1914. 



THE GENERAL CONFLICT 143 

lently borne the wound in our breast which she laid 
open." 

And all this time the Austrian ambassador still 
drove through the streets of Petrograd and the French 
ambassador through Vienna, and vice versa. From 
the moment of the Kaiser's brusk ultimatum to 
Russia, Austria, who appeared at that time disposed 
to adjust matters, receded into second place. But on 
the 6th of August Austria-Hungary finally declared 
war on Russia and on the nth the French ambassador 
asked the Vienna government for his passports. This, 
it will be seen, did not occur till after Germany was 
in a state of war with four nations, until after she 
had violated both Luxemburg and Belgium, and after 
the British had come into the conflict ; in other words, 
after the whole tragic problem had taken a definite 
form. 




CHAPTER XVII 

THE VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG 

THE first act which cannot be put down to the 
credit of the German Empire is the violation of 
the neutrality of Luxemburg. This violation has 
not resounded through the world like that of Bel- 
gium but merely because of its lesser political, not 
moral, significance. Morally each bears the same 
aspect ; each is a question of a treaty broken. The case 
of Luxemburg was all the more unjustifiable because, 
as we shall see, it was Prussia who had displayed most 
activity in framing the treaty and who had most 
interest in its adoption. Even more, this violation of 
neutral territory on August 2 constituted an aggres- 
sion against France before Germany had declared war 
on her ; it therefore invalidated the formal complaints 
of the German ambassador in Paris to the effect that 
Frenchmen had made attacks in German territory. In 
violating Luxemburg, Germany revealed her whole 
war policy of surprise, rapid action, and contempt for 
the only thing which modem international law has 

145 



146 THE WORLD WAR 

acquired for civilization after so many centuries. And 
it is all the more to be condemned because it is impos- 
sible to advance a shadow of justification for the act. 

At the very time it occurred the German minister in 
Luxemburg was declaring that the neutrality of the 
Duchy was guaranteed above all question and would 
never be violated by Germany. This statement at the 
moment when war was already certain forces us to 
one of two painful conclusions regarding Germany; 
either the diplomatic and the military staffs were act- 
ing in defiance of each other or else the government 
was acting in complete bad faith. 

The permanent neutrality of Luxemburg as an in- 
dependent state was specially created by the Treaty of 
London, May ii, 1867. Its most important antece- 
dent is found in the treaty which created Belgian neu- 
trality in 1839. ^s one of the possessions of the 
house of Burgundy, Luxemburg in the sixteenth cen- 
tury fell into the hands of Spain. In 171 3 it was 
transferred to Austria, and later to France. In 181 5 
it was created a grand duchy, but under the sover- 
eignty of the King of the Netherlands. Being one of 
those regions which geographical situation or the 
course of events has put in the road of great conflicts, 
it has known great sorrows. 

The Treaty of London was a solution in order to 
avoid or rather postpone a conflict between Germany 
and France. Napoleon III had just tried to buy this 



LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 147 

territory which had been garrisoned since 181 5 by 
Prussian troops, and keep its cession and its price 
secret. The proceeding would have been within the 
law since Luxemburg from the political point of view 
had ceased to belong to the Germanic community ; but 
it did not suit Prussian interests. The secret was soon 
known for the Grand Duke himself, who was also 
King of Holland, while negotiating with Napoleon 
communicated the fact to the Prussian minister at The 
Hague and showed him the contents of the letter he 
had received from the Emperor of the French.* At 
the same time he declared himself ready to make the 
transaction provided Prussia approved. 

Bismarck decided it was not the moment to give 
France a diplomatic victory or a military position; 
but neither was he desirous of war. Using his mar- 
velous tactics — that mixture of audacity and reticence 
which he knew how to employ in difficult cases — he 
allowed himself to be interrogated twice in the Reichs- 
tag. Autocrat by instinct he could handle democratic 
institutions for his own ends; and so, answering the 
two interrogations, one from Carlovitz and the other 
from Benningsen, he manoeuvred cleverly, giving 
France no motive for a casiis belli but making it clearly 
understood that without the consent of Prussia the 
cession of Luxemburg was impossible. Then he gave 
the French Ambassador, Benedetti, to understand that 



*E. Servais; "La neutralite du Luxembourg," page 78. 



148 THE WORLD WAR 

he could not favor the project, not because he was 
averse to it, but because blundering French diplomacy 
had obliged him to make premature declarations, and 
these had created an unfavorable public opinion. On 
April 2, 1867, Benedetti wrote as follows to his coun- 
try's foreign minister : "I have again seen Bismarck. 
He complains of the difficulties confronting him, and 
appears to blame us for the turn given to the matter 
by the King of the Low Countries (the Grand Duke) 
in directing himself officially to the King of Prussia 
before talking with the cabinet of Berlin. These pre- 
mature communications do not leave the Prussian 
government full liberty." The truth is that Bismarck 
took this tone solely because it was the most con- 
venient one; because he feared, as always, that his 
king would be weak, he complained of their having 
talked first with him before treating with the cabinet, 
which latter was himself and no one but himself. 

Later events show how far he was from any inten- 
tion of yielding to the plans of Napoleon HI; for 
when the Grand Duke finally decided to break off the 
sale, Bismarck was well satisfied and straightway asked 
the powers to meet in international conference in 
London in order to avoid war. 

In the London of 1867, however, there was no more 
interest in Luxemburg and its neutrality than in the 
London of 19 14. England was not looking for an- 
other difficulty nor did she wish to assume a future 



LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 149 

responsibility in a matter of no interest to her. Lord 
Stanley therefore gave a weak answer to the proposals 
of Prussia. In a telegram to Lord Cowley, the am- 
bassador in BerHn, he said: "Of what use is it to 
call a conference until Prussia has decided to state 
her intentions on the fortress (which she possesses) in 
Luxemburg, or at least until France has declared that 
she will submit to the decisions of the same?'* Never- 
theless, the conference was convoked and in it Luxem- 
burg's neutrality was agreed upon. Its terms are 
clearly expressed in Article II : 

"The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits 
determined by the act appended to the Treaties of 
April 13, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of 
France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, will hence- 
forth form a perpetually neutral state. It will be 
obliged to respect this same neutrality toward all 
other states. The high contracting powers oblige 
themselves to respect the principle of neutrality stipu- 
lated in the present article. This article is and will 
remain under the sanction of the collective guarantee 
of the powers signatory to the present treaty, with 
the exception of Belgium, she herself being a neutral 
state." 

The original draft did not contain the last lines 
relating to the sanction of a collective guarantee but 
instead terminated with the words: "the principle of 
neutrality as stipulated by the present article." The 



ISO THE WORLD WAR 

remainder was proposed and defended as a condition 
sine qua non (incredible but true) by the Prussian 
plenipotentiary, Count Albrecht Bernstorff. In order 
that the reader may know the different attitudes as- 
sumed by the representatives of Prussia on the one 
side, and of France and England on the other, we 
reproduce the acts of the session in which the article 
and the amendment were approved. 

To the second article Count Bernstorff proposed the 
following emendation : "This principle (neutrality) is 
and will remain under the guarantee of the powers 
who sign the present treaty with the exception of 
Belgium, since she herself is neutral." The Russian 
representative Count Briinnow said that he was au- 
thorized by his court to subscribe completely to the 
principle of giving the collective guarantee to the 
neutrality of Luxemburg. He hoped that this prin- 
ciple would be admitted as the best pledge that could 
be offered for the peace of Europe. 

Count Apponyi declared that his government (the 
Hungarian) also accepted the guaranteed neutrality 
of Luxemburg. Prince de la Tour d*Auvergne stated 
that he had no instructions relative to the question of 
a collective guarantee; but he felt himself obliged to 
agree that this guarantee had been presented up to 
that moment as the natural complement to the neu- 
trality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; and even 
though the obligation which the powers assumed to 



LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 151 

respect the neutrality of Luxemburg might in a given 
moment have a value almost equal to a formal guar- 
antee, still he could not deny that the Ambassador of 
Prussia might not be right in his observations. 

Van de Weyer, who was also without special in- 
structions (from Holland) on this point gave the 
opinion that in an ample spirit of conciliation it might 
be considered that the guarantee of neutrality ema- 
nated aggregately from the treaties of 1839. Lord 
Stanley declared that he preferred Article II as it 
existed in the draft of the treaty and without the 
amendment of Bernstorff ; but as most of the pleni- 
potentiaries upheld the idea indicated by the repre- 
sentative of Prussia, he, Lord Stanley, would acquaint 
the members of the Queen's cabinet of the proposi- 
tion which had been made and hoped to be able in the 
conference of the coming week to inform them of the 
decision taken.* 

The result was that England later yielded to the 
wishes of the powers and in order to keep peace in 
Europe agreed to the guarantee, definitively approving 
the article with the amendment. 

History presents great contrasts and at times great 
ironies. Prussia so eagerly desired the neutrality of 
Luxemburg that, not satisfied with the declaration 
made in the treaty (which as the French delegate 
pointed out presupposed the defense of the clauses of 



♦Reproduced in Servais; work cited, pages 163-65. 



152 THE WORLD WAR 

the same) she asked the signatory powers for a guar- 
antee which would put that neutrahty under the com- 
mon defense. This then constituted more than what 
she desired, since the defense of the neutrahty became 
so obhgatory that one of the powers could oblige the 
others to enter into armed action in defense of the 
ordained pact. 

Prussia having proposed the clause and the rest 
having accepted it, England understood its importance 
and accepted it, as we understand, when she saw that 
the other powers did not foresee the real future diffi- 
culties ; and undoubtedly she had to assure herself that 
they did not grasp its full importance by means of 
those private conversations which form the most elab- 
orate part of the program in all such conferences. 

Bismarck in reality had again practiced his finesse 
on France, as he himself has admitted. Maurice Busch 
in his book on Bismarck attributes to him the follow- 
ing words which bear every evidence of the mentality 
and the style of the Chancellor: "Public opinion in 
all Germany would have been most favorable to us 
(Prussia) at that time had we wished war over the 
question of Luxemburg; the law, however, was not 
on our side. I have never confessed this publicly but 
today I can say it. After the dissolution of the Ger- 
man Confederation, the King and Grand Duke be- 
came a sovereign, and could do as he wished. To sell 
his country for money would have been a piece of 



LUXEMBURG'S NEUTRALITY VIOLATED 153 

villainy, but it would have been his right/' In this 
Bismarck was forgetting what he had publicly said 
when answering certain observations made at the time 
by August Bebel on a discourse of the Crown, re- 
garding a fortress occupied in Luxemburg.* Bismarck 
in his answer upheld an exactly opposite point of 
view. 

If the preceding is not sufficient to prove the neu- 
trality of Luxemburg and the form in which it was 
dictated to have been principally the work of Prussia, 
and further, that this fact aggravates her present vio- 
lation of the same, let us consider Prussia's own criti- 
cism during the war of 1870 when it was a question 
of Luxemburg's duty to defend her neutrality by arms. 
Bismarck on the third of December of that year sent 
from Versailles a telegram to the government of the 
Grand Duchy holding it responsible for violations of 
its neutrality. Both the reproach and the threat were 
unjust because by the treaty of May 11, 1867, the 
Duchy had been forbidden to keep an army. The 
only force allowed her was that necessary to, maintain 
order, and consequently all defense of neutrality 
against belligerents was completely impossible. This 
circumstance certainly demonstrates to what a very 
great degree this neutrality was appreciated and un- 
derstood by that same nation who in 19 14 unhesitat- 



* Session of the Parliament of the German Confederation, 
September 24, 1867. 



154 THE WORLD WAR 

ingly occupied Luxemburg's railroads for military 
uses, crossed its frontiers, and established herself as if 
in her own house; or rather with more rights and 
less concern than if she had been at home. 

In reality it is a flagrant case of contempt of the 
principles of order and of obligations assumed. It 
prepared the world for the next transgression — the 
invasion of Belgium. 




CHAPTER XVIII 

ENGLAND AND THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN 
NEUTRALITY 

THE war would not have attained its present 
proportions if England had not declared war 
against Germany; or to make a more prudent state- 
ment it would not have attained them so soon. The 
culminating moment of the initial stage was the 
violation of Belgian neutrality, and this was the act 
which involved England. When she claimed this in- 
tervention to be in defense of the Treaties of 1839 
German writers doubted her sincerity. They accused 
her of wanting above all to assault Germany in this 
difficult moment and thus make good on the battle- 
field the previous diplomatic work of isolation. They 
further asserted that the diplomatic and subsequent 
military conduct was due to the growth of German 
commerce which was outstripping Great Britain^s in 
all the markets of the world.* The English answered 
by alleging the necessary defense of the principles of 



* Bernhard Dernburg, former German Colonial Minister ; 
"Germany and England," in the Saturday Evening Post, Novem- 
ber 21, 1914. 

" 155 



156 THE WORLD WAR 

international law without which defense it would be 
impossible to solve any difficulty or maintain any 
agreement; they declared that English public opinion 
would never have consented to Germany's passing into 
France over the ruins of Belgium, but would have 
forced the government to armed intervention ; and that 
knowing this the government decided accordingly. 

It is not easy to say whether England would have 
awaited the opportune moment and entered the war 
in any case, or whether, true to her past reputation, 
she would have extracted the greatest benefit from it 
with the least effort. There is no doubt that Eng- 
land hoped this conflict would solve her modern prob- 
lem. In competition with a powerful rival who was 
overtaking her in naval power and depriving her of a 
hegemony indispensable to her very existence, she 
dared not let the mighty occasion pass without its 
settling who was to be the winner. But in what man- 
ner and at what moment she would have made it do 
so is mere conjecture. It is probable that the prac- 
tical sense of English statesmen did not prompt them 
to prepare a specific plan but rather to watch events 
closely and take whichever course might appear most 
favorable. What really happened however is that Eng- 
land, contrary to German accusations, entered the war 
at a moment not to her liking and after having tried 
cautiously to avoid all compromise and all obligation. 

It is not to the point to repeat Sir Edward Grey's 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 157 

efforts to avert an Austro- Servian war and his lack 
of interest in the Balkan conflict; nor the proposed 
mediation, nor the later attitude when Germany hurled 
first her ultimatum and then her declaration of war 
on Russia, for all these proceedings demonstrate of 
themselves the pacific mind of the Liberal English 
Government at that moment. Grey's answer to Paul 
Cambon, French Ambassador in London, when the 
latter asked for a declaration in favor of France 
should war break out, is enough to clear up all residue 
of doubt. To Cambon's argument that such a declara- 
tion from England could in itself prevent the conflict, 
Grey's answer was completely negative and to the 
effect that England did not feel obliged to uphold the 
interests of any other nation.* This conversation took 
place on July 29, and the question of respecting Bel- 
gian neutrality directed to both Germany and France 
is one more proof that England did not wish to enter 
the conflict at that moment ; otherwise she would have 
let events take their course without trying to warn 
those whose acts might establish the justification for 
her armed intervention.! 

Then too the declaration of Cambon was repeated 
in parliament when the minister of foreign affairs, set- 
ting forth the cabinet's attitude, said that England 
had made no promise to any power whatever, and that 



* English White Book. 

t German White Book and English White Book, 



158 THE WORLD WAR 

she would follow the dictates of public opinion.* 
When finally the conflict was announced, Lord Mor- 
ley, John Burns, and Mr. Trevelyan resigned from the 
cabinet. (Of these the first two were of no small 
influence; the aged and highly esteemed Lord Morley 
being a Liberal of the old school and John Bums the 
most genuine exponent of the Liberal Labor Party; 
that is to say, they represented the two extremes of 
the Liberal cabinet.) The spontaneous exodus of 
these three men makes it appear still less likely that 
there was any predestined policy of intervention. 
Later events demonstrated that England, like France 
and Russia, was without sufficient military prepara- 
tion either in men or war materials. She had to keep 
on preparing as she fought. 

That the violation of the neutrality of Belgium con- 
stituted a great crime is a point on which there remains 
no doubt in spite of the efforts made to defend it. 
When it met with universal condemnation as an act 
which trampled in the dust one of the few conquests of 
international law, namely, the solemnity of a sworn 
pledge, it was claimed that the treaty of 1839 no 
longer existed. Such an affirmation is unworthy of 
argument in spite of its illustrious and audacious sup- 
porters.! No one could have made it seriously. Not 



* Session of the House of Commons, August 3, 1914. 
tBemhard Dcrnburg; work cited; also Bernard Shaw and 
numerous German authors of renown. 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 159 

only did the treaty of 1839 appear to Berlin as one 
to be respected by Germany herself but also by other 
nations, and had any of them violated it she was ready 
to make it respected. Herr Von Jagow, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, never had any doubts on the sub- 
ject. On the contrary when he urged the reasons of 
extreme necessity which had forced the German Gen- 
eral Staff to throw its army through Belgium against 
France, the very excuse implied the transgression. 
On the day of the declaration of war, August 4, Sir 
W. E. Goschen, English Ambassador in Berlin, went 
twice to Von Jagow only to hear that Germany could 
not respect Belgian neutrality; that she must advance 
by the most rapid and easy route into France and 
crush her in the shortest possible time, since it was a 
question of life or death for Germany to anticipate 
the sending of Russian forces against her. Von Jagow 
added that rapidity of action was one of Germany's 
greatest advantages; and that very same night when 
England was threatening to declare war he summed 
the matter up by saying that to send troops through 
Belgium was a question of the salvation of the 
Empire.* 

Nor did the Chancellor Von Bethmann-Hollweg 
advance any such hypothesis as the caducity of the 



♦Despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, re- 
garding the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German 
Government, London, August, 1914. 



i6o THE WORLD WAR 

treaty of 1839; ^^t even in his moment of greatest 
excitement when he pronounced the famous words 
"and merely for a scrap of paper England is going 
to war !'* * — not even then did he offer such a de- 
fense. On the contrary he said that neutrality was 
simply a word which had often been disregarded in 
war time. The undeniable fact is that the treaty 
existed in full vigor and any argument to the contrary 
falls through its own premise. 

Belgian neutrality was a product of historic neces- 
sity. In the successive historic periods Belgium had 
been coveted by whatever nation happened to domi- 
nate. Famous battles had been fought on her soil; 
Holland, Spain, Austria, France, had disputed its pos- 
session, and England's eye was on it even at a time 
when she was paying but little attention to continental 
politics in general. Everything indicated that there 
could be no European peace without neutralizing that 
object of discord, and political annals and interna- 
tional correspondence are full of the difficulties sur- 
mounted in order to accomplish the neutrality. 

It was in 1830 that Belgium separated from Hol- 
land. On October 4 of that year, the provisional gov- 
ernment in Brussels assembled, declared that Belgium 
had constituted herself an independent state; whereon 
the powers, at the instance of King William of The 



♦Dr. Dillon; "The Scrap of Paper." 



/^ 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY i6i 

Netherlands, convened their plenipotentiaries in Lon- 
don and drew up the protocol of the separation of the 
two countries.* In this document where Belgium first 
appears as a separate personality it is set forth in 
Article V that she is to constitute a perpetually neu- 
tral state and that the five powers signing the protocol 
are to guarantee said perpetual neutrality. 

This agreement was not instantly accepted by Bel- 
gium, but later on July 9, 1831, her national congress 
voted the preliminaries of the peace, with its Article 
IX corresponding exactly to Article V of the protocol 
of London. That same year, on December 14, was 
signed the treaty called Of the Fortresses, by which 
England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia on the one 
side, and Belgium on the other, all agreed in the demo- 
lition of certain fortresses in Belgium and the main- 
taining of others, in virtue of the changes wrought in 
the country's condition — "her political independence 
as well as the perpetual neutrality which is guaranteed 
to her." t France, as seen, did not agree to the stipu- 
lations of this treaty, nor were certain of its clauses 
acceptable to Belgium. All the preliminaries were 
given final form in the Treaties of 1839, by which was 



♦Protocol of December 20, 1830, as agreed upon by the 
plenipotentiaries. 

t Treaty of December 14, 1831, between England, Prussia, 
Austria, Russia, and Belgium, preamble and Articles I, IV, and 
VI; reproduced in "L'Etat neutre a titre permanent," by Em- 
manuel Descamp. 



i62 THE WORLD WAR 

settled the pending conflict between Belgium and Hol- 
land, and by which the principle of permanent neu- 
trality for Belgium was fixed more firmly than ever. 
These treaties are three, and interdependent. In the 
first, Belgium was not one of the contracting parties; 
on the one side Holland, and on the other England, 
France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, all recognized 
the dissolution of the former union of Belgium and 
Holland and recognized that the pacts contained in 
the treaty made simultaneously between Belgium and 
Holland should have the same force and value as if 
they formed part of this same treaty. In the second, 
Belgium and Holland are the parties interested; it is 
a treaty of peace and friendship, and in its Article 
VII is set forth the principle of neutrality. In the 
third, Belgium on the one side and the five countries 
mentioned concur; its main premise is the recognition 
of the independence and neutrality of Belgium, and 
the obligation on the part of the great powers to de- 
fend this neutrality. These three treaties virtually 
are one and their subdivision was due to a mere for- 
mula whose object was to facilitate diplomatic labor 
and avoid a repetition of the difficulties of 1830 and 
183 1. A proof of their being one and the same is that 
in two of them the clauses of the other two are re- 
peated, signifying that they have the same force as if 
they were clauses of that same treaty. 

To discuss its validity might be admitted in popular 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 163 

propaganda or justified by high-strung patriotic senti- 
ments, but could never be tolerated in an impartial 
examination of the facts. It has been affirmed by 
those defending Germany^s invasion of Belgium that 
the treaty of 1839 did not solidly recognize Belgian 
neutrality, especially when grave international inter- 
ests were involved in the case ; to reinforce their thesis 
they say that in 1870, when Gladstone was prime 
minister, England considered it necessary to concert 
a new treaty. The facts are that when the Franco- 
Prussian War broke out England, as at the beginning 
of the present era, initiated conversations in order to 
discover the intentions of the belligerents. The pe- 
culiar circumstance of the moment must not be for- 
gotten — how Belgium was panic-stricken over Bis- 
marck's publication of a secret proposal made to him 
by Napoleon III regarding the annexation of Belgium 
by France. The conversations crystallized in the 
treaties of April 9 and April 11 of that same year. 
The first was between England and Prussia, and the 
second between France and England. The two were 
identical and consisted of only four articles. In 
Article I France and Prussia each stated her firm 
determination to observe Belgian neutrality just 
so long as the other respected it, and England bound 
herself to cooperate by means of forces on sea and 
land with whichever of the two powers respected it, 
in order that it might be maintained then and after- 



i64 THE WORLD WAR 

wards. In Article II the two belligerents bind them- 
selves, as already stated in a different treaty, to main- 
tain said neutrality with armed force and to take 
counsel with England on the necessary measures. The 
third Article sets forth a principle which undermines 
the defenders of Germany; and as it was not kept in 
mind by the German propagandists we give it entire 
for those who have not gone fully into the question: 
"This treaty will oblige the high contracting parties 
throughout the duration of the present war between 
France and the North German Confederation or the 
Confederation of the North of Germany and for 
twelve months after the ratification of any treaty of 
peace between these two parties; and when this term 
will have expired the independence and neutrality of 
Belgium, so far as the respective high contracting par- 
ties are concerned, will continue to he based as for- 
merly on Article I of the Treaty of the Five Nations 
of April 19, 1839." 

It is very clear that this double treaty did not and 
could not revoke that of 1839, ^^^ so plain and evi- 
dent are its terms that they could not be improved 
upon by any other diplomatic document whatever. 
Nor can it be alleged that although the treaty of 1870 
did not modify that of 1839 i^ nevertheless inter- 
preted it in the sense that should a casus belli arise, a 
new stipulation would be necessary to give force to 
the previous one. Should such judgment be accepted 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 165 

it would place the art of diplomacy in the group of 
speculative sciences, and the relations between nations 
in the field of abstract doctrine. 

The creation of a neutral state and of a treaty 
to guarantee its neutrality are deeds merely positive; 
the acceptance of the treaty is a promise of fulfilment 
and admits of no omission. When Prussia signed the 
famous treaty with four other powers in 1839 ^^^ was 
not performing a useless act but was offering on her 
oath as a civilized nation to respect its clauses on 
neutrality, and to use her right of obliging others to 
respect them; and all this not in time of peace, but 
in the only moment when the concept of a neutral 
nation takes on efficacy, for neutrality and war are 
correlative terms. To suppose that a new treaty must 
be made previous to every international conflict is to 
deny the force of the first, and this would mean to 
throw onto the scrap-heap an international prescrip- 
tion still in full yigor. 

It is easy to understand how without a careful ex- 
amination of the problem one might fall into such 
erroneous argument. One may argue prima facie that 
if a new obligation was necessary in 1870 when the 
two nations who are today contending were at war, 
so in 19 1 4 it was necessary to repeat something of 
the same sort in order that the belligerents should 
respect what they then respected; but this logic falls 
by its own premise. A treaty of neutrality does not 



i66 THE WORLD WAR 

exclude a treaty guaranteeing that neutrality; on the 
contrary the latter renders homage to the former. 
The manner of maintaining Belgian neutrality was not 
and could not be foreseen. Belgium, on her side, and 
the powers signing the document, all bound them- 
selves to maintain this neutrality; but none of them 
could at that time foresee the multiple occasions which 
the future might present and could not predetermine 
their solution. The application of the covenant had 
to be left until the necessary or opportune moment. 
Consequently in 1870 England looked for a way of 
guaranteeing the clauses of the treaty of 1839, ^^^ 
France and Prussia satisfied her by means of the 
treaties of April 9 and 11, 1870, binding themselves 
to defend with arms that which they had all previ- 
ously compacted. The two posterior treaties, then, 
are nothing else than conventions for maintaining the 
preceding stipulations. 

That this was so the text indicates, and so it was 
always interpreted. Baron d'Anethan in the Belgian 
Parliament of that day thus explained it : "The trea- 
ties, separate but identical, just concluded by England 
with the powers in war neither create nor modify the 
obligations incident to the treaty of 1839; they regu- 
late the practical manner of executing these treaties 
in a determined case. They in no way weaken the 
obligations of the other guaranteeing powers, as their 
text attests. They leave entire the future obligatory 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 167 

character of the anterior treaty, with all its conse- 
quences." * 

Emmanuel Descamp, at a time when this question 
was simply speculative, wrote with great precision, as 
if he had foreseen the present objections : "The Acts 
of 1870 constitute temporary conventions for the regu- 
lation of the guarantee and are of the same nature 
as the conventions of 1831 already quoted. It is as 
absurd to interpret them as acts which have for their 
object to revivify a guarantee merely taken for 
granted, or guarantee outlawed, as to distort against 
the validity of any law the subsequent regulations 
which serve for its execution." f Another writer, 
Charles de Woeste, goes even farther, though in our 
opinion with less penetration, and says that the con- 
ventions of 1870 are useless since they merely con- 
stitute the application of the treaties of 1839 '^^ ^ 
given case. J It is interesting to know that these and 
identical opinions precede by many years the present 
war, and that they were emitted in the purely scien- 
tific field and not animated by partisanship. 

The fact is that Belgian neutrality was never even 
questioned until after it was violated. In Germany, 
France, and England, the countries most interested, no 
one gave it judicial consideration; and no one went 



* Session of the Belgian Parliament, August 16, 1870. 
t Emmanuel Descamp; work dted, pages 166-167. 
$Charlei5 de Wwste; "La neutralitc beige," page 56 . 



i68 THE WORLD WAR 

seeking for antecedents until after the declaration, or 
rather confession, of the German chancellor in the 
Reichstag. Besides, the same chancellor had said in 
other days that Belgium had nothing to fear from 
Germany's growing strength and that the guarantee of 
neutrality given to Belgium gained at the same time. 
The very excuses presented, all of them emanating 
not from justice but from necessity, are enough to 
show that the neutrality treaty was a vital thing. Ger- 
many's necessities can be appreciated but they cannot 
exempt her from responsibility in the political field; 
for in the last analysis, to yield to necessity is to 
trample underfoot all good social relation, all the 
amenities of civilization; which conditions consist pre- 
cisely in the limits imposed upon our own convenience 
by another's rights. Civilization puts the collective 
interest, immediate or remote, above the individual ne- 
cessity. This criticism was aptly expressed by Lloyd 
George when he said : "If Germany violates treaties 
because it is to her advantage to do so, then we must 
prove to her that she will find even greater advantage 
in respecting them." 

Going back a little, we find that in 191 1, when the 
newspapers declared that Germany would violate Bel- 
gian neutrality in case of war with France, Bethmann- 
Hollweg sent to Belgium a concrete denial. In 191 3 
when Von Jagow, foreign minister, was interpellated 
by a social democrat before the budget commission 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 169 

of the Reichstag he answered: ^'Belgian neutrality 
is fixed by international conventions and Germany is 
resolved to respect those conventions/** 

In France, throughout her numerous pohtical 
changes, throughout innumerable revolutions in the 
last century, Belgian neutrality was never questioned. 
The Orleans monarchy respected it as if it had been 
their own work ; and in fact the Belgian revolution of 
1830 was really a consequence of the revolution which 
placed Louis Philippe on the throne of France. 
After him, the Republic of 1848, trying to renew the 
1793 policy of spreading the ideal of liberty among 
other nations, assured Prince de Ligne, the Belgian 
ambassador, that France had not changed except in 
her internal regime, and that the treaty would be 
respected. Lamartine, foreign minister of the Repub- 
lic, made this declaration and his successor repeated 
it. The Second Empire did not modify this policy in 
spite of the evident Germanophile sentiments of the 
Belgian king. The question of the secret Franco- 
Prussian treaty which so alarmed Belgium, and with 
reason, was really a deceitful act of the policy of 
Bismarck, who, on this occasion as on many others, 
used the French ambassador Benedetti for his ends. 
That it was nothing more is demonstrated by the fact 
that Bismarck took no further step after having the 
famous draft in his hands, but guarded it most craftily 



* Belgian Gray Book, document number la. 



170 THE WORLD WAR 

so as to later make it public when hostilities had actu- 
ally broken out between France and Prussia. He ob- 
tained the result he had schemed for; the League of 
Neutral Powers initiated by England to give Germany 
a free hand against France, was a consequence of the 
publication.* Written in Benedetti's own handwriting 
and on the official paper of the embassy, the draft was 
a grave indication that the very name Napoleon was 
synonymous with conquest. 

Regarding Belgian neutrality the chief feature of 
the Second Empire was its attitude in 1870. It is 
certain that Napoleon HI on acquainting Leopold 
of Belgium with the declaration of war against 
Prussia sent him a solemn promise to respect the neu- 
trality and soon after confirmed it through diplomatic 
channels, t 

Belgium, in spite of the treaties which the bel- 
ligerents had made with England and in spite of the 
declarations received, prepared, then as now, to defend 
her territory from all violation, total or partial. She 
knew then, as later in 19 14, that she could exist and 
develop only while this neutrality was eflfective, or at 
least while she showed herself able to defend it with 
that valor which the testimony of Caesar and subse- 
quent history has attributed to her. It appears cer- 



* Henry Welschinger ; "La neutralite beige," in the Revue des 
deux mondes, September i, 19 14, page 9. 
t Henry Welschinger ; article cited, page 10. 



VOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 171 

tain that General Wimpffen, vanquished at Sedan, 
had planned to enter Belgium to escape being routed, 
but the border was well guarded and the Belgian 
army made the enterprise difficult.* 

The Third Republic proceeded even better than pre- 
ceding governments and this at the very time when 
Belgium appeared to incline toward Germany, and 
King Leopold to have suspicious dealings with the 
neighboring empire; when the supposed revelations 
were gaining credulity with the general public, and 
when the Belgian fortifications which were being 
erected appeared rather to menace France than 
in defense against a German invasion. f There was 
actually a period from 1887 to 1895 in which France 
suspected that Belgium would not only admit an in- 
vading army marching rapidly on Paris from Germany 
but would even join it. And on the eve of this 
present war French statesmen knew the German in- 
tentions, knew the Kaiser had informed King Albert 
that he was no longer for peace, knew that Von 
Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, had said 
that in case of war they must pass through Belgium; J 
yet in this crisis, just as during the forty-four years 
of suspicious and ascertained facts, the French cabinet 



* Declaration of General Chazal before the Military Com- 
mission of 1871. 

t Nouvelle Revue, July i and October i, 1888 ; also certain 
numbers during the following year. 

% Bibliotheque universelle et Revue de Suisse, December, 1914. 
12 



172 THE WORLD WAR 

adopted no other attitude than that which the treaties 
and the word of the nation solemnly pledged de- 
manded. 

As for England, never since the Treaty of the Five 
Powers did she doubt for one moment the obliga- 
tion assumed; she went even further and from 1839 
made herself the champion of Belgian neutrahty. 

When Lamertine gave up the ministry of foreign 
affairs for France in 1848, Lord Palmerston, fearing 
the mob agitation fomented by French statesmen them- 
selves, affirmed that "the powers have not only the 
right but the duty to guarantee Belgian independence, 
which duty consists in aiding by every means the parts 
subjected to aggression and to preserve, or insist upon 
the return of, the territorial possessions as determined 
by the treaties." Then to emphasize the statement he 
took a formal pledge to give the most decided aid if 
necessary. Gladstone, some years later, went even 
further. He took the matter out of the juridical field 
and put it into the moral, as was his system, and de- 
clared that the violation of Belgian neutrality "would 
be the perpetration of the most odious crime that had 
ever smirched the pages of history."* In the very year 
1870, Lord Russell, speaking in the House of Lords, 
recognized, almost with verbal excess, the juridical 
debt of Great Britain. "Our obligations to this king- 



* Emmanuel Descamp ; work cited. 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 173 

dom (Belgium) are of the most sacred," he said. 
"We have accepted these along with other powers 
and separately from them. We cannot choose among 
manifold solutions. We can follow but one road, 
and that is the road of honor. We are obliged to de- 
fend Belgium. The members of the British Govern- 
ment declare publicly and explicitly that they intend 
to respect our treaties, to loyally fulfill our obliga- 
tions, and not to dishonor the name of England." 
Lord Salisbury, more inclined to the typical language 
of a statesman, said with justice : "The independence 
of Belgium is extremely important to the European 
powers and they are bound by compacts highly favor- 
able to the independence of that country." * In the 
foregoing there is a slight lack of completeness; if 
Salisbury had added "and vitally necessary to Eng- 
land" he would have said the whole historic truth. 

It is strange that Chancellor Von Bethmann-HoU- 
weg did not comprehend the essence and therefore 
the raison d*etre of the "piece of paper" as he called 
the Treaties of 1839. That later polemists pretended 
not to understand it can pass; but that he, directing 
the affairs of the most powerful empire dominating 
for long years Continental policy — that he did not un- 
derstand is inexplicable. His country had absolute 
prevision of the slightest happenings ; its military men 
knew all the weaknesses of the enemies, their forces, 



* Session of the English House of Lords, July 17, 1891. 



174 THE WORLD WAR 

movements, means of communication, fortresses, 
cities, inhabitants, and even the private fortune of 
these; it is inexplicable that in the diplomatic depart- 
ment of the country possessing all this exact informa- 
tion, the very real importance which England ascribed 
to the treaties of 1839 was not known, especially when 
even the most superficial historian was aware of it. 
It is evident that there are two Germanics, one of the 
military party admirably perfect in its way, and the 
other of the diplomats, completely negative. 

The famous scrap of paper * did have its raison 
d'etre. When drawn up in 1839 it was the outgrowth 
of all preceding history and in time came to be looked 
upon as a precious conquest which must never be aban- 
doned, never questioned, but always respected even in 
the most difficult crisis. 

History shows that English policy, excepting the 
colonial, revolves around the nearby coasts ; these were 
a subject of constant dispute and the theater of long 
wars and continental conquests. Let us see what 
an eminent English writer said in an epoch not in- 
fluenced by the events of today, f 

Under the reigns of Edward I and Edward III our 
foreign policy had already begun to assume a definite form 
and to direct itself towards that national objective still 



♦Communication of the English Ambassador to Sir Edward 
Grey on the declaration of war. 

fEsme Wingfield-Stratford ; "History of English Patriotism," 
page 61. 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 175 

adhered to by modem statesmen. The British policy of 
those reigns is dead because it has been consummated; 
but their European policy still survives after six centuries. 
Its resume may be found in the fact that the key of our 
position in Europe is the Low Countries. The extreme 
to which this guiding principle of our diplomacy has ar- 
rived in the course of centuries is extraordinary, and 
from this the majority of our important wars have re- 
sulted more or less directly. 

In these conflicts may be included the Hundred Years 
War, dating from the reigns mentioned, the short wars 
of Henry VIII and Mary Tudor, the Holland campaigns 
of Elizabeth, of Cromwell, and of Charles II ; all the long 
struggle with Louis XIV, the War of the Austrian Suc- 
cession, and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
which began at the Scheldt and ended at Waterloo. And 
there are even those who predict that another war, great- 
est of all, awaits us if we are to make sure of the inde- 
pendence of those countries and our own. 

We have here the origin of the long rivalry between 
England and France, a rivalry which some persons are 
convinced is permanent and incurable. But it was not 
against France as France that we were set, but against 
the power which threatened to dominate the Low Coun- 
tries. Now that this danger is over it has been shown 
that it is possible for the two countries to come together 
and to cordially pursue a common policy. Until a very 
recent epoch the Low Countries had but little to fear 
from an eastern neighbor, unless this term be applied to 
the Emperor Charles V. These are the reasons why our 



176 THE WORLD WAR 

policy has consisted, generally speaking, in cooperating 
with Germany against France, a situation which is now 
completely reversed. As far back as the reign of King 
John we began to see this cooperation, and an Anglo- 
German army was defeated in Bouvines. Later we find 
Edward III at the beginning of the Hundred Years War 
exercising the functions of Vicar General of the Empire 
and conducting in vain a numerous and heterogeneous 
army to force the French defenses on the Flemish 
frontier. 

In past epochs, however, the means of defense had 
not assumed the astounding form of today. The 
depths of the sea had not been conquered and the 
air was sacred to departed spirits and the gods. But 
today it is doubly comprehensible that England will 
not easily permit the second maritime nation of the 
world to instal herself on the opposite shore of the 
narrow Channel — the nation that wished "to clutch 
the trident of Neptune as firmly as it held the sword 
of Frederick the Great," the nation that aspired with 
undisguised eagerness to an extensive colonial domin- 
ion, the nation that competed for the world*s com- 
merce and struggled with Englishmen, both in Europe 
and abroad, in a fierce economic fight. It is strange 
that not only the chancellor of the empire, but also 
scientific men like Professor Hermann Oncken of the 
University of Heidelberg, should persist in considering 
that England's cause for entering the war — defense 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 177 

of Belgian neutrality — was a pretext of small impor- 
tance. Professor Oncken says doctorally: "No one 
goes to war for such a poor motive." It is true that 
he considers this question, following the opinion of 
many English writers such as the chief members of 
the Faculty of Modem History at Oxford,* as purely a 
moral question; but therein lies the greatest error. 
It is human nature for the English to make a virtue 
of their going to war, but that the Germans should 
not have understood that their doing so was a dire 
necessity, is completely inexplicable. 

In sending her troops to the fields of Flanders, 
England was not defending the Belgians; she was 
defending her own rights acquired in fair contest and 
in perfect reciprocity by means of a compact signed 
by five powers, who guaranteed its observance by their 
word given before the world and with due responsi- 
bility. 

To consider this as sentimentality on England's 
part constitutes the whole error around which most 
of the writers have revolved, and is explained by the 
passion of the moment which distracted even }the 
serenest minds. They really believed that English 
public opinion rose in defense of a treaty and of an- 
other nation, and obliged its government to declare war 
on Germany. Neither the English people nor their 



* "Why We Are at War ;'* written by the members of the 
Faculty of Modern History of the University of Oxford. 



178 THE WORLD WAR 

government would be capable of any such error. Only 
one ruler in history would have committed it — Na- 
poleon III — and certainly the system brought him no 
good results. England was not disposed to intervene 
when Austria, in spite of all her declarations, was pre- 
paring to hurt Servia by breaking the recent treaty of 
Bucharest virtually approved by the powers ; nor when 
Germany broke the treaty of London of 1867 which 
guaranteed, under the signature of the English gov- 
ernment, the neutrality of Luxemburg. England, full 
of great statesmen, would have understood all the 
ridiculous aspect of this championship which the 
writers tried to attribute to her. In a moment when 
the acute mind of Asquith was directing the cabinet, 
and that of Sir Edward Grey, who has been likened to 
Pitt the Younger,* was directing the foreign policy, 
the British government was bound to be devoted to 
the defense of state interests and to sustain a treaty 
which benefited these; naturally they alleged that the 
real cause coincided with one even higher — respect for 
a sworn pact, and defense of a people laborious, active, 
honest, worthy in every aspect of championship. 

It is just as much of an error in historical criti- 
cism to glorify the act of the Belgians. The Belgians 
responded to a necessity. The calamity which has 
fallen upon them is one more of the many due to 
their geographical situation, one more which history 



♦James M. Beck; "The Evidence in the Case.' 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 179 

has been preparing for them throughout the centuries. 
If the Belgians had let the German troops pass, ac- 
quitting their conscience by presenting conventional 
protests, they might not have seen their houses de- 
stroyed, their cities razed to the ground, nor suffered 
the thousand other misfortunes so vividly related; it 
is probable that their industries and commerce and 
monuments would have remained intact ; but one thing 
would most certainly have perished — their independ- 
ence. Given a national life by the will of the great 
powers, and with the object of establishing a neutral 
state, Belgium, had she demonstrated the impossi- 
bility of maintaining this international situation, would 
have shown that her raison d'etre as an independent 
state no longer existed. Yuste, studying the life of 
Queen Maria of Hungary, sister of Charles V, says 
in this connection: "Reason and experience showed 
Queen Maria the true role which the Low Countries, 
an industrial and commercial nation, should play. 
Only a vigilant neutrality could consolidate her pros- 
perity and preserve her, perhaps, from dismember- 
ment."* A writer of the present moment speaking 
with enthusiasm of King Albert I says something 
which is doubly true when he qualifies him as the 
"second founder of Belgium." f 



♦Yuste; "Vie de Marie de Hongrie," page 131. 
fM. L. Dumont Wilden; "Albert I, second fondateur de la. 
Belgique," in the Revue des deux mondes, December i, 1914. 



i8o > THE WORLD WAR 

Neither in the case of Belgium nor in that of Eng- 
land do we wish to deny the importance of the sac- 
rifice made by entering the present war. Nor do we 
mean to mete out any less sympathy to those who 
are so sorely tried during the invasion. On the con- 
trary, we wish to express our conviction that a country 
is more admirable when it defends its national exist- 
ence than when it fights for an abstract principle; in 
the first case ideality has the collective well-being for 
its basis, in the second ideality is the product of a 
morbid condition. From the day that Austria sent 
her ultimatum to Servia, the Belgian government un- 
derstood the danger it was running. On that same 
day, July 24, the minister of foreign affairs sent a 
circular to the kings* ministers accredited to those 
governments signatory to the Treaty of 1839, which 
circular directed them, should events precipitate them- 
selves rapidly, to read to the respective ministers of 
foreign affairs an accompanying letter undated, re- 
claiming respect of Belgian neutrality.* Five days 
later in view of what had happened the Belgian gov- 
ernment decided to put its army on war footing, and 
on July 31 mobilization was ordered. At this state 
England had already taken action and continued ad- 
dressing herself to France, Germany, and Belgium, 
demanding the fulfilment of their obligation. Sir 
Francis Villiers, British Minister in Belgium, begged 



* Belgian Grey Book, document number 2. 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY i8i 

urgently to see the minister of foreign affairs to de- 
clare to him that "in view of the existing treaties Sir 
Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do every- 
thing possible to maintain her neutrality." And 
Davignon, the minister in question, answered him that 
"Belgian military forces, considerably improved in the 
recent reorganization, were in condition to permit of 
an energetic defense in case the territory should be 
invaded." * The same day the German minister de- 
clared to the general foreign secretary that he knew 
the precedents of 191 1 and 19 13 concerning declara- 
tions on the part of the German government to re- 
spect Belgian neutrality and that he was "certain that 
the sentiments manifested at those dates had not 
changed." f And on August 2, the same German min- 
ister in Belgium repeated that although he had no in- 
structions to make an official communication he could 
declare that his personal opinion, already known, was 
that Belgium could feel tranquil so far as her neigh- 
bor on the east was concerned.} 

But on the same second of August came the ulti- 
matum to Belgium, a work of gross perfidy and one 
which, though a precedent can be found in history, is 
nevertheless a dishonor to humanity. It appears evi- 
dent that German diplomacy, tied to the tail of the 



* Belgian Grey Book, document number 11. 
ji Belgian Grey Book, document number 12. 
$ Belgian Grey Book, document number 19. 



i82 THE WORLD WAR 

Pomeranian steeds, was obliged to write this infamous 
sheet. In it was set forth the necessity of violating 
Belgian territory, and the intention of occupying it as 
a base of operations; an offer was made to "pay 
cash" for everything, to preserve the integrity of the 
territory after the war; but in case these conditions 
were not accepted Germany hurled the threat of treat- 
ing Belgium as an enemy.* A great error both in 
matter and in form is this note. It breathes the same 
sentiment which prompted Frederick the Great to 
occupy Silesia; in it is the same utter disregard of 
another's rights, the same incomprehension of the 
limits of what may and may not be done. The great 
king used to say "I will occupy Silesia and soon 
pedants will not be lacking to uphold my rights." The 
German General Staff thought the same but it for- 
got that the times have changed. The moral isolation 
in which its nation finds itself, in spite of having pro- 
duced so many men beloved of humanity, is the con- 
sequence of this great fault. The law of modem war- 
fare cannot permit this outrage even in order to de- 
fend great tactical interests, even to rapidly destroy 
an enemy so as to then turn on another, even to settle 
the outcome of a war. 

If this were not the case anything would be author- 
ized; collective assassinations and the enslavement of 



* Belgian Grey Book, document number 20. 



VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY 183 

a neighbor, the taking of his riches, the abuse of his 
person. No ! Our modern age has created a force in 
the international field which is above that of arms; 
an effective force which can give a victory and impose 
a defeat ; a force which is called international law. It 
finds vigorous supporters in all those who see in the 
principle of public order dictated for the public good 
and honestly lived up to, a guarantee of their own 
existence. Lloyd-George was voicing a universal con- 
viction when he declared that if Germany believed it 
to be to her interest to break treaties she must be 
taught that it would be even more to her interest to 
keep them. 




CHAPTER XIX 

THE ULTIMATUM AND ENGLAND'S DECLARATION 

OF WAR 

ENGLAND acted with extraordinary rapidity. On 
her asking France and Germany, as in 1870, for 
a confirmation respecting Belgian neutrahty, France 
immediately gave a favorable answer and sent the 
same assurance to Brussels. This attitude of France, 
whether due to a high conception of her own duty 
or whether due to her military plans which did 
not include an invasion of Belgium, is altogether 
laudable. Germany delayed an explicit answer to 
England, but meanwhile was using other language in 
Brussels. Toward the English government she did 
not wish to assume the responsibility of pledging her 
word and then committing the outrage of breaking it; 
with Belgium she wished to hide the truth in order 
that the country might not be prepared, since the in- 
vasion beyond doubt was prepared beforehand and the 
German diplomats in Brussels knew it. 

In short, Germany made her decision; and in face 
of England's threat to declare war on her, Von Jagow 

185 



i86 THE WORLD WAR 

did not know any other explanation to give than that 
of military necessity; and later Von Bethmann-HoU- 
weg dissolved his own ideas in a sea of words and 
regretted that England should go to war for a scrap 
of paper.* 

Germany was at war with Belgium on August 4. 
On that day she assaulted the nation which, since 1^ 
birth three-quarters of a century before, had strictltr 
fulfilled its sworn pact. That same day England hav^- 
ing sent an ultimatum declared war on Germany. It 
was a grave day in that country, where they had not 
learned to reckon with the race that never pardons. 
It was a grave day in that country where political stu- 
dents and writers, lulled by a long peace and inflated 
by great prosperity, had not foreseen the danger of 
exploiting the credulity of the masses and the fanatic- 
ism of the governing classes. 

Could England have failed to enter a conflict which 
was jeopardizing the nation that so flagrantly disputed 
with her the domination of the sea ? Hardly. 

German writers have talked much about England^s 
intervening for the purpose of destroying the com- 
merce of her rival. To give only this hypothesis for 
her act means ignorance of the magnificent figures 
which British commerce has shown in recent years. 
That the active and audacious German competition was 



* Miscellaneous, number 8, 1914 Official document of the 
English government. 



ENGLAND^S DECLARATION OF WAR 187 

displeasing to Great Britain no one can deny ; nor that 
economic jealousy was one of the causes, perhaps the 
principal, of the political complications. Was it not 
the Kaiser himself who had urged German mercan- 
tile activity as the reason for his larger fleet ? Was not 
the international policy of the state, as necessary pro- 
t ,tor of commercial interests and as motive for those 
ifiierests, his idea even before it was adopted by the 
' nodern Phenicians" as the English have been called? 
Even before it became for a brief period the unfruit- 
ful program of an eminently industrial Republic like 
the United States ? 

The justification presented to the German people 
whenever new sums were asked for warships was that 
the expenditure would defend and augment their com- 
merce; and sotto voce, and indeed sometimes aloud, 
for there was nothing to fear from British imper- 
turbability, it was said that it would serve to chase the 
English from the sea. To these English the Kaiser 
threw out a threat when he said "Our future is on the 
sea" ; or his more picturesque phrase, "Without the 
consent of the German Sovereign nothing must hap- 
pen in any part of the world." No one can suppose 
that England, to whom supremacy on the sea was her 
very life, could remain neutral when such threats were 
about to be reinforced, or at least tested, by a struggle 
with other powers. 
13 



i88 THE WORLD WAR 

Nevertheless, English policy in latter years appeared 
to incline to the maintainence of peace. 

A certain phenomenon of these early moments must 
not be passed over without comment. On the Conti- 
nent, after the declaration of war, the various cabinets 
were strengthened by men who the day before had 
been irreconcilable adversaries — ^Jules Guesdes, in 
France; Vandervelde, in Belgium; while in Germany 
the great mass of those applauding the Kaiser was 
made up by the Socialists of the Reichstag along with 
his electors, all organized in regiments just as disci- 
plined as those that had marched to the front. But in 
England at this crucial moment three prominent mem- 
bers, champions of peace at any price, left the cabinet. 
There was opposition even among the supporters of 
the Liberal government. 

We do not mean that party differences regarding 
peace at any price did not terminate shortly after. 
The supreme voice of patriotism was heard by all, ask- 
ing its sacrifice from Irish as well as English, and all 
responded. But there is no doubt that if Germany 
had not been so scornful of her neighbor's rights, of 
treaties, and of English interests, the tacit protest of 
Morley and Burns as they left the House of Commons 
might have materialized into a preventive action on 
the part of a Parliament whose majority was much 
more inclined to peace than to war. Old Gladstone 
Liberals and young members of the Labor Party, that 



ENGLAND'S DECLARATION OF WAR 189 

is to say, the two extremes of which the government 
was composed by the repeatedly expressed preference 
of the people, were agreed to work for peace. At the 
beginning of 19 13 and again at the beginning of 191 4 
it appeared that this majority would split; that some 
would follow the fiery Winston Churchill and others 
the no less fiery Lloyd George, and all because of 
questions touching upon a possible war; only the au- 
thority of Asquith with his admirable statesmanship 
was able to prevent it. 

It would have been difficult for the English govern- 
ment to choose an opportune moment. She had to 
count on a parliament in unison with the people, which 
state of harmony was an easy matter only where pub- 
lic opinion had been prepared and worked up as in 
Germany. 

It must be remembered that Germany on her side 
was not able, in spite of her many efforts, to penetrate 
the intention of the British cabinet; for the British 
cabinet washed in any case to have its hands free. 

When the German government asked the British 
what its attitude toward Germany would be if the 
latter maintained the Treaty of 1839, which meant 
Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey did not wish to 
compromise himself and had to answer that he had 
not considered that point. The fact was, England could 
not consent to tie her hands. It was in the order of 
things that sooner or later, when the French shores 



I90 THE WORLD WAR 

were occupied, her own interests would force her into 
the conflict. This step could be avoided only by one 
of those aberrations like blinded pacifism, which the 
masses, more enamored of an absolute principle than 
a reality, undergo ; and from such danger the English 
people would not have been able to deliver themselves. 
Between entering later or entering at once the English 
government preferred that moment when Germany's 
merchant fleet was scattered, her warships off duty. 
Only in that way could she prevent being surprised as 
Russia was when the only declaration of war she 
received from Japan was the sound of the cannon of 
Chemulpo. 



<i^^ 



CHAPTER XX 

TURKEY AND THE CONFLICT 

THE nation that from the first resolved to follow 
the Germanic Empires into the formidable con- 
flict they had undertaken was Ti rkey. Ever since 
Turkey penetrated into Europe she has suffered the 
heavy consequences of not having accepted Christian- 
ity. An opposition, tacit when not violent, has made 
her the victim in political life of her religious faith. 
It appears that the European world which could tol- 
erate less logical creeds in remote continents would 
not compromise with Mohammedanism at the gates of, 
or within, Europe itself. Of that same Tartar race 
which long ago sent Bulgarians and Hungarians to 
settle in Europe's fertile places, and accept Europe's 
religion, the Turk has been the object of such ani- 
mosity that, to his detriment, an ideal of civilization is 
absorbed in an international interest — to expel the 
Crescent from Europe and then annihilate it. This 
appears to be the watchword of the present century. 
In our social existence nothing is worse than the union 

191 



192 THE WORLD WAR 

of sentiment with interest when the combination is 
directed to harming a given existence. 

The glorious history of Islam has been for some 
time past the fullest of sorrows. The years have 
brought her a continuous, unalterable diminution of 
power and loss of territory, and this to the general 
satisfaction, if not enthusiasm, of the entire world. 
And yet the Turk is considered by those who have 
studied that part of the Orient to have a good dis- 
position and great personal honesty. Although it is 
not to the credit of those practising Christianity to 
say it, it is nevertheless certain that of all the peoples 
in that part of the globe the Turk inspires most con- 
fidence and affection. Writers, diplomats, Europeans 
and Americans who reside there, and commercial trav- 
elers, all testify to this opinion. 

After long appearing to be in a trance, the Turks 
awoke not many years ago and dethroned Abdul Amid, 
the Red Sultan, and put on the throne Mohammed V. 
This initiated a regime of liberty. The revolution of 
the Young Turks, which for years had been hatching 
unsuccessful plots, was at last able to conquer by a 
proclamation and without great battles. 

But only in part did the revolution fulfill its mission. 
It was a question whether the new regime would be 
able to build up a solid barrier against either Slavic 
or West European ambitions, and to this task it was 
not equal. On the disappearance of the old routine, 



TURKEY AND THE CONFLICT 193 

foreign covetousness, stimulated by the fear that the 
Young Turk party might make conquest more difficult 
than formerly, awoke with more savage instinct than 
ever; and this very party, with its newly acquired 
ambitions for the old empire, encouraged in its turn 
European appetites. 

In the diplomatic field also there was a change. 
England was withdrawing from the first rank she had 
hitherto occupied, and leaving it to Germany; and 
Germany was decided to open a road through Turkey 
to Russia, who had just come back with new zest into 
Balkan politics. The work of the German ambassador 
Von Marschall found the field abandoned. Turks of 
both the old and the new order understood that they 
could hope nothing from Russia favorable to their 
interests, while Germany on the other hand could not 
awaken immediate suspicion even in the most wary. 
There is no doubt that Von Marschall whispered the- 
ories of legitimate expansion in the ears of the most 
credulous or ambitious, and these theories must have 
appeared sincere. Germans and Moslems constituted 
two great compact masses, two races equally warlike 
and situated in favorable positions; the union of the 
two ought to mean their glory and prosperity, and 
together they ought to be able to expel the smaller 
races whose early boldness had acquired formidable 
positions and had carried them to dreams of govern- 
ing of the world, to the detriment of more legitimate 



194 THE WORLD WAR 

interests. These and other theories explained pru- 
dently but in good faith, together with a realization 
of the international situation, inclined Turkey most 
decidedly toward the great Central Empire. 

On the day when two German warships pursued in 
the Mediterranean took refuge in the Dardanelles, 
Turkey not only received them but decided to go to 
war. Russia, instead of taking prompt action, was 
slow to understand that the moment had arrived to 
liquidate forever the account that had been standing 
ever since the Congress of Berlin; and England 
alarmed for her African possessions, also threw off 
that arrogance which was characteristic of all the 
nations in times of peace, and adopted a too conciliatory 
tone. 

Turkey for her part was in no hurry to enter the 
fight. For the moment she merely rechristened the 
Goehen after the famous Sultan, Selim Yaruz (whose 
companion in world domination was Charles V), re- 
tained the practical German seamen who manned it, 
prepared her fortresses, filled them with Germans,* 
and waited until, according to tradition, "the infidels 
would oblige her to give Europe peace by means of a 
war." 

In all this period preceding the declaration of war 
Turkey acted with great duplicity. On August 4, 
19 14, the grand vizir had assured the English repre- 



* The Times, December 11, 1914, account by Sir Louis Mallet. 



TURKEY AND THE CONFLICT 195 

sentative in Constantinople that Turkey renewed her 
assurance of remaining neutral.* When the Goeben 
and the Breslau entered Turkish ports he Hed and said 
they had been bought, and with feigned tears induced 
the EngHsh Marine Commission not to abandon Con- 
stantinople. As to what happened concerning the two 
German warships, the same grand vizir made many 
salaams and tried to justify himself to Ambassador 
Tallet when the latter arrived in Constantinople after 
his vacation, August 18. By the same hypocritical 
procedure the Dardanelles were closed, and there was 
even more hypocrisy when the abolition of the capitu- 
lations was being discussed. This page in the history 
of Turkish diplomacy is hardly in accordance with the 
teachings of the Prophet. 

It appears that Enver Pacha, ardent, patriotic, and 
ambitious to the point of aspiring to the caliphate, was 
the decisive factor in Turkey*s entrance into the war. 
Enver is the same who as Bey resisted the Italian in- 
vasion in Cirenaica, and who led the vanguard into 
Andrianoplis when it was reconquered ; more than all, 
he was the hero of the coup d'etat by which the mod- 
erate ministry was overthrown (not without blood- 
shed) and fell into his hands and Talaat Bey's, with 
the present grand vizir and the minister of state as 
decorative figures. The prestige of Enver Pacha was 
great in the army, for which reason Mohammed V 



Second English Blue Book, document number 3. 



196 THE WORLD WAR 

and his heir (Mohammed had got the throne only 
through an army conspiracy) were not strong enough 
to oppose his plans. If in a country like Germany 
the military party was able to impose itself little by 
little on the whole nation, it could do even more in a 
country like Turkey. Seeing that under her mantle 
of neutrality she was actively preparing for war, the 
three allied powers sent a collective note asking that 
all Germans who filled public positions in Turkey 
should be sent out. While the cabinet was vacillating, 
the war party, helped and perhaps inspired by Ger- 
man officers, committed the aggressions that provoked 
war.* 

The Sultan was to use the terrible weapon of the 
Holy War, kept as a threat, in order to make Egypt 
and India rebel against England, and Tunis, Algeria, 
and Morocco against France. His armies were to 
assault Russia and weaken her western frontier, while 
others hastened to the Suez Canal. By this means 
England, in order to defend Egypt, would have to 
abandon France. 

It would appear up to the present moment that the 
Islamic world is not to carry out these enterprises. 
The Holy War has not accomplished the hoped-for 
result. Apparently the true instinct of the masses, 
an instinct not unknown to the Mohammedans, warned 



"^The Times, December ii, 1914; article cited; also Second 
English Blue Book and Second Russian Orange Book. 



TURKEY AND THE CONFLICT 197 

them that once more religion was being made to 
serve poHtical ends, and that the statesmen in Con- 
stantinople invoked the Prophet without believing in 
him. Nor was the expected organization of the masses 
easy. Modern warfare demonstrates that the machine 
has taken the place of men and that the organization 
of an army is no simple task. 




CHAPTER XXI 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 



WHY Italy remained neutral at the outbreak 
of the war is not generally understood in 
spite of the copious explanation it has received. The 
Italian government stated its course clearly and 
the press of the country not only supplied the pub- 
lic with a great assortment of data, but in polemics 
against both underhanded and open attacks, it set 
forth many just arguments. But the great mass 
of people are not compelled to analyze or even to know 
the factors in the problem; for them it was easier to 
deliver the superficial criticism that the ally in peace 
did not continue to be an ally in war. Not only did 
the mass express itself in this way, but also certain 
writers who, forgetting their mission of elucidating 
events, allowed themselves to be carried away by the 
passion of the moment into publishing the statement 
that Italian neutrality constituted treason.* 

The remembrance of another neutrality, declared in 



* Hugo Miinsterburg ; "The War and America," page 74. 

199 



200 THE WORLD WAR 

1870 when the French government was hoping for 
Italian aid, lends some color to this accusation from 
disappointed Germans who, with reason or without, 
were hoping to see the Italian army on the battlefield 
of 19 1 4 in their defense. 

There is, however, a definite psychological fact back 
of this question. Without it the coincidence of help 
twice expected and twice failing in the decisive mo- 
ment could not be explained; it is, that official Italy 
has never been sentimental in politics. Going a step 
further we may add that though the Italian govern- 
ment has never been sentimental the public has always 
been so. Admirable dispensation which the marvelous 
Latin spirit has conceived, and which northern nations 
like England and the United States, where government 
is bound down to public opinion, or like Germany 
where government dominates public opinion, cannot 
understand. Nevertheless it responds to a salient ne- 
cessity in political ethics. The government is a super- 
intendent of affairs. It must weigh advantages and 
judge motives. Its chief care must be to harmonize 
the immediate and tangible good with the intangible, 
and not to violate the principles of collective order; 
for these, accepted and respected by all, constitute a 
national interest ; but neither must the government lose 
itself in abstractions and forget realities. The public 
on the other hand is the expression of the different 
phases of the human soul. It is sentimental, pas- 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 201 

sionate, valorous, cowardly, fool-hardy, prudent, and 
at times brutal. It is a kaleidoscope of all the con- 
ditions, positive and negative, of the human morale. 

And so we find Italians fighting on all fields and for 
all kinds of ideas. In America, Greece, Poland, Hun- 
gary, Italians have offered their arms and their lives. 
And although France did not see the armies of Victor 
Emanuel II fighting with her in 1870 as hers had 
fought with him on the plains of Lombardy in 1859, 
she could nevertheless admire Garibaldi's red-shirt ed 
volunteers in the Vosges Mountains and around Dijon. 

Sentimental policy on the part of the Piedmontese 
government first or of the Italian afterward would 
have made Italian unity impossible ; for had this unity 
been suddenly proclaimed instead of patiently achieved 
it would have been only ephemeral. Perhaps, indeed, 
Metternich's contemptuous "Italy is only a geographical 
expression" would have weighed eternally on the penin- 
sula. 

How differently was the Italian unity accomplished 
from the German. The latter could call upon the best 
army in Europe; three successful wars served her as a 
pedestal — 1864, '66, and '70, all of that easy kind of 
victory which proves the enemy's inferiority. More- 
over German unity was an amalgamation, not a reno- 
vation. The Italian on the other hand had only the 
reduced little Piedmont army — a few men without war 
material — and Garibaldi's group of soldiers. Its de- 



202 THE WORLD WAR 

feats were to be expected and its few successes could 
neither produce enthusiasm nor give hope. Moreover 
Italian unity was an entire renovation ab imis; it had 
to struggle against the head of the Church who had 
held Rome from the time of Charlemagne and even 
before ; it had to struggle against the secular monarchy 
of the Bourbons who held Naples; and against Aus- 
trian princes very influential in the court of their birth. 
Those who know Italian history understand that much 
resourcefulness and astuteness had to be employed to 
hold Napoleon III to his task of defeating Austrians 
on the fields of Magenta and Solferino in 1859; and 
to hold the English as friends in i860, and induce them 
to look with sympathy on Garibaldi*s expedition. 

Later, in 1866, and without alienating the good will 
of France, Italy allied herself with Prussia and recov- 
ered Venice from defeated Austria. Three years after, 
she attained her present extent by occupying Rome, 
which act Napoleon III, influenced by the Catholic 
Party so powerful in his court, refused to recognize 
in the name of that neutrality which he represented to 
France as benevolent, to England as a natural conse- 
quence of the League of Neutrals initiated by her, and 
to Prussia as a great service rendered to the cause 
which she herself was sustaining. Considering the 
machinations which beset modem Italy it is very patent 
that without this sort of secular genius, this utilitarian 
statecraft acquired in misfortune and prompting her 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 203 

to secure her rights not by the sword but by words, 
she would never have been able to accomplish such 
results. Had the sentimentality of the populace been 
guiding public affairs, Italian unity would still be 
merely a patriotic dream. 

Nearly fifty years have passed since Rome was made 
capital of the new Italian Kingdom, and these have 
been years of unbroken equilibrium and careful safe- 
guarding of the country's sacred interests. Austria, 
hated, was turned into a useful ally while France, 
the Latin sister, became a feared adversary. Bis- 
marck, with that characteristic astuteness which events 
have not discounted, wanted Italy to come into the 
Triple Alliance, led there by Austria in such a way 
that the two rival nations would be united from the 
start. Italy acceded with the approbation of most of 
her public men. To maintain, after unity was an ac- 
complished fact, the same principles which had served 
its formation had to be the program of Italian cabinets, 
for the period of consolidation was equally difficult. 
There was the covetousness of foreign governments 
to guard against, and still more menacing, an internal 
enemy — the Catholic and Apostolic Church of Rome 
with the immense number of faithful adherents w^ho 
kept up their protests and revindications, and who 
clamored unceasingly for the restoration of the tem- 
poral power of the Pope, 

Speaking on the present war in the Chamber of 
14 



204 THE WORLD WAR 

Deputies, Salandra, then premier, kept to this same 
practical poHcy. "We must be neither of one side nor 
the other,'' he said; "we must be exclusively Italian. 
Our neutrality is not the abandonment of positions 
conquered nor is it the act of Pilate washing his hands 
of responsibility; it is instead the solidest attitude for 
making our rights recognized and our aspirations 
satisfied." 

Therefore cool-headed statesmen smiled benevolently 
at the noise of the market-place and the acclamations 
and protests of the hot-headed crowd. They knew 
how the masses applauded great ideas and aspired to 
noble actions; how they were ready to make them- 
selves, even in their relative weakness, the champion of 
brilliant principles of ethical equilibrium ; but they, the 
statesmen, must go their own way, laboring for the 
consecration ad perpetuam memoriam of the works 
which others had so successfully carried on. 

Examining the matter in the light of this rational 
criticism it is easily seen that the Triple Alliance was a 
necessity for Italy. When it was formed, Germany 
was not the naval power that she is to-day and there- 
fore her friction with England had not begun. In- 
stead, although the increase in Prussia's power had 
somewhat diminished British sympathy, the two nations 
were still the natural allies they had always been. 
Italy on the other hand had a war fleet which was 
considered strong for that day and sufficient to neu- 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 205 

tralize any naval action on the part of France against 
Germany. Moreover Italy maintained her traditional 
friendship with England. Germany's powerful army 
was a guarantee to the new kingdom, defending it by 
its prestige and upholding the authority of the reign- 
ing house of Savoy which was not recognized in the 
south of the peninsula; above all it put a curb on 
French inconstancy, for France already repented hav- 
ing aided in creating a powerful rival. Of this the 
occupation of Tunis convinced even the most stub- 
bornly Italian and the most decidedly pro-French. It 
even alienated Garibaldi whose French sympathies had 
survived his ill-treatment at the Assembly of Bordeaux 
where, in spite of his having been popularly elected, 
they did not wish him as a member because he was 
not French. (This incident, it may be recalled, so dis- 
gusted Victor Hugo that he left the assembly.) On 
the occupation of Tunis Garibaldi wrote the following : 
"The treaty which France has made with the Bey of 
Tunis has shattered my good opinion, and if these 
unfair proceedings in Africa continue they will force 
us to recall that Carthage and Nice are no more French 
than I am Tartar; and that Italy has as much right 
to ancient Carthage as France has." * 

For Austria the Triple Alliance, besides signifying 
defense against the Slavic world, meant the recogni- 



* "La Triplice Alianza. Ricordi, note, ed appunti di un vecchio 
parlamentare." (Garibaldi's words are published in this book.) 



2o6 THE WORLD WAR 

tion by Italy of her holdings across the Adriatic and 
security from a former enemy at her back, always 
ready, as in the Austro-German war of 1866, to assault 
her in a trying moment. 

Difficult days of conflicting opinion preceded Italy's 
entrance into the alliance with the Central Powers. 
Agostino de Pretis, the premier who in 1881 began 
to exercise almost a dictatorship which was bound to 
terminate in his death, advocated ignoring the Tunis 
affair and continuing the friendship with France; 
Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, the celebrated internation- 
alist and scientist, was also for friendship with France 
but sought to harmonize it with intimacy with the 
Central Powers. A third diplomat. Baron de Blanc, 
then under-secretary of state and held in less authority 
than the other two, was most vigorous in insisting on 
the alliance with the Teutons as a necessary guarantee 
to Italy's future — a defensive alliance, for this was the 
only aspect which the matter then bore. This young 
diplomat saw most clearly into the problem and his 
argument triumphed. Bismarck insisted that Victor 
Emanuel's son Humbert I of Savoy should pass in 
penitence, so to speak, through Vienna on his way to 
Berlin ; and Humbert I, responding to a political neces- 
sity, went to Vienna on October 27, 1881. (This visit 
was never returned by Emperor Franz Joseph in spite 
of the many succeeding years which misfortune 
granted him on the throne.) On May 20, 1882, was 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY . 207 

signed the defensive treaty whereby Italy entered the 
already existing alliance between the two Central 
Powers, henceforth to be known as the Triple Alliance. 

We do not know the complete text of this treaty; 
but judging from the repeated declarations of states- 
men familiar with it in its entirety, and judging fur- 
thermore by the light of recent eevnts, the alliance in 
its multiple renewals never ceased to be defensive. 

When the present Kaiser came to the throne, Bis- 
marck as is well known was asked to retire. He was 
succeeded by General Von Caprivi. One of Von 
Capri vi's first acts was to write an official letter to 
Premier Francisco Crispi of Italy. After notifying 
him of his new dignity of chancellor he declared that 
as long as he held that post the German Empire would 
work for peace "but without departing from the prin- 
ciple of always being a good friend to its friends. This 
is the message which my sovereign has charged me to 
send, and it is also that of my own conscience." Crispi 
answered with great cleverness detailing the duties his 
nation had assumed and insisting indirectly, as is the 
manner of diplomatic documents, on the defensive 
conception of the alliance. "As with Prince Bismarck" 
he wrote, "so with you will I continue conscientiously 
for the maintenance of peace. But if the unfortunate 
day should arrive in which Italy or Germany, attacked, 
should find themselves in the sad necessity of defending 
themselves, you will see me following the example of 



2o8 THE WORLD WAR 

the king my sovereign, and in unison with the whole 
Itahan nation, ready to fulfill worthily and to the last, 
the duty which would be imposed upon us." * 

These words, knowing the man who wrote them and 
the satisfaction with which they were received in Ber- 
lin, meant more than they said. Crispi was the states- 
man of his epoch most inclined to the Central Powers. 
Whenever he was not in power German interests 
wanted him back, and Emperor William II even re- 
solved to journey to Italy especially to confer with 
him.f That Crispi was hated in France because of his 
political manoeuvres is in itself significant. If any man 
in Italy could effect a change in the nature of the 
pact which bound the three powers, it was he; more 
than this he persistently tried to change it. In its 
existing form he considered it insufficient. It did not 
prevent the difficulties with France which Italy was 
constantly suffering, since its strictly defensive charac- 
ter compelled the allies to cooperate only in a castis 
foederis. But fortunately for Italy, every time that a 
change of this sort appeared imminent, Crispi's minis- 
try fell, and also because the German government, 
being more prudent than its emperor, feared that this 
restless statesman might prove a dangerous friend and 
drag Germany into war at an inopportune moment for 



* Francisco Crispi ; "Questioni internazionali, diario e docu- 
menti," pages 3 and 4. 
t Francisco Crispi; work cited, page 291. 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 209 

a cause which was not hers. Hohenlohe used to say 
''Crispi keeps Caprivi uneasy just as he did Marschall 
and Holstein, for no one can foretell what this restless 
man will do next; especially as he has picked up a 
hot-head like Blanc for his minister of foreign 
affairs." * 

When the Emperor made the visit mentioned with 
the idea of interviewing Crispi and changing, perhaps, 
the clauses of the treaty, Italian policy had returned 
to its habitual tendency ; that is, it had given up imper- 
ialism by means of violent and audacious blows and 
had buried it in the field of Adua. It had realized that 
the African defeat was the natural consequences of all 
international acts which do not bear the right relations 
between the means employed and the object aimed at. 

Since Crispi no Italian statesman has had imperial 
hankerings; but with due caution all have followed 
Cavour's policy of trying to establish bases for ter- 
ritorial growth without colliding with other nations 
bent on the same mission. They have sought to pre- 
serve the traditional English friendship, to make com- 
pacts with France that would do away with mischiev- 
ous economic struggles and would regulate Mediter- 
ranean questions. In short they kept endeavoring to 
relax the too tight embrace of the Triple Alliance and 
save Italy from the risks which the other two mem- 



* "Memoires du Prince Clovis de Hohenlohe ;" Volume III. 



2IO THE WORLD WAR 

bers ran, and from identifying herself too closely with 
the various questions which concerned them. 

Thus the alliance began to decline and in 1899 the 
Foreign Minister Guicciardini affirmed openly in the 
Senate that even the casus foederis would not be suffi- 
cient to drag Italy into a war with England,* This 
statement, which neither Austria nor Germany chal- 
lenged, is extremely interesting. Without knowing the 
secret agreements which may have existed it would be 
venturesome to suspect that Italy had been dissolved 
from her obligations in the event of a casus belli pro- 
voked by England, But whatever may have been the 
full meaning of Guicciardini's words, they undeniably 
indicated that the force of the treaty, far from increas- 
ing as Crispi had desired, had waned. 

After the outbreak of the present war a revelation 
was made in the Italian parliament which demonstrates 
not only the permanently defensive character of the 
Triple Alliance but also that the present case, because 
it had had an identical precedent had already been the 
subject of interpretation by the Central Powers. Gio- 
vanni Giolitti, then premier, speaking with all the au- 
thority of that high position, pronounced the following 
words: "In order that our loyalty may be above all 
question I desire to make known to you a precedent 
which demonstrates that in proclaiming our neutrality 



* Benedetto CirmenI ; Deutsche Rundschau, November, 1914. 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 211 

the government has given an exact interpretation to the 
treaty of the Triple Alliance, and one admitted as exact 
by the other members of the Alliance. 

"On the August 9, 19 13, I received while absent 
from Rome a telegram from the Marquis di San Giu- 
liano, then foreign minister, in which he said : Austria 
has communicated to us and to Germany her intention 
of operating against Servia, and defines such action 
as a casus foederis for the Triple Alliance, which defi- 
nition I do not consider applicable. I will try to get 
in touch with Germany and impede this action; but 
it may be necessary for us to say that we do not con- 
sider this possible action as defensive, in which case we 
would not consider the casus foederis to exist. 

"To this I answered: If Austria operates against 
Servia it is evident that no casus foederis exists. It 
would be an action carried out on her own account and 
not in her defense since no one is thinking of attacking 
her. Therefore it is necessary to declare all this to 
Austria in the most serious manner, and we must hope 
that Germany will take some step to dissuade Austria 
from her dangerous venture. 

"This was done and our proceeding did not disturb 
in the least our good relations with our allies."* 

This revelation, which provoked long commentaries 
in all the foreign press, has never been denied either 



* Session of the Italian Parliament, December 5, 1914. 



212 THE WORLD WAR 

officially or privately. This declaration made so sol- 
emnly was accepted by all not only as certain but as 
conclusive. Moreover the argument was so evident 
that to discuss it would have been stupid; especially 
as during Italy's war against Turkey, Germany and 
Austria applied the same theory. More than this they 
showed themselves hostile and limited her field of 
action in the war. 

Thus we see that on the breaking out of the present 
conflict Italy's obligation was the following : To stand 
by her allies if the war was defensive ; if otherwise, to 
reserve her liberty of action. In spite of all that has 
been written one way and another, and in spite of all 
the differences of opinion to which human events give 
rise, no one has been able to establish that the present 
conflict came about through an attack by Russia, 
France, England, Belgium or Servia. The contrary is 
self-evident. The judicial fact is that Germany first 
declared war on Russia ; and as to the case between 
Austria and Servia nothing could be more incontro- 
vertible than that the first-named declared war on the 
second, and that, up till August i, the thesis declared 
and upheld by the Central Powers was that the ques- 
tion lay entirely between those two states. The ma- 
terial fact differs in nothing from the judicial, for 
even if Russia was arming herself she was doing it in 
order that her prestige in the Balkans might not suffer ; 
she was seeking a solution by virtue of which it might 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 213 

not appear that Austria had full power over the Balkan 
States, forcing them through fear, while Russia left 
them to her mercy. Still further do the facts support 
the case, for it was not Austria who complained of 
the attitude of Russia and declared war on her, but 
Germany — unexpectedly, and at the very moment 
when it appeared as if an agreement might be brought 
about. 

This declaration of war coming from Germany and 
not from Austria is the most explicit proof that the 
casus foederis did not exist and that Germany was bent 
on forcing Austria's hand and involving her in a Eu- 
ropean conflict. 

Writers most benevolent to Germany, and also the 
official documents of that nation, have synthetized her 
thesis in the following terms : The Triple Entente, 
under the perfidious guidance of England, were pre- 
paring to make war when conditions were most advan- 
tageous to themselves; Germany knowing this, chose 
the moment instead of waiting for her enemies to 
choose it. This may all be true; it is admissible that 
these were the reciprocal intentions of the belligerents; 
but setting aside all the occasional causes which might 
have presented themselves for avoiding the conflagra- 
tion, as they always do if given sufficient time, and ad- 
mitting that Germany rushed into an offensive war 
today in order to avoid a defensive one tomorrow, all 
this does not alter the problem so far as Italy is con- 



214 THE WORLD WAR 

cemed. The Triple Alliance stipulated nothing in re- 
gard to a preventive war, and in any case Germany 
should have taken counsel with all members of the 
Alliance if she wished their aid. The present war 
should have been decided by all three powers with 
equal voice. 

But instead, Italy was never consulted, never 
warned. Austria's note to Servia surprised Italy just 
as much as it surprised the Triple Entente. Indeed it 
surprised her more than it did England, since it ap- 
pears that something of its contents had been revealed 
to the latter in order to obtain from her a promise of 
neutrality. Everything indicates that it was feared 
that Italy's good offices might avoid the audacious 
blow which Austria wished to strike, and so she was 
left completely in the dark. It is not thus that a nation 
can be inveigled into a war for a cause not her own. 
Even had the Treaty of the Triple Alliance been of- 
fensive Italy would have had every reason for declin- 
ing to comply. With justice might she have said to 
the Central Powers, "I am your ally but not your 
slave." Once more had Teuton diplomacy fallen short 
of its aim. Decidedly Bismarck had embodied all the 
diplomatic talent of a whole epoch. 

Italy being absolved from marching to war beside 
the Central Empires, to have done so unnecessarily 
would have been treason to her own interests. To 
begin with it would have broken her traditional friend- 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 215 

ship with England which, though a little less close in 
the last few years, had never ceased to be sincere and 
useful. As a result of this break, Italy, with hundreds 
of miles of coast exposed and with a fleet inferior to 
that which the allies could assemble in the Mediter- 
ranean, would alone have suffered the consequences of 
naval warfare. Her commerce and her railroads, 
nearly all coastal, would have been destroyed; her 
principal cities would have been at the mercy of the 
enemy, for although, by the uses and conventions of 
maritime warfare, these should have been inviolate, 
we have seen how little respect the rules laid down in 
time of peace receive in time of war; a pretext could 
easily have been found for bombarding them. An- 
other matter to consider is that the Italian people have 
not the German conception of the state; they are not 
accustomed to an iron social discipline. And soon, 
with industries paralyzed, exportations and importa- 
tions made most difficult (for deprived of the sea no 
route would be open except through Austria and Aus- 
tria herself engaged in war) there would have been 
seething dissatisfaction; add to this the unpopularity 
of the cause, and one may see that public agitation 
tnight have risen to any degree. 

Although Italian military leaders have always held 
in high respect the German military organization, the 
general opinion has nevertheless been that England 
could not be beaten ; that her indisputable dominion of 



2i6 THE WORLD WAR 

the seas would neutralize every enemy victory on land 
and put her at last in a position to dictate peace terms. 
Thus no battle lost by England could redound to the 
adversary's practical benefit. Only when the enemy is 
at the mercy of the victor can terms be dictated and 
compensation received for all the sacrifices of blood 
and money ; and even in this case, considering the suf- 
fering and ruin which modern war presupposes, the 
compensation is never adequate. 

Even more; granting that fortune had smiled 
throughout on the arms of the Triple Alliance, Italy 
would not have come out benefited. As has been said, 
after the French occupation of Tunis and the Franco- 
Italian conventions of September 28, 1896, Italy had 
directed her energies toward the eastern end of the 
Mediterranean. She looked toward the trade high- 
ways of Asia. Later we find these aspirations coincid- 
ing with those of Germany and Austria, and affecting 
the interests of Turkey. Austria was trying to reach 
down to Salonica and dominate those waters; Ger- 
many was dreaming of a great empire from the North 
Sea to the Persian Gulf; and Turkey, having been 
stripped to almost nothing in Europe, naturally wished 
to maintain her Asiatic possessions. 

Another Italian aspiration, and one necessary to the 
defense of her own coasts, was Albania. Her inter- 
ests demanded either a weak state there or her own 
flag; but Austria also wanted Albania. A war vie- 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 217 

torious for the Triple Alliance would have meant that 
Italy must abandon her policy in Mediterranean Asia. 
As prelude to this she must withdraw her troops from 
those islands in the ^gean Sea which she had been 
occupying since the war with Turkey. It would also 
have meant the installing of Austria in Avlona and 
Durazzo, facing Italy's own southern coasts and only 
a few hours distant. Italy might have received in ex- 
change Tunis and Corsica; at least it is affirmed that 
these were offered to her if she would side with the 
Central Powers. But Tunis and Corsica were of little 
importance compared with what she was aspiring to. 
They meant but little in the commercial sense and 
nothing in the military. Weakened at the back and 
with the then existing equilibrium of Europe broken, 
Italy would have passed from an ally into a vassal of 
the Central Powers. Without a doubt Germany and 
Austria would be united more closely than ever after 
a favorable war and after the death of the aged 
Francis Joseph, perhaps in a common national bond. 
If this were consummated it would throw back the 
international situation of Europe to the times of the 
Holy Roman Empire, which period, as history shows, 
was not one of great fortune or great glory for Italy. 
On the other hand defeat of the Triple Alliance 
would also have signified disaster for Italy. It would 
have endangered all her colonies and probably Sicily 



2i8 THE WORLD WAR 

and Sardinia, islands which are really an integral part 
of her territory. 

These reflections on the results of the war ought to 
be sufficient even to the theorists and defenders of 
German acts to explain why Italy did not adhere to 
the Central Powers. Such writers have defended 
Germany's act in breaking the Belgian Neutrality 
Treaty, because to do so was a necessity of state. 
Chancellor Von Bethmann HoUweg from the tribune 
of the Reichstag enunciated the theory that a treaty 
could be broken for urgent reasons of state ; Von Jagow 
expressed the same to the English ambassador. Using 
this same theory, Italy, in spite of her treaty to cooper- 
ate with her allies in case of war, was justified in dis- 
regarding the piece of paper which imposed upon her 
an anti-national obligation. The foregoing is said, 
however, merely to demonstrate how slippery is human 
logic when influenced by passion. It is necessary to 
insist on the fact that there was no treaty obliging 
Italy to go to war against her own interests, when this 
war was offensive, almost aggressive. The Italian 
government was right then, when on August 3 she 
declared her neutrality to all the belligerents. 

Even with this much settled, a serious question re- 
mained unanswered : did the Triple Alliance still exist 
or had it terminated? This problem, profound from 
the theoretical point of view, also involved great prac- 
tical consequences. Evidently a treaty, like a private 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 219 

contract, terminates when the time expires for which 
it was concerted. But also a treaty like a private con- 
tract cannot exist when its cause has ceased to exist. 
The Triple Alliance had for basis the reciprocal de- 
fense of the contracting parties in case of attack. Ger- 
many and Austria having entered war de facto could 
not have fulfilled this obligation toward Italy had she 
been assaulted by a third power outside of the entente. 
Nor could Italy expect such aid had she joined them 
in the armed conflict, for the clauses of the compact 
would not then have applied. Italy being attacked, 
and it being proven that the case came within the 
clauses concerted, it would be patent that during a 
war which seriously compromised Germany and Aus- 
tria, Italy might remain neutral; and in a war that 
compromised Italy, Germany and Austria might re- 
main neutral. The legal precautions would not be 
understood. The justice that could measure either 
case does not exist in international law; for in inter- 
national law more than anywhere else, self-interest 
dominates, and even had the two powers been able 
to stand by the treaty they would not have done so 
unless opportune for themselves. 

A war is the dissolvent of international cohesion. 
Weakening some nations, strengthening others, it 
breaks the compacts which bind them. Even a victori- 
ous war changes the relation of the victors. What- 
ever the future may bring the treaty which now binds 
15 



220 JHE WORLD WAR 

Germany to Austria will certainly be changed. A war 
changes the whole field of diplomatic action and there- 
fore all kinds of relationship ; and certainly it changes 
all treaties unless these refer to fixed situations. The 
Triple Alliance was invented in order to maintain a 
supposed European equilibrium in the interests of gen- 
eral peace. It was to serve as a check on the French 
desire for revenge against Germany, on Russian domi- 
nation in the Balkans to the prejudice of Austria, and 
on the expansion of France to the prejudice of Italy. 
In short its mission was to prevent war. On this 
rested its defensive character. 

The Triple Alliance disappeared both in deed and 
in word the day that Germany declared war on Russia 
and France; nor could Italy, after her declaration of 
neutrality, expect any aid whatever, nor could the 
Central Powers give it to her or receive it from her. 
The treaty, then, had terminated for failure of its 
raison d'etre. To suppose that it still existed would 
be to oblige Italy to renounce all benefit from the con- 
flict, to render her powerless to defend her own inter- 
ests, and to condemn her to maintain a shadow with- 
out a substance. 

All this discussion leads to the question whether 
Italy was free to incline to one side or the other. 
Italian statesmen like Salandra, like the late Marquis di 
San Giuliano, and Sonnino, his successor as foreign 
minister, all considered that she was. Of the same 



ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 221 

mind were students and eleventh-hour pacifists and 
socialists like Napoleon Colajanni and Arturo Labri- 
ola. Men like Enrique Ferri, Sacchi, Bissolati, the 
aged statesman Giovanni Giolitti, never even admitted 
that it could be otherwise when speaking in parlia- 
ment; and so the Bettolo resolution to that effect was 
voted by the whole Chamber and the whole Senate, 
except for weak protests from a few orthodox social- 
ists. 

For Italy the war was now narrowed down to a 
question of opportunity and advantage. If peace could 
satisfy the national aspirations it would be maintained ; 
if not she would go forth on the battlefield and claim 
what was due her, thus to make sure that her confines 
might not be limited by the peace concert. 

The National Zeitung took occasion to remind Ital- 
ians of Macchiavelli's opinion on neutrality as once ex- 
pressed to Vettori ; but the caustic journal overlooked 
the fact that it was not this same kind of neutrality 
which the Florentine Secretary was condemning, but 
another sort inspired by his own extraordinary doc- 
trines — doctrines not sufficiently understood or appre- 
ciated by the simple-minded average person, who is 
sentimental only where another's interests are con- 
cerned. Here is the Zeitung paragraph in full : "It is 
exactly four hundred years ago this fourth of De- 
cember that Macchiavelli had the opportunity of ex- 
pressing his mind on neutrality. In answer to Fran- 



222 THE WORLD WAR 

cesco Vettori, Florentine envoy in Rome, who asked 
him what ought to be the attitude of the Pontifical 
State as between France, England, and Venice, on the 
one side, and the Swiss, Spain, and the German Em- 
peror, on the other, Machiavelli replied that to be neu- 
tral was of no use to a state unless it was stronger than 
the belligerents. The neutral was exposed to the hatred 
of the vanquished, to the contempt of the victor ; it was 
obliged to make contracts first with one then with the 
other, and each one of them thinking it might be 
cheated ; the neutral's fate was often to be taken over 
by the conqueror." * 

The words of Machiavelli applied to a neutrality 
which could trust the words of the belligerents and 
the principles of international law which guarantees, 
or ought to guarantee, to neutrals the undisturbed en- 
joyment of peace. But the good German critic knew 
perfectly well that to trust in the statutes of inter- 
national law , is not as tranquilizing in this century, 
aspecially after the cases of Belgium and Luxemburg, 
as it was in the fifteenth. Italian statesmen did not 
have to recall the words of their illustrious compatriot, 
and still less did they need the veiled threat of the 
Berlin newspaper. This has been demonstrated by 
subsequent events. 



* National Zeitung, December 5, 1914. 



CHAPTER XXII 



Italy's participation 



'VjEUTRALITY having been declared and having 
-^ ^ been accepted patiently by the Central Empires 
and joyfully by the Entente, it was not difficult to 
detect that other events were shaping themselves which 
would cause Italy to act more in harmony with her 
interests. These interests were concrete and popular 
— to consolidate her national unity, to assure her do- 
minion in the Adriatic, to hold the ^gean Islands 
occupied since the war with Turkey, and to establish 
a sphere of influence political and commercial in Asia 
Minor. Thus far it had been her two allies who ob- 
jected most to these aspirations. To Austria the first 
two enumerated were especially unwelcome. For her to 
voluntarily cede Italian provinces forming part of her 
empire so that Italy might complete her unity, would 
mean raising the most dangerous internal questions. 
To the multiple peoples tied to the chariot of the 
Hapsburgs it would teach a solution of their own 
problem which they are now prevented from contem- 

223 



224 THE WORLD WAR 

plating by the iron principle of integrity. All this 
Austria knew only too well; hence her constant nega- 
tive to every Italian claim. 

As far back as December, 19 14, when Baron Son- 
nino became foreign minister, Italy, with precision and 
ability, brought up a question which was bound to 
present itself and which slowly led her to declare war. 
Sonnino instructed the Italian ambassador in Vienna, 
the Duke of Avarna, to ask the Austro-Hungarian 
government what compensation it was disposed to 
make to Italy in accordance with Article VII of the 
Treaty of Alliance, the claim being based on the Ital- 
ian occupation of certain territory in the Balkans.* 
The aforesaid Article states with all clarity that if one 
of the powers should make territorial occupation it 
must previously fix the compensation which the other 
would concede. Its clauses had prevented Italy from 
acquiring European territory while she was at war 
with Turkey; and Austria then applied its terms 
with such severity that in case of not being heeded, 
or rather not being obeyed, she prepared to invade 
Italy; this was in accord with the plans of the 
General Staff whose chief. General Conrad Von 
Hertzendorff, most vehemently desired such inva- 
sion. Now Italy through the subtle penetration of 
her statesmen was reciprocating and using the same 
arguments, all of them drawn from the very notes 



* Italian Green Book, document number i. 



ITALY'S PARTICIPATION 225 

which Austria, unconscious of the future, had sent 
during the Italo-Turkish war. 

Count Berchtold, in the name of the Dual Mon- 
archy, affirmed that the miHtary operations against 
Servia did not signify territorial occupation either per- 
manent or temporary. Baron Sonnino replied that be- 
cause of the precedent which existed in the war with 
Turkey he could not accept this argument. "At that 
time Austria-Hungary" he said "on the basis of Article 
VII, prevented us not only from making momentary 
occupations but even from the most simple war opera- 
tions." * In Sonnino's note, which is a magnificent 
document of strict logic, three despatches are repro- 
duced: one sent November 5, 191 1, by which the 
Italian Government is informed of Count AhrenthaFs 
declaration "that any Italian action on the Ottoman 
coast of European Turkey or on the islands of the 
^gean Sea would not be admitted by either Austria or 
Germany, because contrary to the Treaty of Alliance ;" 
the second despatch, of November 7, 191 1, says "that 
Count Ahrenthal considered the bombarding of ports 
in European Turkey, like Salonica, Cavala, etc., con- 
trary to Article VII of the treaty"; and in the third, 
dated April 21, 1912 — the time of the Italian attack on 
the Dardanelles — Count Berchtold himself says : *'If 
the Royal Italian Government wants back its liberty of 



* Italian Green Book, document number 6. 



226 THE WORLD WAR 

action the Imperial and Royal Government could ask 
the same; but it cannot admit that Italy should carry 
out such operations or any others contrary to the point 
of view manifested in previous conversations. If such 
operations were carried out the consequences would be 
grave." 

Faced with precedents so concrete the Austrian min- 
ister changed his tactics and began to temporize. He 
had to transfer the defense of his point of view to 
another field. 

Meanwhile Prince Von Biilow was sent to Rome 
to replace the German ambassador Von Flotow. Both 
these men were well known Italophiles, the former hav- 
ing married into one of the most distinguished Italian 
families, the Camporeale. (It may be remarked in 
passing that the late mother of the Princess Von 
Biilow, in her youth a beauty at the court of Napoleon 
III, nearly occupied the throne of France instead of 
the Spanish Eugenia de Monti jo.) 

Von Biilow arrived in Italy with both good and bad 
intentions. His prestige was at stake, and he had to 
show the emperor who had relieved him of the chan- 
cellorship that he knew how to serve his country on 
all occasions. The good intentions consisted in obtain- 
ing for Italy the most favorable concessions from 
Austria. The bad consisted in suborning the internal 
politics of the country by fair means or foul. With 
the coming of Von Biilow, all that strength which the 



ITALY'S PARTICIPATION 227 

German Government can call into play in a nation 
which had long depended on her, began to make itself 
felt. 

But there is a popular instinct which easily under- 
stands events and foils all intrigues. The masses — 
even the pacifists, antimilitarists and socialists — all 
rushed to the public squares and in loud voices clam- 
ored for war against Austria. 

In Austria, the recently appointed chancellor, Baron 
Burian, a man careful and clever, abandoned the thesis 
of Berchtold and adopted another, namely : that it was 
impossible for Austria to cede territory because while 
in a state of war she could not give that which a treaty 
of peace might not leave in her power. By this thesis 
Burian interpreted the Seventh Article of the treaty 
in the sense that territorial compensations could only 
come out of conquests. A few days later, in February, 
he amplified it, formulating an accusation against 
Italy and demanding compensations from her because 
she had shortly before occupied a part of Albania, and 
also because of the vEgean Islands occupied long 
before. 

Baron Sonnino and the Duke of Avarna replied that 
Italy was not asking for territory which would be the 
object of conquest but of territory which belonged 
exclusively to Austria, since Article VII spoke of com- 
pensations, not of partitions; they claimed that the 
occupation of Avlona was in fulfilment of the pact of 



228 THE WORLD WAR 

London which obliged the powers united or separate 
to maintain order in Albania; and if, as it happened, 
Italy had gone alone with her army, it was because she 
was the only one of the signatory nations who was not 
a belligerent ; and as to the ^gean Islands their occu- 
pation depended on the fulfilment of the It. 'ian-Turk- 
ish treaty of peace signed in Lausanne, and that Count 
Berchtold, in a telegram of May 2t,, 191 2, had "re- 
nounced on that occasion the right to receive compen- 
sation." ' , 

In the second half of February the Duke of Avarna 
plainly informed his government that "the Imperial 
and Royal Government will never consent to make 
cession of territories belonging to the monarchy in the 
present conditions." * And at the same time Sonnino 
virtually indicated to Austria that if she would not 
accept Italy's interpretation of Article VII, the treaty 
would be considered null and void, 

Burian multiplied his arguments with admirable fer- 
tility and spun his web cleverly, but Italy was not to be 
caught. Instead she obliged him to withdraw much 
of his thesis, and so conversations were kept up and 
time was running on. It was not until the beginning 
of March that the Austrian government consented to 
go to the bottom of the question, forced to do so evi- 
dently by the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. 
But then arose another point no less serious — at what 



* Italian Green Book, document number 27. 



ITALY'S PARTICIPATION 229 

date must the cession of territory be made. The Italian 
government insisted that it should be immediate and 
the Austrian, at the end of the war. And this time 
she had Germany's full support. 

About this time the Italian parliament was expected 
to open anciWon Biilow began to operate, so to speak, 
on the men composing it. Most important among 
these was Giovanni Giolitti, and he it was who received 
most of the busy diplomat's attention. It is to be re- 
called that not long before, Giolitti had voluntarily re- 
signed from the premiership in favor of Salandra who, 
separating from his political leader Sonnino, had lately 
attached himself to Giolitti, while Sonnino, yielding 
to the difficulties of the moment, consented to become 
Salandra's foreign minister; but the majority of the 
cabinet was still inclined towards the former premier, 
Giolitti. He, as Von Biilow knew, was pacifist by tem- 
perament and would have preferred to satisfy popular 
aspirations without entering a war whose issue he con- 
sidered doubtful. 

Lobbying was incessant and gave rise to much suspi- 
cion. None fell on Giolitti but much on his alter ego; 
and the suspicion of subornation was confirmed in an 
imprudent moment by Von Bethmann-Hollweg.* Pop- 
ular agitation increased considerably, and parliament, 
for the most part contrary to abandoning neutrality, 
was won over little by little. 

* Discourse of Von Bethmann Hollweg in the Reichstag, May 
29, 1915. 



230 THE WORLD WAR 

By the end of March Austria put aside the previous 
questions and got to the point of formulating concrete 
propositions. In exchange for benevolent neutrality 
she offered a part of the Trentino, but Italy was to 
renounce every other pretention both during and after 
the war. Baron Sonnino answered by sending a draft 
embodying the following : The Trentino must he ceded 
in its totality; the Italian western frontier must include 
Gradisca and Goritzia; Trieste and its hinterland must 
constitute an autonomous state; the Curzolari Islands 
in the Adriatic must he ceded to Italy; Austria must 
recognize Italy's sovereignty over Avlona and its sur^ 
roundings, and renounce her interest in Alhania. In 
consideration of all this Italy would hind herself to 
strict neutrality and renounce all later compensations. 

Meanwhile the rumor ran that Germany and Austria 
would make a separate peace with Russia; and both 
groups of the belligerents let it run undenied, each 
hoping that it would cause Italy to decide. Austria 
thought she could impress her into accepting what had 
been offered, while the Allies supposed that the fear of 
a prompt termination of the war would hasten her. 

Count von Burian did not accept the Italian counter- 
proposition in its entirety — merely consenting to giving 
up the Trentino. 

Then Italy, whether for fear that matters were 
drawing to a conclusion or whether for other reasons, 
repudiated the Triple Alliance with the entire approval 



ITALY'S PARTICIPATION 231 

of her people, asked parliament for full powers, and 
prepared for war. And on May 24, 191 5, it was an- 
nounced that "His Majesty the King declares that Italy 
considers herself in a state of war with Austria-Hun- 
gary from tomorrow." 

During the pourparlers both nations were preparing. 
Italy had changed her artillery, filled the arsenals which 
the war with Turkey had depleted, and reformed her 
armament. Austria had fortified herself in the Alps 
and the Isonzo, had organized new army corps, and 
improved her intrenched camps till they were supposed 
to be impregnable. 

The people of the two countries, who had always 
been opposed even when the famous alliance was at its 
meridian, were filled with choler and hatred. The 
Italo-Austrian war represented an historic necessity, 
and Italy knew how to choose the moment. Von 
Billow was right when he said in his Imperial Germany 
"Austria and Italy may be either allies or enemies" ; for 
the day that the alliance terminated which Bismarck 
and events had forced on them, they were enemies. 

Von Billow now had to abandon his post in Italy, 
for although war was not declared against Germany, 
diplomatic relations were broken. The declaration 
came later as a logical consequence ; and in the present 
encounter of the Teutonic and Latin armies on the 
fertile plains of northern Italy, history is repeating 
itself. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

BELLIGERENT AND NEUTRAL BALKAN STATES 

THE European War was initiated in the Balkans 
and there, in that agitated peninsula, source of so 
many past political contentions and pretext for German 
imperialism to engender the present one, it will end. 
This is an opinion which has found many adherents in 
both belligerent camps. With this conviction the Ger- 
mans and their allies prepared and carried out the Ser- 
vian invasion at the risk of other frontiers where they 
were heavily engaged by superior enemy numbers ; and 
with this same conviction English, French, Italian and 
Russians, sent or prepared military contingents. It 
was this belief that made them, the Allies, fear the 
grave consequences of an adverse action, a fear which 
produced important consequences in the political field, 
such as the retirement of Delcasse, and later of Viviani 
and his cabinet. It was this fear which brought about 
the retirement of Sir Edward Carson and the reform 
of the English cabinet as to its functions; also the 
reappointment of a chancellor in Russia, a post which 

233 



234 THE WORLD WAR 

had been vacant since the time of Gorstchacoff, and 
the resignation of Sazonoff who, as foreign minister, 
had been for years promoting good friendship with 
England and strengthening the aUiance with France. 

Among the nations at war only Italy failed to pay 
serious attention to recent events in the Near East. 
Her disregard was probably influenced more by oppo- 
sition to Servia and Greece in their Adriatic aspira- 
tions, than by her clear vision of things. In such an 
agitated period when the slightest move might bring 
irremediable consequences it was not easy to discern 
the safest path. 

In this war it has been affirmed that England has 
twice been tricked — once by Turkey, once by Bulgaria. 
The reproach for this falls on those calculating states- 
men who worked on that party passion, always plenti- 
ful in democracies in spite of sacred unions, and mag- 
nified certain ill-advised events with that judgment 
which comes so easy the day after. Also it is affirmed 
that the Allies committed a grave error in not acting 
with rapidity and violence against Bulgaria and Greece. 
This is another easy judgment v/hich may be tolerated 
in the abstract but which cannot stand practical exami- 
nation. The fact is that no one parliamentary critic or 
publicist was able to indicate what should have been 
done in the respective cases. England could not pro- 
ceed against Turkey without first explaining to the 
suicidal government of the latter the benefits of neu- 



THE BALKAN STATES 235 

trality, and recalling past relations to her that had been 
more than friendly. Undoubtedly the British ambas- 
sador must have besought the grand vizir not to bring 
up the problem of Constantinople by entering into war, 
for it would serve to arouse new aspirations on the 
part of Russia, and these to the detriment not only of 
Turkey but also of England. 

It would appear that, granted the hatreds, the ambi- 
tions, the enormous convergence of difficulties, and the 
general greediness of the Balkan States, their problem 
can be solved only by the sacrifice of one of the com- 
ponent parts. Neither the Treaty of Paris nor that 
of San Stefano, nor of Berlin nor Bucharest, could 
successively say the last word because of the confusion 
of races in the peninsula, and the prolonged crisis 
which they, so long under a foreign yoke, were then 
passing through. Whether important or not for the 
objects and success of the Great War, this last Balkan 
complication effaces all the past hard work which 
Europe had to do in their behalf. To know this past 
work is necessary if one is to appreciate what is to be 
done in the future and to anticipate the consequences 
of the present struggle. 

In a mountainous region of limited extent, with 
scanty vegetation or mineral riches, are gathered to- 
gether less than nineteen million souls of many different 
races. They represent opposing civilizations and as a 
16 



236 THE WORLD WAR 

consequence of their successive domination within the 
group they hold different ideals; and the wars they 
have made on each other are legion. Greece bathed by 
the ^gean Sea can recall a race and a grandeur of 
other days, the quintessence of a whole illustrious era. 
Bulgaria on the Black Sea and with one insignificant 
port on the Mediterranean, holds a mixture of Tartars 
and Slavs who under their Czar Simeon in the ninth 
century dreamed of conquering Constantinople, and the 
Russians, and all the Latin peoples. Servia, on the 
central mountain chain, represents the purest branch of 
the Jugo-Slavs, who still sing the deeds of the 
Nemesios de Ettiene and of Duscian, emperor of 
Servia and Greece, to say nothing of the less dis- 
tant heroisms of Kara George and Miloch. Albania 
near the Adriatic is a mixture of Greeks and 
Wallachian-Slavs. Montenegro to the south has a 
population of Servian origin but which has diverged 
into customs of its own. These people had a 
political affinity with Russia of such long standing 
that far back in the time of Peter the Great they were 
declared vassals of the Muscovite Empire. In the 
northeastern part of the Balkan Peninsula is Rumania, 
whose population of Dacio-Latin origin is the rarest 
tessera in all this rare mosaic of races. The Ru- 
manians can look back to the glorious services they lent 
to Christianity in its long struggle with the Turks, a 
struggle in which Mircea the Elder, John the Terrible, 



THE BALKAN STATES 237 

and Michael the Brave made immortal names. In the 
southeast are the Turks with a past which few nations 
can surpass for heroism; and here and there, all over 
the peninsula, are mixed indigenous elements of the 
Roman period, Turkish elements which did not with- 
draw from the region when their empire lost it, Bul- 
garians whose presence might be construed into an 
anticipation of their country's political aspirations, and 
Spanish Jews, and Greeks, and Italians. And within 
any one of these groups are subdivisions caused either 
by ancestral ties or by customs acquired during years 
of political attachment to other groups. 

Swept thus together in the "racial dust-bin of 
Europe" these various elements have had to defend 
themselves against invaders and against each other. 
The very inclemency of the region has saved them 
from being politically absorbed ; likewise it has helped 
them to maintain their personality against foreign 
occupation and to congregate in their mountain fast- 
nesses and resist contact with the conqueror. But 
against these good qualities must be set a lack of public 
spirit in most of them. It is this which has prevented 
them from forming into a single state for common 
defense, an easy matter in the past century when their 
arch enemy the Turk was falling into decadence and 
when the current of thought was favorable to the prin- 
ciple of nationality. But Greeks, Slavs, Tartars and 
Latin colonists had no conception of the state. All 



238 THE WORLD WAR 

of them in spite of their different origin possess one 
common patrimony — love of the small autonomous or 
independent municipality. That this form of govern- 
ment proved to be an obstacle in the historic evolution 
through which they were passing is more than evident. 
They needed and lacked a coordinated army for ener- 
getic action against a common oppressor. Rumanian, 
Bulgarian, or Servian greatness, when separately 
achieved, could only fall after a brief period because 
victories cannot in themselves constitute greatness but 
merely stepping stones toward it; confronted by an 
enemy better prepared and with a better interior or- 
ganization, even victories do not mean final triumph. 

When fighting the Turk, the Balkan States, thanks 
to Europe, were able to gain their independence. Such 
was the influence of the moral (rather than religious) 
idea in the past century. But they would never have 
conquered the Crescent had they not united to form 
the Balkan League. For one brief moment they knew 
the strength of union; then before they could enjoy 
the spoils of victory or even sheathe the triumphant 
sword, they began to attack each other. 

It is a case where the difference of race, of past, and 
of psychology could not converge toward that solid- 
arity which would have given them, as fruit of their 
triumph, both greatness and the respect of the world. 

The most important Balkan state is Rumania with 



THE BALKAN STATES 239 

Wallachia and Moldavia, the two great provinces 
awarded her on the partition of European Turkey. 
Rumania contains seven milHon inhabitants and had an 
annual commerce exceeding two hundred million dol- 
lars. During three centuries the Rumanians suffered 
the direct domination of the Mohammedans. Shel- 
tered sometimes by Russia, they found intermittent 
respite from the horrors of a regime of ferocious oppo- 
sition. The Treaty of Koutchouc-Kainardji bettered 
their situation but this lasted only a short time. The 
privileges conceded by the hatti sherif, or imperial 
rescript, and later by the treaties of Bucharest in 1812 
and Adrianopolis in 1829, created a new state of 
things. The Rumanian principality was henceforth 
free to carry on commerce, to name princes from 
among its nobility at first for seven years and later 
for life; and best of all, it was left to the local authori- 
ties to fix taxes. 

The Congress of Paris could not look favorably on 
any Balkan state and least of all on Rumania, con- 
tiguous to, and protected by, Russia. This was the 
period of the *'Slav peril," one of the many hoaxes that 
have frightened the world ; and consequently Rumania, 
in spite of her protests and in spite of the usual jus- 
tice of Napoleon IIFs policy, could not obtain the 
satisfaction she hoped for, and saw herself organized 
into a sort of federation over which presided the Sul- 



240 THE WORLD WAR 

tan of Turkey with full authority over everything 
except legislation. 

But an internal movement annulled Europe's diplo- 
matic measures taken in favor of Turkey. Wallachia 
and Maldavia named, contrary to the statutes, the 
same hospodar or political chief. This was Alexander 
Conza who in 1861 assumed the title of Prince Alex- 
ander John I, and became the great reformer of Ru- 
mania, the great initiator of her modern organization, 
and the direct forerunner of her independence. A 
Turkish decree of September 10, 1861, recognized 
Conza as vassal prince, and authorized the constituting 
of a single assembly and a central administration for 
the two Turkish provinces. 

As always happened in the Balkans the victory which 
Turkey and other foreign foes could not win by arms 
alone was given to them by internal dissensions. The 
new prince was attacked in his work of regeneration 
by the former interests — local aristocrats on the one 
side and revolutionists on the other. His premier was 
assassinated June 20, 1862, just after having ad- 
dressed his adversaries in the legislative assembly in 
these vigorous terms : "Do what you will you cannot 
frighten me. You may crush me, but while a drop 
of blood runs in my veins I will defend society, the 
family, and public order." Four years later Conza 
himself was forced by a military conspiracy to abdi- 
cate in favor of the journalist Rossetti, chief of the 



THE BALKAN STATES 241 

plot; and thus closed the most brilliant parenthesis of 
Rumania's history. More bound to Turkey now than 
during the grave question of secularizing religious 
properties (which had been done with courage and 
decision by Conza), the Rumanians thought of taking 
a foreign prince whose family influence would save 
them from whatever future international difficulty 
might permit Turkey to exercise a sovereignty; for 
already they were looking upon her sovereignty as only 
nominal. In short they offered the crown to a brother 
of the King of the Belgians, the Count of Flanders; 
but Napoleon III did not approve and suggested in- 
stead Charles Hohenzollern, who was substituted for 
the national Rumanian prince. 

It appears that again on this occasion Bismarck 
resorted to his customary duplicity and pretended that 
the King of Prussia, head of the house of Hohen- 
zollern, would not give the necessary authorization; 
by which ruse he made Napoleon beg it all the more 
insistently. As was hoped. Napoleon's candidate, a 
prince of one of the most powerful houses of Europe 
and sanctioned by the King of Prussia, brought to 
Rumania all the personal prestige which would protect 
her from the jurisdiction which Turkey in accordance 
with the treaties claimed. 

In 1877, Rumania having helped Russia with great 
forces, her independence came as a natural thing. It 
was provided for by the Treaty of San Stefano and 



242 THE WORLD WAR 

ratified in the Treaty of Berlin; but it cost her the 
province of Besarabia which she was forced to cede to 
Russia in exchange for a swampy and sterile district. 
Rumania as an independent kingdom enjoyed a long 
era of peace and began to nurse expansionist dreams. 
She wanted to unite all Rumanians still living under 
foreign domination under the sceptre of the Prussian 
prince, and to vindicate her right to all those regions 
which they inhabited. 

These aspirations however have been kept within 
prudent limits. Rumania has followed the wise policy 
of not mixing in dangerous adventures nor yearning 
for excessive dominion ; instead she appeared to under- 
stand that the greatness of a race does not consist in 
the number of square miles it can claim, and that even 
the justest of causes must bide its time since, as hap- 
ens in international relations, there is no organism for 
the dispensing of justice. 

More than this. Rumania was able to establish 
friendship w4th the former oppressor, to keep up a 
cordiality with Russia, to live in peace with the other 
Balkan States, and even to avoid giving any uneasi- 
ness to Austria who held many Rumanians under her 
jurisdiction. When the Balkan Alliance was formed 
against Turkey it was impossible to persuade Rumania 
to join it. The Bulgarian premier even went so far 
as to indicate to the Rumanian, Majoresco, the neces- 
sity of arriving at some agreement in case of a possible 



THE BALKAN STATES 243 

catastrophe to the Ottoman Empire; but the latter 
refused to enter into conversations, answering that 
when the catastrophe arrived it would be time to talk, 
and that meanwhile there would be no misunderstand- 
ing between Rumanians and Bulgarians. Later when 
the Bulgarian minister in Bucharest brought up the 
same matter, Majoresco made the same answer. The 
Bulgarians were afraid, and rightly as subsequent 
events showed, to leave an undecided neighbor at their 
back. 

When the Second Balkan War broke out, not against 
Turkey, but to the shame of all concerned, among those 
who had just been joined to defeat her, Rumania went 
in, hoping to arbitrate the destinies of the combatants. 
She allied herself with Greece and Servia, sent her 
army to threaten Sofia, and forced the Bulgarians to 
sue for peace. On the opening of the present conflict, 
and for some time after, she maintained an attitude of 
vigilant neutrality. Like Italy, who was her ally in 
Balkan affairs, she knew how to navigate in troubled 
waters without shipwrecking either her dignity or her 
interest. Germany filled the country with spies and 
intriguers of all sorts. Bucharest saw an influx of the 
class of women specially useful in that capacity. But 
in spite of Germany's efforts, Rumanian neutrality 
was punctuated by frequent manifestations in favor 
of the Allies. 

When Italy joined the fray it was expected that 



244 THE WORLD WAR 

Rumania would instantly follow. But the government 
wanted still more time to consider and prepare; and 
this excess of prudence was her undoing. Her declara- 
tion of war against the Central Empires came late, 
when they, animated by new enthusiasms, could dis- 
pose of seasoned troops to hurl against her. The 
deep indentation made by Hungary into the middle of 
the Rumanian scissor-like frontier favored their quick 
invasion of the unfortunate land. 

Greece was the first nation to separate from the 
Balkan empire which Turkey constituted in the period 
of her splendor. This can be explained on the ground 
that in the prerailroad days the current of Western 
European civilization could more easily reach this sea- 
bound country than those inland. But there was also 
another and less practical reason, and that was Greece^s 
past gift of art and beauty to the world. The Hel- 
lenism of the early nineteenth century contributed 
much toward overcoming diplomatic doubts. 

On January 13, 1822, after a brief revolution, a 
Greek assembly met in Epidaurus to proclaim Greek 
independence and draw up a constitution. This is the 
period of the Holy Alliance. Sovereigns felt the need 
of strengthening their positions. They had not yet 
recovered from the consternation which France caused 
in 1789 and 1793; and on hearing the word revolu- 
tion governments as well as sovereigns trembled. The 



THE BALKAN STATES 245 

very people themselves, worn out by the harrowing 
Napoleonic period, were longing for a term of tran- 
quillity, even of debility with its peril of cruel relaxa- 
tion. But not the Greeks. Greece was really animated 
by those very principles which were inspiring so much 
terror; it was the reverberation of the great revolu- 
tion that roused her from her lethargy. Back in 1793 
the Hetaria, a cosmopolitan association which had for 
object the complete expulsion of the Turks from 
Europe, was founded ; and soon it spread from Vienna 
over the entire continent. Later, in Athens itself, was 
organized another called the Friends of the Muses, 
of literary guise, but in reality with the same political 
purpose back of its cult of Hellenism. 

The new preachings incited the Greeks to deliver 
their country from the yoke of a race so opposite in 
origin and religion, and to again raise it to its apogee 
of glory. The study of the great Greek monuments 
of art and literature by the two cosmopolitan societies 
named stirred Greek ambitions; and these are still far 
from appeased in spite of the satisfactions time has 
granted. 

At the head of the agitation were Capo dTstria 
and Ypsilanti. They seized upon the insurrection in 
Albania as a favorable starting point for their own 
projects, and straightway Greece and the JEgean 
Islands flew to arms. Ypsilanti hastened north in the 
hope of getting the Moldavian and Wallachian dis- 



246 THE WORLD WAR 

tricts to rise, but in vain; they could not be led by a 
foreigner. Meanwhile Ali, Pasha of Janina, had re- 
belled against the Sublime Porte and was in arms. 
The provinces of Epirus, north of the Gulf of Corinth, 
and Morea, south, proclaimed the revolution from 
Patras, and the revolutionaries occupied Rumelia. 

But the sovereigns of Europe, seeing the bonfire 
lighted, feared for their thrones. In that very year, 
1 82 1, voices were heard on every side reminiscent of 
past liberty; conspiracies were unearthed; the police 
everywhere noticed a something strange bubbling irre- 
pressibly to the surface; in short, there was a feeling 
of revolution in the air. And so, in spite of the Hel- 
lenism that had attracted France and England, in 
spite of Russia's advantage in ejecting the Sultan from 
Europe, and finally, in spite of the Christian ideal and 
religious influence, the powers of Europe, from the 
very first moment, took the side of th^ Mohammedan 
Empire against the little Christian country which w^as 
struggling with such ardor and success. 

The Sultan was not impressed by the first Greek 
success; in face of the danger he had only to do what 
is impossible in Christian Europe: to declare a Holy 
War and call all his coreligionists to come and defend 
the green banner of the Prophet. The effects of the 
Holy War however were not to be visited on the revo- 
lutionists alone, but on all Christians; and thus while 
the Mohammedan army, exalted by religious fervor, 



THE BALKAN STATES 247 

went conquering the weak little Greek forces, the ex- 
cited Islamic population in Stamboul committed hor- 
rible massacres of the Christians. 

Excess of defense was the system always adopted 
by the Turks and proved to be the cause of their many 
misfortunes. Greece was losing all the battles. Of 
the districts, or provinces, which had risen in favor of 
nationalism there remained only Morea or southern 
Greece and a few islands. There was every prospect 
of complete victory for Turkey, when Europe, hear- 
ing of the massacres, saw that she could no longer 
leave the Christians of the Orient defenseless. It was 
not the time to oppose such legitimate aspirations as 
those of Greece. It was not the time for sovereigns 
to fall back on reactionary generalizations which per- 
mitted their own moral interests to be prejudiced by 
such spectacles of blood. Among the many devotees 
of Hellenism was Czar Alexander I, who saw that 
his prestige and his amour pro pre would suffer if he, 
as protector of Christians living under the Turkish 
Empire, should consent to such slaughter. 

Next England entered the lists. Under pressure of 
public opinion, which for centuries has been a potent 
factor in that country, she tried to reconcile her role 
of moral protector to the Ottoman Empire with the 
dictates of western civilization. France also experi- 
enced a wave of opinion directed by Greekophile com- 
mittees which were sending arms and munitions to 



248 THE WORLD WAR 

the little nation. But the circumstance most propitious 
for Greece was the misgivings which began to insin- 
uate themselves in the various European cabinets. 
Each feared that the other might solve the grave 
problem in its own favor, or at least force a general 
crisis which might be contrary to the interests of the 
rest; and so the very same reactionary conspiracy 
which had been alarmed at seeing in Greece the begin- 
ning of many popular revindications (which were later 
in the middle of the century to explode terribly) now 
began to consider the question from another point 
of view — European equilibrium and Christian senti- 
ment. 

Thus it happened that when hope was least expected 
it came from those very powers who had shown them- 
selves hostile at the beginning. Nicholas I, successor 
to Czar Alexander, began by declaring that he wished 
to intervene alone and straighten out the difficulties, 
in disregard of the principle of Ottoman integrity. 
Rather than this, when Athens was taken by the Turks 
in June of 1827, a convention of the powers raised a 
voice and obliged Turkey to give autonomy to Greece 
under penalty of combined military action. 

This much accomplished, successive mistakes on the 
part of the Turks promoted her from autonomy to 
full independence. As the Sublime Porte would not 
accept the ruling of the convention, Russia declared 
war on him and arrived at the gates of Constanti- 



THE BALKAN STATES 249 

nople. On February 3, 1830, another conference of 
the powers convened in London and determined that 
Greece should be created an independent state with 
a Christian king. Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the 
first chosen, declined the post (and was soon after 
elected King of Belgium) and it was given to Prince 
Otto of Bavaria. 

But Greece had not the moderation of Rumania; 
her ambitions kept growing. Logical enough, consid- 
ering that her independence was born amid shouts of 
praise and sentiments of the highest idealism. She 
and all her sympathizers were dreaming of "the glory 
that was Greece,*' and forgetting meanwhile that to 
recover the soil of antiquity and live on it could not 
in itself bring grandeur and power. In the eyes of the 
patriots the little kingdom appeared a small thing 
hardly worth the bitter struggle it had cost ; soon they 
wished to extend their independence to other Greeks. 

Disturbances began and King Otto declared war on 
Turkey with the support of the whole nation; but the 
Greeks, being defeated, made their king pay the pen- 
alty as was their custom. Dethroned by the revolution 
of 1862 he was succeeded by Prince George of Den- 
mark, head of the present dynasty. As this king never 
identified himself with the spirit of the country he 
governed, he could with more calmness handle difficult 
situations and assuage the undisciplined passions of his 
subjects. 



250 THE WORLD WAR 

Nothing but a moment of weakness could have sent 
this house to war in 1908. It was an inexphcable 
disaster for Greece. Thanks once more to Europe 
peace was not purchased too dear. The Greeks were 
to retrieve themselves a few years later when the 
Balkan Alliance nearly drove the Turks from Europe, 
and to regain their military prestige soon after in the 
war against Bulgaria. 

In both these wars the Greeks were intimately allied 
to the Servians and continued the alliance. They 
bound themselves to support Servia in war should any 
Balkan nation attack her ; but present events show how 
the Germanic theory that treaties are mere pieces of 
paper makes easy converts. Greece under the influ- 
ence of King Constantine assumed an equivocal atti- 
tude. There was talk of an entente with Bulgaria, 
which if not formal and direct, existed through the 
medium of Germany. There was talk of having re- 
served the right, because of her maritime situation, to 
maintain a benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. It 
is probable that the cabinets of Athens, Berlin, and 
Sofia, had never even taken up the matter, but again 
as in past times national interests and family ties were 
the main influence, as explained in Chapter XXVI. 

Greece had so long languished under the Ottoman 
yoke that her liberation did not at first awaken great 
enthusiasm for commerce and agriculture. Only in 
recent years did the economic renovation commence. 



THE BALKAN STATES 251 

The country lacks a hinterland; the coastal regions 
suffer from a scarcity of water, and the remoter dis- 
tricts suffer from lack of communications; only re- 
cently were the few railroads constructed. On the 
other hand sea traffic has progressed enormously. The 
gross tonnage of steamers under the Greek flag 
amounted in 19 14 to 820 thousand tons, having risen 
from 139 thousand in 1898; this increase of fifty per- 
cent is something which no other nation has attained. 
Exportation doubled itself in the last nine years pre- 
ceding the war, having gone from 80 to 158 million 
francs ; but the replenishing of war material after the 
defeat of 1898 and the subsequent victorious wars ex- 
hausted the Greek exchequer, and the nation had fre- 
quently to turn to France. France and England held 
Greek prosperity and even Greek political expansion in 
their power, but Germany controlled the throne, the 
court, the general staff, and the greater part of the 
press. 

Of all the Balkan States, Servia has always been the 

most turbulent. She was the principal cause of the 

Eastern or Byzantine Emperor's calling the Turks into 

the peninsula centuries ago; and today, if not to blame 

for the German invasion of that same peninsular, at 

least she was the pretext for it. This Slav people first 

appear in history about the year 600 when they came 

from beyond the Carpathians and, with the permission 
17 



252 THE WORLD WAR 

of the Eastern Emperor, established themselves in the 
rude mountains which are today called Servia. Little 
by little the Servians developed and began to dream 
of unbounded grandeur; their hero Duscian wanted 
to march on Constantinople to save which the emperor, 
who still enjoyed a vestige of the old Roman prestige, 
called the Turks to his defense. Servians and Turks 
met at Kossovo, in 1389, and that battle destroyed 
every illusion and prostrated the land under five hun- 
dred years of oppression. The Servian Empire had 
succeeded in comprising the present country of that 
name, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Dal- 
matia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia. The right to Greece 
also existed in the title assumed — Emperor of Servia 
and Greece — but was not consummated. It is to the 
brilliant epoch of Duscian that Pan-Servian aspira- 
tions hark back, as if the great historic periods were 
parantheses to be opened and closed at will. 

The logical consequence of Ottoman cruelty was 
Servian revolt. At the beginning of the last century 
the semi-political brigandage gave way to coordinated 
rebellion. In 1803 the chiefs of the little country, in 
laying their grievance before the Sultan, made known 
a political and moral state of surpassing horror. "Our 
life, our religion, our honor, are threatened. Not a 
husband can be sure of protecting his wife from out- 
rage, nor a father his daughter, nor a brother his 
sister. Cloisters, churches, monks, popes — none are 



THE BALKAN STATES 253 

safe from desecration." In spite of the Sultan's con- 
ciliatory words the consequence of this petition was 
more repression, and out of the goading of the people 
rose the figure of Kara George (George the Negro) 
as the Turks called the national hero George Petro- 
vitch. By his Turkish appellation he has come down 
to fame and by it the dynasty which he founded is 
known. 

But the hero is not always the victor, and by 18 13 
the Sultan had triumphed. Nevertheless he had prom- 
ised in the Treaty of Bucharest, signed the preceding 
year, that de motu propio he would grant certain 
autonomy to Servia. Shortly after, he made use of 
Miloch Obrenovitch, who later became head of the 
second or rival Servian dynasty, to organize this 
autonomy. But after bridging over the moment of 
danger the Sultan did not keep his compact and Miloch 
Obrenovitch began a new revolt, at the same time do- 
ing away with Kara George by having him assassinated 
in his sleep. 

By the convention of Akkerman and the Peace of 
Adrianople, Servia secured better treatment; and a 
Httle later, in 1830, a hatti sherif gave the principality 
organization and legal personality. In 1856, the 
Treaty of Paris, of celebrated memory, put this statu- 
tory organization under the guarantee of the powers. 
Soon after, the last Servian fortress was evacuated by 
Turkish soldiers; and the Congress of Berlin held in 



254 THE WORLD WAR 

1878 recognized Servians complete independence. 
With this the green banner of Islam ceased to float 
over the land. Of all this amelioration Russia was 
the moving spirit. 

The Obrenovitch dynasty was to pay dear for the 
unscrupulousness of its founder Miloch. King Milan 
put himself at the service at the house of Austria and 
with his hands in Francis Joseph's pocket, decided the 
fate of his kingdom and initiated the difficulties of the 
modern Balkan period. At the instigation of the 
Vienna government he attacked Bulgaria in 1885; but 
his first small successes were later turned into decisive 
defeat. He was forced to abdicate and his son and 
successor was the king who, along with his queen 
Draga, was the victim of the well-known tragedy of 
1903. This shocking assassination, including as it did 
the queen's brothers and several cabinet ministers, put 
Servia for awhile beyond the pale of civilization. 

But the new king, Peter I, a descendant of Kara 
George, prudently gave Servia a Russian orientation 
which later led to the Balkan League and Servian ex- 
pansion. The league was principally the work of 
Servia and Bulgaria. It was a splendid conception 
which might later have produced favorable results for 
all concerned and have been a blessing to Europe and 
the cause of civilization; but Balkan appetites were 
as ever exorbitant; and just as in physics, no two 
bodies can occupy the same space at the sam^ time, 



THE BALKAN STATES 255 

so in politics no one territory can belong to two nations 
at the same time. 

Servia's program, as we shall see, included con- 
quests difficult to make and detrimental to other na- 
tion's interests; she had to be brought within more 
modest bounds. Turbulent, agitated, always causing 
new complications, she has long been Europe's chief 
anxiety. Her proximity to Austria was partial justi- 
fication for her temper, for it is well known that all 
peoples who have misgivings get a certain amount of 
reactionary influence from the adversary. The men- 
tality of the Servian masses, like all collective mental- 
ity, could not dissimulate. Therefore confronted by 
Austria who wished to check her development, her 
ambition enlarged till it became a veritable lust of 
territory. 

Economically subject to the Dual Monarchy, she be- 
came tributary to it to such a point that in 1884, when 
Milan was king, seventy-eight percent of her exporta- 
tions went to Austria who sent back ninety percent of 
the importations. Austria, with that sinister intuition 
characteristic of her dealings with subject countries, 
knew of the situation and tyrannized over Servia eco- 
nomically. From 1906 to 1910 she declared a tariff 
war which impoverished the country still more. 

Servia's total foreign commerce in normal years 
amounted to less than 200 million francs; while her 
public debt at the beginning of 1913 reached nearly 



256 THE WORLD WAR 

659 million francs. From that time her commerce 
continued to decrease and her debt to augment. Today 
she is a ruined nation fighting heroically, feeling the 
full weight of a war of annihilation ; and in the Euro- 
pean peace concert she will have an implacable adver- 
sary, Austria ; an enemy, Germany ; a reluctant friend, 
Italy, two sentimental allies, England and France ; one 
decided but inefficient defender, Russia. 

On each one of these post-bellum elements depends 
her future. 

In 1907 Bulgaria by way of celebrating her libera- 
tion from Turkey unveiled the statue of the Czar Lib- 
erator. Her homage to Russia was of the fullest. In 
that nation she recognized the source of her inde- 
pendence. The following year Ferdinand I took the 
title of Czar of the Bulgarians and formally declared 
the independence which had already been verbally ac- 
knowledged by the Congress of Berlin and by innum- 
erable subsequent acts. The somewhat presumptuous 
title of Czar easily found heraldic experts to corrob- 
orate it by unearthing the precedent of Czar of the 
Bulgarians and the Greeks which Bulgarian rulers had 
assumed in her period of greatest splendor, when she 
was dreaming of conquering all the Latins and the 
Slavs. 

Bulgaria has no upper middle class. Lacking it, 
there is no great concentration of riches; property is 



THE BALKAN STATES 257 

quite evenly divided and agriculture is the only source 
of income. Her history as a free state is her present- 
day history, and her political inclinations are emphat- 
ically liberal. The race is more liberty-loving than 
the Servian, more vigorous in political life than the 
Greek, and less diplomatic than the Rumanian. Many 
consider her the most consistent of the Balkan States. 

The origin of the Bulgarian has not been determined 
with exactness, owing to the many elements which 
have gone to his making. He came originally from 
the shores of the Volga. To this Mongolian stock was 
added Thracian-Illyrian-Slav, and after that all the 
ethnic mixtures possible in that locality. Somewhat 
akin originally to the Turk the Bulgarians have always 
tried to differentiate themselves from their kinsman 
during their long period of subjection, but have suc- 
ceeded less than the Servians. 

Like the other Balkan peoples the Bulgarians had 
their day of power. Their capital Tirnova pretended 
to outshine Constantinople, which city their Czar 
Simeon would have accupied had not their rivals the 
Servians attacked his army in the rear. At its height 
of splendor the empire extended as far as the Adriatic, 
comprising Thrace, Macedonia, Servia, etc. — in brief, 
the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. Bulgaria 
has made war on Greeks, Rumanians, Venetians, Hun- 
garians, and all others within reach; only to be con- 
quered with them all at Kossovo by the common 



258 THE WORLD WAR 

enemy the Turk. This sealed Bulgaria's doom. She 
was effaced from the map. 

It would appear from a study of the psychology 
and history of the Bulgarians that the blood of the 
primitive Volga stock in their veins counts for more 
than their early annals indicate. They can rise rapidly 
in grandeur, stand firm in victory; but let misfortune 
overtake them and they sink into lethargy. This ex- 
plains why the "Bulgarian Atrocities" which so roused 
the righteous indignation of Gladstone found but faint 
echo in the subjects of these atrocities. Looking back 
over Bulgarian history we find that while the Greeks 
were heartened by the French revolution, while the 
Rumanians were trying to throw off the Turkish yoke, 
while Servia was appealing to the great Napoleon for 
aid, Bulgarian men submitted to seeing their women 
violated and bent their own backs to the heavy blows 
of the Kurds. Not until 1876 did they rebel, and then 
but timidly. The movement needless to say was quickly 
submerged by the oppressor's Bashi-Bazouks under a 
sea of Bulgarian blood — the "atrocities" which so re- 
volted the noble soul of the English premier. 

Russia, partly by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1877 
and partly by her insistence at the Congress of Berlin 
the following year, was able to present Bulgaria with 
an informal independence, which was ratified into the 
absolute and formally recognized condition a little 
later ; hence the statue to the Czar of Russia. Rumelia 



THE BALKAN STATES 259 

was added in the course of events and nominally sepa- 
rated from Turkey, both acts being corollaries to a 
problem already solved. 

Like Greece, Bulgaria has known two reigning 
houses within a brief period ; first the Prince of Bat- 
tenburg who soon relinquished the honor, and next 
the present ruler Ferdinand who, by custom and in- 
clination is Germanic, in spite of the blood of Louis 
Philippe which flows through his veins. 

While the economic organization is favorable to an 
equitable distribution of material benefits it does not 
produce a rapid development of riches. Thus Bul- 
garia's condition of independence has not brought her 
the prosperity she hoped for. With an area of 96 thou- 
sand square kilometers and a population of nearly 
four and a half million she had, before the Balkan 
War, an exportation of 184 million francs and an 
importation of about 200 million. Her public debt was 
over 600 millions and this sum doubled itself and more 
after the Balkan Wars. Both politically and econom- 
ically the Bulgarian situation is grave. Politics have 
been generally in a chaotic state and some of the 
most important men in the kingdom have been im- 
prisoned on the government's order; and as to the 
nation's credit, a loan made in Germany shortly after 
the war began, was at the rate of seven and a half 
percent, and with other usurious conditions besides. 



26o THE WORLD WAR 

There have probably been more loans at a higher rate 
since. 

Until the aggressive conduct against her quondam 
allies which provoked the Second Balkan War, Bul- 
garia enjoyed the general sympathy of Eurpoe. In 
much greater degree than Servia she stood for liberal 
institutions and was simple, thrifty, disciplined, and 
of a high order of military virtue; but that unex- 
pected and crafty assault on those who had been her 
brothers in arms the day before, apprised Europe that 
the Mongolian with all his traditional defects was in 
her midst. Next she turned against Russia; and to- 
day the Russian Czar Alexander, the Liberator of Bul- 
garia, must smile from his bronze pedestal as he 
watches soldiers march through Sofia and listens to 
the roar of the cannon on the Varna. And if his 
disembodied spirit has taken cognizance of the pres- 
ence of Turkish troops in that land which he freed 
from them at the cost of so much Russian blood, he 
must be convinced of the madness of the whole human 
family. 

The Bulgarians will probably continue to regard the 
statue with respect while they carry on their policy of 
unlimited ambition, of hatred and vengeance against 
Servia; but, at the same time, they will never be per- 
suaded of the faithlessness of their present attitude. 
Did not Radoslavoff , one of the most important states- 
men of the Stambuloff interregnum, announce to an 



THE BALKAN STATES 261 

aFtonished world that Bulgaria had long been in a 
state of legitimate defense against Russia? When it 
comes to such a statement the conscience has lost all 
equanimity and is incapable of judgment. 

) 

Montenegro as a state is a negligible quantity, but 
not so as a moral entity. The little race which com- 
poses it has written epic pages in history. Of Servian 
origin the Montenegrins climbed from the shores of 
the Don to occupy the high mountains and have held 
these tenaciously against inclement nature and con- 
tentious enemies. This mere handful of the earth's 
inhabitants offers more poetry than sociology to the 
student. Isolated in their mountains they did not hesi- 
tate to resist the Byzantine emperors, the Bulgarian 
invasion, and the ever-returning Ottoman. War was 
their mission, violent death their destiny; and to this 
day when a child is baptized at the font Tl is with the 
pious prayer "God save thee from dying in thy bed !" 
When the Turks had conquered all the Balkan regions, 
conquered the Hungarians, reached the gates of 
Vienna, the Montenegrins were still defending their 
territory with heroism and success. 

Nominally dependent on the Sultan when not actu- 
ally at war with him, they nevertheless had their own 
dynasties ruling with a sort of semi-theocracy, and 
keeping up direct relations with other states. It was 
not until 1878 that the Sublime Porte recognized Men- 



262 THE WORLD WAR 

tenegro*s independence after thoroughly despoiling 
her, with the complicity of all Europe and the active 
aid of Albania, of all that territory which had been 
accorded her by the Treaty of San Stefano. But in 
spite of its small extent the present king, Nicholas I, 
who succeeded on the assassination of his uncle Danilo, 
accomplished much for his people. By means of clever 
diplomacy, by his frank and sincere conduct, by the 
important marriages made by his children, and by the 
admitted and admired valor of his subjects, he suc- 
ceeded in raising his little kingdom to international 
importance; and yet its whole wealth, its debts, its 
assets, its commerce, would not equal that of an average 
city. Nicolas I played his part in the Balkan Wars but 
European interests deprived him of his share of the 
spoils. What they gave him was not the prize he 
sought. Throughout all he continued faithful to 
Servia and has kept at her side in the present war. 
Once more the Montenegrin warriors are seeking vio- 
lent death, and chanted war songs are the daily bread 
of the people. 

The only time the Balkan States were able to con- 
quer the Turks was the day they united. In that his- 
toric moment they forgot the suspicions and enmities of 
the past and stood together with a common interest. 
They at last apprehended the necessity of suiting their 
acts to their interests, a conception formerly too diffi- 



THE BALKAN STATES 263 

cult for them to grasp. But unfortunately, both for 
themselves and the peace of Europe, this correlation 
between action and the common good lasted but a 
short time. Covetousness and passion again gained 
the ascendancy which they hold over weak states just 
as they do over weak individual consciences. 

The Italo-Turkish War of 191 1 was bound to 
weaken Turkey and diminish her prestige; conse- 
quently it was natural that those nations who still had 
hundreds of thousands of their own race subjected to 
the Turk should try to get some benefit from the 
defeat. Europe however was not at all anxious to see 
the conflict extend to the Balkans and forbade Italy 
to carry the war farther than Africa and the sea. The 
Balkan States, as we have seen, were products of suc- 
cessive European Congresses, and were living in con- 
tinuous tutelage of the great powers; but the famous 
phrase Italia fard da se was repeated by the politicians 
of those countries, and their increasing military 
strength gave each one of them the right to apply it to 
herself. Let the Balkans, they said, also do for them- 
selves whatever their interests dictate. 

To allow a favorable situation to pass by would be 
a great mistake; so the idea of an alliance surged up 
spontaneously, and the members of the various govern- 
ments, either through diplomacy or directly, set forth 
the grounds on which they could agree. Under the 



264 THE WORLD WAR 

pressure of circumstances they arrived at signing a 
treaty. 

The preamble of this compact is extremely signifi- 
cant in the present moment. It begins : "His Majesty 
Ferdinand I, King of the Bulgarians, and his Majesty 
Peter I, King of Servia, penetrated with the convic- 
tion of the community of interests and the similarity 
of purpose of the two sister nations, Bulgaria and 
Servia, do hereby, etc., etc." It is well to keep this 
language in mind when examining subsequent acts. 

After the treaty came military conventions and secret 
appendices which all virtually form an offensive alli- 
ance against Turkey, with the design of taking from 
her all her European possessions except Constantinople. 
This was to be done under the patronage of Russia 
who, from protector of the Christians living in that 
part of the globe, had become the active friend and 
defender of all the new Balkan States. 

From the first moment grave obstacles to the alliance 
presented themselves; the discussions revealed deep 
jealousies and suspicions, from which it was easy to 
predict what afterwards actually happened. 

When GuechofT, the Bulgarian premier, had an 
interview with Milovanovitch, the Servian premier, 
both were simultaneously enthusiastic over the idea 
of the union; but later when Rizoff, Servian repre- 
sentative in Rome, and Stancioff, in Paris, took up 
with Milovanovitch the question of how Macedonia 



THE BALKAN STATES 265 

should be divided (when won) difficulties arose. The 
same thing happened after the Greek representative in 
Bulgaria, Panas, declared officially that "if Bulgaria 
could promise her participation in a war in which 
Greece might be attacked, he was authorized to state 
that Greece would reciprocally participate in a war in 
which Bulgaria might be attacked." The Bulgarian 
cabinet agreed unanimously to the clause, but later 
came difficulties which could not be settled without 
resorting to posterior arbitration. The Czar of Russia 
was selected as arbiter. In fact, Article II of the 
secret addendum to the treaty between Servia and 
Bulgaria terminates thus : "The two contracting par- 
ties bind themselves to accept as definitive frontier (of 
the future conquests set forth above) the line which 
His Majesty the Czar of Russia, within the limits indi- 
cated above, may find most in conformity with the 
rights and the interests of both parties." And in Arti- 
cle IV of the same addendum more scope is given to 
the arbitration by the clause: "All differences which 
may arise as to the interpretation and execution of any 
clause whatsoever of the treaty, or of the present secret 
appendix, or of the military convention, shall be sub- 
mitted to the final decision of Russia." 

In the minds of some of the statesmen arranging 
these affairs there was a presentiment of future trouble 
in spite of their efforts to provide a solution for every 
question. But this was offset by the belief that Russian 



266 THE WORLD WAR 

influence would count for much and that the Czar^s 
judgment, given in the interests of peoples equally 
friendly, would be respected. 

The diplomatic situation and the military organiza- 
tion being all prepared, and the public mind worked 
up to the proper pitch, partly through Turkey's own 
acts, the war broke out. Turkey could do little to 
defend herself and victory crowned the efforts of the 
Balkan allies. These efforts, as the following figures 
show, were not uniform : Bulgaria had over sixty thou- 
sand dead and wounded, Servia about fifteen thousand, 
and Greece less than eight thousand. Bulgaria it will 
be seen bore the principal burden of the war. 

All Europe, but especially Russia, followed the 
campaign closely. She alone, as hers was to be the 
grave responsibility of arbiter, knew the secret com- 
pacts. In those days Europe was living on a volcano 
and any new Balkan trouble might have widespread 
and terrible consequences. 

When Bulgaria threatened Constantinople and could 
easily have taken the last trench which opposed her 
invasion, she was checked. Russia, although favorable 
to expansion, had fixed its Columns of Hercules in 
Adrianopolis. The occupation of Tchataldja was 
vetoed. And this because Constantinople constituted 
the age-old aspiration of Russian policy. Its posses- 
sion meant a brilliant and assured economic future for 
the whole south of the immense empire. Therefore 



THE BALKAN STATES 267 

Russia preferred to see it remain in the hands of a 
decadent state like Turkey, who was bound to be ex- 
pelled one day or another from Europe, rather than in 
the hands of a young and vigorous nation like Bul- 
garia. The Muscovite Empire had given its full sup- 
port to the Slavs or Slavized population of the Bal- 
kans. She had fought for them many times, had 
thrown the weight of her European influence on their 
side, and had covered them even when they were in 
error with the mantle of her power; but she was not 
ready to give them her most precious aspiration. 

And so, although the allied Balkan States conquered 
all along the line and occupied all the former Ottoman 
possessions, Europe decreed that they should not cross 
the line of Tchadaldja nor partition Albania and thus 
arrive at the Adriatic — a curious phenomenon which 
demonstrates once more how relative are human 
affairs ; these same states had been vanquished by Tur- 
key and in their very defeat they had found, because 
Europe willed it so, the satisfaction of many of their 
ambitions; now they had vanquished Turkey and by 
will of that same Areopagus of powers they were to 
be deprived of their prize. In the first instance they 
did not inspire fear and Turkey did; now it was just 
the contrary. 

The two Adriatic nations, Italy and Austria, were 
of Russia's mind. They did not wish a young, vio- 
lent, and audacious state established at the entrance to 
18 



268 THE WORLD WAR 

their sea, so they too placed their veto and in far more 
brutal form than Russia's. By it the Balkan States of 
Greece, Montenegro, and Servia, saw the territor}^ they 
had expected to divide considerably reduced. To have 
bowed to superior force would have been prudent. 
Had they not felt its benefits in other days? Should 
not the one have compensated the other? 

But they could not see it that way. In misfortune 
the statesmen of the three countries mentioned lost 
the serenity of more fortunate days. Discussions and 
accusations began; and while they were disputing, the 
various armies started fighting each other. War broke 
out, and the victory, as is known, did not favor Bul- 
garia. Attacked at three points she could not resist cind 
had to submit. The treaty of alliance was broken by 
the sword and with it went the question of Russia's 
arbitration. 

Bulgaria had to suffer the blame. Perhaps as a 
nation she did not deserve it but certain it is that the 
nation, either by order of the king or by military edict, 
accepted the deeds committed. There could have been 
no cabinet resolution to this effect for the cabinet still 
hoped for the arbitration provided for in the treaty, and 
which meant Russia's support: its representative 
Danoff was in the Russian capital at that very mo- 
ment to secure it; yet no one can deny that the whole 
nation, cabinet included, was full of joy over the first 
small successes obtained. 



THE BALKAN STATES 269 

(The Servians and the Greeks, as pointed out in an 
article in the Le Temps, hardly appeared grief-stricken 
by the affair and it is probable that the assault carried 
out by the Bulgarians was not altogether contrary to 
their own desires.) 

When peace was restored, the Balkan States in spite 
of their reprehensible conduct did not suffer grave 
consequences. Bulgaria to be sure did not receive what 
she wished nor even what was at first offered; and 
yet she was able to add twenty percent more territory 
to her kingdom, by deducting it from the region ceded 
to Rumania, and sixteen percent to her population. 
Her new 23 thousand square kilometers were in 
Thrace and Macedonia and with them she received 633 
thousand inhabitants and a port on the ^gean Sea. 
The cession of Cavala, so hotly disputed, was forcibly 
upheld by Russia in spite of the fact that Bulgaria's 
leaning toward Austria was already discernible; but 
it was impossible to take it from the two conquering 
states. Servia got seventy percent more territory and 
a million and a half more inhabitants, which meant an 
increase of fifty percent over her previous figure, and 
Greece received eighty-eight percent more of both land 
and population, the latter doubling by the fact. 

Thus we see that compensation was in the inverse 
ratio to sacrifices made; Bulgaria who thought her- 
self entitled to so much came out with little. She, a 
country of agriculturists, dreamed of playing in the 



270 THE WORLD WAR 

Balkans the same role that Prussia played in the Ger- 
man confederation, and so the remaining states, 
through fear, limited her powers. 

Germany's decision to carry the war into the Bal- 
kans bears the stamp of an offensive tending to avoid 
an aggression. Germans possess a special mentality 
which has led them to believe too much in acquired 
rights ; but in a war of this importance only the treaty 
at the end can determine what those rights are, and a 
nation can be conquered even while it holds enemy 
territory. It has been said that General Joffre, cold- 
bloodedly measuring events, exclaimed : "That France 
should be a battlefield afflicts me, and I grieve for my 
compatriots in the occupied territory; but as for con- 
quering the enemy, it does not matter whether the 
field of action be in France or elsewhere." This apt 
thought which on the face of it might have emanated 
from an English brain, applies to past wars also ; Fred- 
erick the Great might have handed it down to his 
descendants. 

To invade Servia meant to ungarrison the new 
Russian fronts, reduce the forces on the western front, 
and increase the danger of an Italian invasion; that 
Germany took such risks must have been the conse- 
quence of one of two facts ; either Turkey threatening 
to make a separate peace, must have implored aid with 
such insistence that it could not be denied, or else, 
warned by the Balkan monarchs of the possibility of 



THE BALKAN STATES 271 

their joining the Allies under the influence of public 
opinion, the German governing powers with the Kaiser 
at their head wanted to terrify their enemies by sheer 
power and take all the warlike spirit out of them. No 
other hypothesis appears admissible. 

To follow the road which would threaten Egypt 
has all the pretentiousness of an expedition in the 
Napoleonic style — that into Russia, for example, but 
with the addition that the Servian campaign would 
have the same form as the Napoleonic wars in Spain. 
To suppose that Germany went to Turkey to get men 
would be to suppose her ignorant of Ottoman affairs, 
which was not the case ; or that she went to Constanti- 
nople in order to make the Sultan declare a Holy War ; 
for the fact is that the Holy War lost its raison d'etre 
the moment Turkey allied herself with a government 
not Mohammedan; furthermore Germany must have 
known that the Arabs feared an increase of Turkish 
power and that the Arab was the only element that the 
Turk could make into an army. 

Whatever the German design may have been her 
activity in the Balkans modifies the whole Balkan 
question. Before, there may have been some predeter- 
mined scheme; today there must be another radically 
different. 

The prospect of a satisfying partition, of commercial 
outlets in the Adriatic, of the internationalizing of the 
Dardanelles, were all possible, even easy. The Quad- 



272 THE WORLD WAR 

ruple Entente had tried to find a solution which for a 
moment appeared to be acceptable. It gave satisfaction 
to all and annulled the Treaty of Bucharest which had 
been the cause of so much resentment. But Bulgaria 
committed under the inspiration of this very solution 
the same error that she committed the day she ordered 
her armies to assault her allies. After two wars in 
which the flower of her youth perished, after an ex- 
penditure of more than a thousand millions, we find her 
within three years' time in another war, allied to a 
nation whose interests are contrary to her own, who 
holds the theory of domination by virtue of brute force, 
and who used to declare that the Balkan nation was not 
worth the slightest effort. Such an act must have 
been dictated by passion not by reason. 

The fact is that each one of the Balkan States is 
aspiring to again build up an empire such as existed 
in an entirely different epoch, which will comprise iden- 
tical territory whose centers will vary. For the con- 
venience of the moment they can accept an arrange- 
ment, but real alliance is impossible. Considering the 
insatiable ambitions of each one it is necessary, if an 
equilibrium is ever to be attained, that one of the 
states must be sacrificed. There must be an epoch of 
general agreement to make them understand that they 
must submit to the interests of stronger nations which 
have historic reasons or acquired rights. When one is 
weak he must respect these rights. Above all their 



THE BALKAN STATES 273 

many disillusionments should have made them see that 
there is no attaining all in a single moment; and that 
after the results of the war against Turkey they should 
have felt satisfied and contented for a reasonable 
period. Even Bismarck, whom no one exceeded in 
ambition, was content to rest on the laurels of his 
victories. 

The question of the Dardanelles and that of the 
Adriatic are more ancient than the Balkan question, 
but are related to it geographically if not politically. 

Whatever may have been the immediate reason for 
Italy's not sending a contingent to the Orient, and 
whatever may have been the direct cause of Italy's 
policy of reservations, the latent antagonism to Servia 
was at the bottom of it. If conventions and treaties 
existed these had not been able to alter it, and to the 
Servian antipathy must be added that against Greece, 
also based on conflicting interests. 

On these two states being formed and with relative 
strength, Italy, farsighted, looked toward Rumania to 
whom she was attached in sincere friendship. Be- 
tween these two Latin nations a treaty exists but its 
terms are unknown. Certainly it must have for basis 
the Balkan statu quo in the interests of Rumania, and 
especially the statu quo of the Epirus and of Albania in 
the interests of Italy. 

But the Pan-Serbs aspire to dominate the whole 
eastern coast of the Adriatic from Trieste to the sea. 



274 THE WORLD WAR 

They base their aspirations on the rights of the ancient 
Illyrians; they claim to represent the Eastern Roman 
Empire ; they declare the Servians to be the successors 
of all the eastern tribes who imbibed their ideas from 
this same empire; they remember the greatness of 
their king-conquerors. They go even further, — they 
claim that Venice and the coast south of it were once 
in their hands and that the city was founded by Slavs. 

Historically true or false as these statements may 
be they have the defect of ignoring all posterior his- 
tory, of forgetting the work done by the Venetians, or 
that done long before by the Romans, or that of the 
Popes ; they overlook the Italianizing process that had 
gone on for centuries, and above all, the actual present- 
day state of things. 

Even setting aside all these precedents the Servians 
would reduce to uniformity the mixture of races, types, 
and tendencies that exists on the eastern shore of the 
Adriatic. And yet they have not been able to har- 
monize their interests with those of one tiny portion 
of Albania which they have occupied. The tribal 
rainbow in that part of the Adriatic not only is diverse 
through origin, but because of its lack of social dis- 
cipline it could never submit to any state unless that 
state could rapidly endow it with commercial riches 
and the political force of well ordered administration, 

Italy at this moment is not fighting Austria in order 
to create at her back an enemy even more ambitious. 



THE BALKAN STATES 275 

Any one who does not know the preceding cannot 
explain Italy's anxiety. 

In the Dardanelles it was the same story. Russia 
fought for centuries against Turkey, created one Bal- 
kan state after another with the one sole object of be- 
ing able to liberate her products from the tyrannous 
master of the Straits who might choose not to let them 
pass through. When Bismarck inclined Russia toward 
Asiatic expansion he knew that she might thus attain 
enormous proportions but not enrich herself. Russia 
might have acquired vast new regions, whole Asiatic 
nations, and an immense number of square miles. She 
could have become colossal in the German style; but 
not great according to Latin ideology. Russia has no 
outlet, for she can export her products by the north 
only during a few months of the year; in the south 
she is tributary to Turkey or whomever may possess 
the Dardanelles; in the west she is at the mercy of 
Germany and to a certain extent of Sweden; and in 
the east she is far from the coast. The present war 
has demonstrated that Russian vastness is not great- 
ness, since it has no sure sea route. 

For centuries Russian statesmen have understood this 
and all their international action has been directed 
toward obtaining Constantinople. It appeared outrag- 
eous to Russia that little nations of three or four 
million inhabitants without industry, without sufficient 
strength to serve as a guarantee — nations who like 



276 THE WORLD WAR 

Bulgaria owe their whole existence to her — should 
come to dispute this right with her. That England, 
who made herself mistress of the Mediterranean, of 
India, and then of Egypt, and who secured great in- 
fluence in Persia — that England should have fought to 
prevent her occupying Constantinople was easy to un- 
derstand ; that England should have always upheld the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire and thus dissembled 
her self-interest, was almost just; that France, Eng- 
land and the little Piedmont kingdom should have 
joined in the Crimean War was explicable; but that 
upstart tribes of yesterday, elevated to the category of 
states, should wish to oppose the vital ideal of their 
protector, was truly exorbitant. 

Russia entered this war with a fixed idea of securing 
Constantinople. To defeat this end is Turkey's only 
extenuation, for the war for many reasons is contrary 
to her interests. It is said that when the present French 
president, Raymond Poincare, was foreign minister he 
signed an agreement by which he bound France, in case 
of a general war, to support Russia in the occupation 
of Constantinople. It is further stated that this secret 
treaty was unknown to the English until after they 
had intervened in the present conflict. If this is true, 
and it is entirely within probability, the English action 
in Gallipoli would appear a consequence of the secret 
Franco-Russian treaty rather than a necessary military 
action. If the Russians get down to Constantinople 



THE BALKAN STATES 277 

they will hold the city, they will hold the Straits, they 
can have a commerce; but even then they will not be 
the masters of the eastern Mediterranean, nor will 
they dominate the road to India. If the Germans can 
realize their dream the Bagdad route is already inter- 
cepted. 

The Balkan tangle has its explanation, but it is not 
such a serious thing as to be decisive in the life of 
Europe. For years it has been a thorn in the side 
of statesmen, but today it is chanting its de profundis. 
The Balkan intervention in the general conflict is the 
tramonto of an old, old question. Others will be the 
problems of the future. 




CHAPTER XXIV 

BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRALS IN LATIN AMERICA 

WHEN President Wilson declared war on Ger- 
many, it was with the hope that the greater part, 
if not the whole, of Latin America would follow him 
into the conflict. Had this happened it might have cre- 
ated an international wave of condemnation as effica- 
cious as armies ; or even had it yielded less result than 
its illustrious author expected, it would nevertheless 
have affected the cause of civilization most favorably. 
It would have weakened kaiserism not only in the three 
nations which today serve as a pedestal to that cult, 
but also within the confines of Germany itself. 

But it must be confessed that Latin America re- 
sponded only in small part. Later, as Teutonic vio- 
lence became more unbridled on the seas, the countries 
in question appeared better disposed to understand the 
serious duties incumbent on them in the present tragic 
period. In November of 191 5 we published in Le 
Matin, of Paris, an article declaring all moral neutral- 
ity to be a crime;* today we go further and declare 



* Le Matin, November 15, 1915; "Une neutralite qui est un 
crime." 

279 



28o THE WORLD WAR 

all judicial neutrality a crime at a moment when the 
fate of the world is compromised. Not to participate 
in the struggle favors the cause of social retrogression 
championed so strongly by the Central Empires. 

The first to follow President Wilson's lead were 
Cuba and Panama on April 7 and 10 respectively. 
On the nth, Brazil handed the German minister his 
passports but did not reach the point of declaring war 
till some eighteen months had passed. Bolivia broke 
diplomatic relations on April 13 and Guatemala on the 
28th. On May 18 and 19, Honduras and Nicaragua 
followed suit, and on June 9 and 11, Haiti and Santo 
Domingo. Last on the list come Peru, San Salvador, 
and Uruguay, who found that they could no longer 
treat with German representatives who were propagan- 
dists rather than diplomatic agents. 

Cuba had the honor of following the United States 
immediately. Liberals and Conservatives, the only 
groups represented in the parliament of the little re- 
public, promptly decided to commit their country's fate 
to the immense international conflict. This was a 
logical step. Unlimited submarine warfare being the 
issue between America and Germany, an island coun- 
try could not consent, through silence, to the hallowing 
by force of a principle which handed neutrals over to 
the mercy of belligerents. Least of all could the larg- 
est and most important of the Antilles do so. She 
who had suffered much did not feel herself called 



LATIN AMERICA 281 

upon to submit to hunger and desolation for other 
peoples' quarrels. The German theory would have 
endangered Cuba out of all proportion to her size and 
wealth. 

The Cuban congress put a touch of sentiment to the 
decision. As the step taken by the United States was 
its first act of international hostility since the war 
with Spain undertaken precisely for the purpose of 
liberating Cuba, it was natural that the latter should 
now respond by a generous support which would re- 
pay, as far as possible, the debt then contracted. More- 
over, Cuba, while still a Spanish colony, had always 
kept alive the principles of civilization and progress 
and had given to the world her modest contribution 
accordingly; in her struggle for independence she al- 
ways sought to relate this personal or national effort 
to the general cause of human liberty. In reaching 
her decision regarding the world war she did not for- 
get that in the conflict with Spain in 1898, Germany 
would have put a check on the nation who championed 
Cuba's cause, and would have sought some other solu- 
tion than the natural one had England not prevented. 

It cost no effort for Panama to follow Cuba. She 
of all nations could least afford to remain neutral after 
the United States had taken a stand, for she owed 
her life to its ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, who, 
to favor the high principles of progress, did not hesi- 
tate before an act of international violence (which he 



282 THE WORLD WAR 

had the courage to leave nakedly as such with no at- 
tempt to clothe it in the dubiously sentimental mantle 
of modem diplomacy). Panama's neutrality would 
have put the Canal Zone in grave peril. It might have 
permitted Germany to use the ports temporarily, or 
German citizens to flock into the small republic in great 
numbers and form perhaps terrorist nuclei acting on 
orders from Berlin. The United States did not ter- 
minate France's work of uniting the two great oceans 
for the purpose of putting it at the disposition of fan- 
atics. She knew too well from her own experience 
what the compatriots of Von Papen and Boy-Ed were 
capable of. In deciding to protect it the Panama Re- 
public anticipated the desires of the White House and 
gave proof of discreet foresight. 

Supposing on the other hand that the United States 
were defeated, it is easy to sketch the story of Panama 
as the prey of German land-lust. The second step in 
the march of German hegemony over the earth would 
bring it to the fertile and weakly governed states of 
Central America. In which case the Panama Canal 
would play a more important part than the Suez Canal 
plays in the present stage of history. Once in posses- 
sion of it Teuton power would receive its eternal con- 
secration, for it would dominate the two great oceans 
and with them the commerce of the world. If, under- 
standing this, Panama had remained neutral either 
because she selfishly expected salvation through the 



LATIN AMERICA 283 

efforts of others or because she thought her influence 
neghgible, she would have shown that she was un- 
worthy of her present poHtical status; her secession 
and the act of Roosevelt in her behalf would have had 
hardly the justification of success. 

The nations of America who have not responded to 
the call and who do not stand beside the United States 
and the Allies, are acting contrary to the dictates of 
their own interests. The human struggle now being 
enacted does not admit of specators; he who watches 
indifferently the frightful debacle which may hurl hu- 
manity back into medievalism is a traitor to the high 
principles of civilization. Latin America, standing by 
unconcerned in such a moment, gives the lie to both 
history and geography. 

No serious-minded student of the question can doubt 
that a German victory would reinforce kaiserism with 
all its principles of military strength; it would serve 
as a pedestal to the emperor; for the whole nation, 
even those who have clamored for their rights, would 
prostrate themselves before the colossus. The history 
of the Hohenzollerns tells us that their ambition knows 
no limits. From the little corner of Brandenburg to 
the wide expanse of modern Germany they have found 
the road easy in spite of Napoleon and in spite of Aus- 
tria. Nor does history give us any promise of a 
change of their tendency; excepting the moribund 

Frederick II, of brief reign, they have all had one 
19 



284 THE WORLD WAR 

single idea, clung to tenaciously by opposed fathers 
and sons alike — one single principle, one single faith: 
an insatiable greed for territory. 

Should they succeed in their present designs it is not 
difficult to foresee the future state of the world. Ger- 
many dominating it, and some Friedrich or Wilhelm 
dominating Germany from the Gulf of Riga to the 
Straits of Calais; England reduced to a second-class 
power, France a vassal, Italy again invaded, Russia 
Teutonized, and the seas in the grip of the conqueror. 
All the past which Rome bequeathed us, destroyed ; all 
the political regeneration which England has been com- 
pounding in the enormous crucible, lost ; all the ideal- 
istic grandeur of the French Revolution, vanished ; the 
Latin soul, practical and sentimental, and the Saxon, 
analytical and sedulous, swept away into the mists of 
the past. 

That this should not come to pass is worth a super- 
human effort on the part of the nations; and those 
who will not make the effort may sit to-morrow in self- 
reproach or in that deep remorse which is the ener- 
vating price paid for improvidence. 

If Latin America voluntarily excludes herself from 
the great current of events, if she envelops herself any 
longer in an emasculated neutrality which is blind both 
to great human ideals and to her own interests, she 
will put herself out of the concert of civilized powers. 
It still appears, in spite of the decomposition of Rus- 



LATIN AMERICA 285 

sia and the defeat of Rumania and Italy, that the 
Allies would win their cause. The day after there will 
be no room for those Latin-American nations who 
have lagged behind listening to the far-off roar of 
the furious battle. The little American republics who 
have not feared danger will be part of the new society 
of nations, but not so the larger ones. It was Faust 
who said that liberty was worth conquering anew each 
day; and so in international politics, recognized rights 
are always the corollary of a historic duty fulfilled 
resolutely and without flinching. 

Whatever be the victory of the Allies, complete or 
partial, let us repeat that neutrality will still have been 
a crime so far as the interests of the Latin-American 
nations, separately or collectively, are concerned. The 
hegemony of the United States on each side of the 
canal would remain recognized and sanctioned. It 
would be theirs for having sacrificed their blood and 
their material interests with a generosity unprece- 
dented; it would be theirs for having responded even 
at the cost of interior disturbances to the appeal of a 
historic duty, in an hour of supreme necessity; and 
finally it would be theirs because they would have 
welded themselves in close friendship to the European 
nations who, in future international affairs, would 
accord them a freehand in all the American continent. 
There would be no grounds for expecting anything 
else, and some future secretary of foreign affairs 



286 THE WORLD WAR 

could say, with regard to Patagonia, "these territories 
interest us because the sphere of influence which we 
exercise over them obHges us to observe a continuous 
and vigilant tutelage." It would be but a repetition of 
what the present secretary, Robert Lansing, said in 
his report on the purchase of the Danish Antilles and 
apropos of the people of the Caribbean Sea. 

Argentine, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, all hav- 
ing discontinued diplomatic relations with Germany 
would, by declaring war, insure a brighter destiny for 
Latin America and give her a place in the society of 
nations which is forming on the battlefield where im- 
perious necessity has brought into being that which 
the exhortations of students and dreamers was power- 
less to create. Were these countries to declare war, 
the United States would not have the right to affirm 
before History, as she may with more than justice if 
the present conditions continue, that while her armies 
went forth and her citizens gave their lives and money, 
the greatest republics of Latin America were sunk in 
selfishness. W^ere these to declare war on Germany 
they would pay a debt of long standing and one from 
which their circumstances have exempted them until 
now. It is just about a century ago that a reaction- 
ary wave swept over Europe. It culminated in the 
formation of the Holy Alliance and the reconstituting, 
mutatis mutandis , of the statu quo ante. The reaction- 
ary spirit, like the spirit of liberty, flies swift and far 



LATIN AMERICA 287 

and from the coast of Europe it looked toward that 
of South America. It was when Europe was strug- 
gling hardest for liberty that South America freed 
itself ; and in the minds of the governments interested 
and of their reactionary statesmen who were directing 
the Holy Alliance, the restoration of the statu quo ante 
was projected to that new continent. Then as now, 
but in very different proportion, the United States was 
the most important power in the New World ; the at- 
tempt to revert to former times was not aimed at it, 
but at that portion which had belonged to Spain. 
Vessels lay anchored in the Bay of Cadiz awaiting the 
word to sail, and even from remote Russia aid came 
for the project. 

The United States, weak economically and without 
an army, imposed the first veto, and in doing so jeop- 
ardized her national existence. The scheme failed; 
and without going into a discussion as to whether the 
failure was due most to her action or to other factors, 
the truth remains that she was a powerful instru- 
ment in fixing the status of South America, raising 
it from a colony into a free continent both in fact 
and in letter. 

This debt has never been paid. There came no end 
of suspicions and reciprocal misunderstandings of the 
sort that fill the annals of international relations. But 
in presence of a tremendous crisis like the present, the 
hollows and depressions in the waving line that de- 



288 THE WORLD WAR 

scribes the relations of states should be overlooked, 
and only the high peaks of generous intention and ser- 
vice rendered should hold the eye. The question, for 
Latin America, narrows down to this : Is it the just 
spirit of President Monroe that animates her various 
peoples or is it that of a triumphant Kaiser coveting 
the domination of the seas. The answer is not diffi- 
cult to give. 

As all know now, the ruling passion of the German 
mind is the dominion of the seas. This comprises 
not only a hegemony over Latin America but also its 
conquest, by which the retrogressive spirit of the Holy 
AlHance of 1815 would be renewed. That such aspira- 
tions were entertained in Germany has been revealed 
by Pan-Germanic Leagues of all shades, and even more 
so by German scholars who in the countries in ques- 
tion often play the role of moral vanguard to the 
armies. Gustave Schmoller, the eminent rector of the 
University of Berlin, expressed the desire to see in 
Brazil a new German empire in the form of a very 
powerful colony supported and defended by Central 
Europe. Wilhelm Sievers pronounces Latin America 
the res nullius in the political world and claims it for 
Germany, since she is the last power to arrive on the 
colonizing field. Adolph Wagner, Alfred Funck, 
Lange Friedrich all think the same, and Richard Tan- 
nenberg, who partitions the world among the elect, 
awards Argentine, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay, 



LATIN AMERICA 289 

along with a third of Brazil and the southern part of 
Bolivia, to Germany.* 

In all Latin America, Germany with the "disinter- 
ested" object so indiscretely revealed by her writers, 
has been busy opposing North American influence by a 
system of intrigue. In Mexico every incident, large 
and small, was turned to use. The German minister 
there. Von Eckhart, a man of much tenacity but small 
talent, tried to apply the same methods as those which 
will go down in French history as Boloism. In Colom- 
bia, German propaganda struck deep roots after the 
segregation of the Republic of Panama. Everywhere 
the efforts were furthered by the Conservative element, 
the Catholic Church, and the immigrants from Spain; 
but likewise they encountered a barrier in the tradi- 
tional spirit of liberty and rebellion characteristic of 
that part of the world. 



* Edgardo de Magalhaes, article In the Nineteenth Century. 




CHAPTER XXV 



SPANISH NEUTRALITY 



FOR many long years Spain has sat aloof from the 
concert of nations. In international politics the 
Pyrennees have represented a real barrier, and the fact, 
instead of keeping Spanish diplomats on the alert, was 
made an excuse for abandoning themselves to a state 
of helplessness. At the time of the war with the United 
States in 1898 Spain was sleeping, and even losing 
the last remains of her great colonial empire hardly 
served to awaken her. Every nation has its peculiar 
qualities and its traditional defects, and the fact is that 
Spain, a great nation in many ways, is not so in the 
field of international politics. Her public men ap- 
proach the subject in a spirit of benighted chivalry 
which is little short of fantastic in the careful and 
practical business of treating the relations between 
states. Spaniards do not like obligations nor cleverly 
prepared rulings ; they prefer the success of force and 
the satisfactions of amour pro pre which in the eyes 
of the masses constitutes national honor, and in the 

291 



292 THE WORLD WAR 

eyes of statesmen, a vanity gratified. Spain's whole 
history, long and glorious as it is, is full of such de- 
ductions; the most casual observer cannot fail to find 
them both in the past and present. 

In the agitated events which the world has been 
witnessing since 1914, in the confusion of ideas and 
interests which naturally followed, Spanish diplomacy 
has been vacillating, insecure, unable to find a view 
point which would permit the country to participate 
in the struggle and claim some of the benefits. Nor 
has the government of Don Alfonso XIII made a 
program of practical utility out of neutrality but in- 
stead, a species of dogma, of abstract conception that 
cannot be discussed, of noli me tangere, in the same 
way as years ago the Carlists made the Virgin Mary 
generalissimo of the armies of the Pretender. 

Spain has long nursed two traditional aversions: 
England and France. Her two great glories selected 
with as much lack of logic as of historic truth, are 
the "Second of May'' and Trafalgar. From time to 
time both deeds supply the theme for brilliant orators 
to turn their best phrases before an enthusiastic public. 
Time has diminished but not effaced these aversions. 
In this tenacity we see the same inflexible tempera- 
ment which spurred the Conquistadors to prodigious 
deeds in America. Gibraltar, held by the English, is 
a thorn in the side of every Spaniard, and the invasion 
by Bonaparte's soldiers is a never-to-be-forgotten 



SPANISH NEUTRALITY 293 

nightmare. Today England is fighting fraternally be- 
side Frenchmen, and on the very fields where she once 
fought against them ; Italy is struggling with an enemy 
who yesterday was her ally; Prussians and Austrians 
have put aside Sadowa: Bulgarians are shedding the 
blood of the Russians who liberated them. To the un- 
compromising Spanish integrity such things are beyond 
all understanding and that is why, having lost the 
power which one day made Spain rule the world, she 
has gone on ceding her place as a first rate power to 
new nations. She lacks that peculiar ability or rather 
flexibility which others have known how to substitute 
for strength. 

To grievances of long standing was recently added 
the conquest of Morocco by France. Over this ter- 
ritory Spain not only claimed rights but, so far as 
the part nearest her own peninsula was concerned, she 
had made good her claims by conquest. Certain pain- 
ful incidents made it difficult to maintain friendly re- 
lations between the two and in every instance Spanish 
diplomacy was unequal to the task of defending the 
interests of the kingdom; instead of prompt action it 
had recourse to the usual posthumous regrets and ran- 
cors. In the Conference of Algeciras, the Marques de 
Almodovar del Rio, Spanish plenipotentiary and presi- 
dent of the gathering, instead of trying to extract 
some benefit for his country out of the situation created 
between France and Germany, passed his time making 



294 THE WORLD WAR 

declarations as to his probity. With Spain's approval 
and even cooperation the question of Morocco was con- 
secrated by the conference, yet it only served to aug- 
ment the useless rancors in the souls of the Spanish 
people. 

Nevertheless, there have been two friendly conven- 
tions between Spain and France and England: that 
of 1907 and that of 191 3. One was signed by An- 
tonio Maura and the other was fathered by Count 
Romanones, two ex-premiers who are the faithful ex- 
ponents of the two parties which until recently stood 
in close formation and alternately disputed the power 
— the Conservative and the Liberal. The conventions 
in question brought Spain out of her isolation for a 
moment and gave her the chance of raising her voice 
in Mediterranean affairs, but they were two separate 
acts and not part of a system or policy. Later, the 
men who carried them out almost tried to excuse them- 
selves for having done so. Count Romanones affirmed 
that by putting through the convention of 19 13 he had 
merely followed in the footsteps of the Conservatives ; 
and Maura affirmed that imperious circumstances 
forced him into the convention of 19 13. "Those agree- 
ments did not respond to any effort of the imagina- 
tion but to a reality, to a conjunction of incoercible, 
imperative, evident realities." * 



* Discourse of Don Antonio Maura in the Royal Theatre of 
Madrid, April 21, 1915. 



• SPANISH NEUTRALITY 295 

The marriage of King Alfonso XIII with the 
Princess of Battenberg did not bind the English gov- 
ernment to the Spanish; we might almost say that it 
hardly united the two royal families to any appre- 
ciable degree. Nor did the frequent and dangerous 
visits of the king to Paris and of the president of 
the French Republic to Madrid have any results. Offi- 
cial colloquies of this sort usually prove to be useless 
or else are a revelation of something previously pre- 
pared ; but between France and Spain there was never 
anything well prepared. If it were possible for Spain 
to act in the present moment it is probable that the 
balance would fall to the side of the Teutonic Em- 
pires. The Army and the Church, the two great forces 
in Spanish politics, are decidedly Germanophile. The 
masses, though divided, are in the majority similarly 
inclined. The aristocracy has made an article de luxe 
out of Germanism and the bureaucracy, a most import- 
ant element, has the same ideas. Only the literary men 
take the opposite side. The young generation, inspired 
in the French school, understand the problem which is 
being resolved on the battlefield. One great dramatist, 
Jacinto Benavente, is rabidly pro-German, but nearly 
all the rest, headed by the aged Galdos, the most patri- 
otic and broad-minded of all Spanish writers, are 
favorable to the Allies. 

In countries of fervent Catholism, the literary man 
counts for little in the forming of public opinion. In- 



296 THE WORLD WAR 

stead this is formed from the pulpits and the sacristies. 
The word of the artist does not rouse ready echo Hke 
the word of the confessor. For this reason it is truly 
extraordinary that in such a hostile atmosphere, Spain's 
literary men have been able to take a just and well- 
defined stand; for it is generally admitted that in all 
times the man of letters has followed the counsel of 
^schylus, to be "prudent and cautious and to obey 
always the one in command." 

In short, public opinion is that which commands, and 
in Spain public opinion is contrary to the tendencies 
of the enlightened class. The press, a very great power, 
although discredited in all nations, is emphatically pro- 
German; and a few sheets in Madrid which formerly 
hardly managed to exist today are prosperous and 
have a great circulation, precisely because they con- 
stantly predict the imminent and decisive victory of 
the Central Empires. The Correo Espanol, an ultra- 
montane organ, and La Tribuna lead the movement; 
then come the A. B. C, which pretends to be impar- 
ital but is hardly less passionate, and the Universo, a 
clerical organ like the Correo Espanol, but less ag- 
gressive. The publications of the so-called Newspaper 
Trust cover all the ground from a strictly maintained 
moral neutrality to a weak defense of the interests of 
the Allies; and also on their side are some republican 
newspapers of small importance. Generally speaking 



SPANISH NEUTRALITY 297 

the Germanophile dailies have the greater circulation 
and make a greater impression on the public. 

In spite of the agitated state of the country, poli- 
ticians have maintained great prudence in their words. 
An exception is the factious orator, Vasquez Mella, 
who represents the Carlist Pretender, Don Jaime, and 
the Church. Mella knows that Don Jaime will never 
sit on the throne of Spain, but it pleases him to take 
the apocalyptic tone so beloved by races of little judg- 
ment. When he says "there can be conciliation with 
France but never with England" the public applauds 
with frenzy. This road leads the ultra-Catholic orator 
to the same exaggeration which made up the vigorous 
synthesis of the Torquemadas, the Cisneros, the Riban- 
daneiras; and in the face of the blood of innocent non- 
combatants he can laud ecstatically "the audacious 
Zeppelins which know how to extend their wings like 
the triumphant wings of victorious Germany." But 
Mella is an exception, let it be repeated. He belongs 
in every way to the fifteenth century. 

Maura is also clerical, but although of saner lan- 
guage, in the depths of his soul he feels anything but 
affection for the enemies of Germany. In the speech in 
the Royal Theatre of Madrid, already mentioned, he 
answered the Germanophiles in the following sense: 
We have no other solution than the present one since 
we are not at liberty to go into the fight in favor of 
the Central Empires. Melquiades Alvarez, the Radi- 



298 THE WORLD WAR 

cal leader of the Chamber of Deputies, completed the 
idea by stating, "Those who wish to unite us to the 
cause of Germany would commit suicide; therefore I 
say emphatically that if it should be necessary some 
day to abandon neutrality, which I hope not to be the 
case, we ought to put ourselves most decidedly on the 
side of Great Britain and France. The solidarity of 
interests which has united us to both these countries is 
such that their hostility would mean the ruin of 
Spain." * In another discourse he amplified this by 
saying that "only these two countries could threaten 
the independence of our territory." f These two po- 
litical chiefs. Conservative and Radical, are the anti- 
thesis of each other in fundamental ideas, but there is 
the same thought back of each one's words, namely: 
The geographical situation of Spain leaves us only one 
way out — a benevolent attitude to England and France, 
for they could easily destroy us in short time. It was 
natural that Alvarez, modern and republican, should 
feel a sympathy toward these two liberal nations; 
Maura, who gave the head of Ferrer to the Jesuits, 
bowed to necessity but champed at the bit. 

Count Romanones, official head of the Liberal party, 
was the only politician of any responsibility who lifted 
a frank and friendly voice for the Allies. The Count 



* Declaration by Melquiades Alvarez in the Imparcial, August, 

1914. 
t Speech by Melquiades Alvarez in Granada, May i, 1917. 



SPANISH NEUTRALITY 299 

had to change his tone, had to go on believing that this 
empirical Spanish neutrality was "a neutrality that 
kills," had to be silent and yield his power later to the 
chief of the dissenting Liberals, Garcia Prieto ; this to 
the great scandal of those who had applauded for so 
many years the close-knit organization of the two Span- 
ish parties regularly succeed each other in power. Also 
the Revolutionist Lerroux, feared though but little 
esteemed, raised the banner of the Allies from the very 
first moment. His action was more unfortunate than 
that of Romanones; in fact, the fighting deputy on 
returning from France was stoned in the streets and 
had to return instantly whence he came. 

The clergy and the army are two corner stones 
on which the whole Spanish edifice rests. So it was 
in the Middle Ages, and so it is to-day. Of little cul- 
ture, excessively intransigent, without a notion of mod- 
ern ideas, the Spanish clergy is refractory to all spirit 
of liberty and hostile to all reform. It has taken pos- 
session of the popular mind and moves it according 
to its designs. It intervenes in public affairs, creates 
mayors, names deputies, influences ministers. It does 
nut use the pulpit for preaching the doctrine of Christ, 
but for directing politics and dictating rules of life. 
It exercises both functions with the same intolerance 
with which in former days it used to order autos de fe. 

From the very first moment of the present war the 
Spanish clergy took the side of the Central Empires. 
20 



300 THE WORLD WAR 

The Kaiser is considered the restorer of the faith ; for 
the Spanish firmly beHeve that he only awaits the 
moment of victory to throw off the Lutheran so antipa- 
thetic to his soul, and announce his conversion to 
Catholicism ; just as the Mohammedans believe that he 
only awaits the moment of victory to proclaim his con- 
version to Mohammedanism. In the churches, which 
are supported by the state (and the state claims to 
be neutral), German propaganda takes the most as- 
tounding forms. Belgium destroyed and martyr- 
ized deserves her fate for having raised in Brus- 
sels a statue to Ferrer; France invaded is being pun- 
ished for having separated Church from State; 
Italy is condemned for holding the Holy Pontiff 
prisoner after having robbed him of his temporal 
power ; and the slaughter of innocents everywhere is a 
punishment of God. A medieval spirit animates this 
propaganda to such a point that the ideals of the Ger- 
man Emperor find even more echo in the little towns 
of the Iberian Peninsula than in his own country. 
It is evident that another factor besides the similarity 
of ideals has been at work, and over which no one in 
Spain makes any mystery — bribery. Later it will be 
possible to confirm the rumor, for German statesmen 
do not cover up these acts any more than they con- 
cealed the gifts they put into the full hands of Spanish 
statesmen when trying to place a Hohenzollern prince 



SPANISH NEUTRALITY 301 

on the throne of Spain — an aspiration which led to the 
Franco-Prussian war. 

The Spanish army has been an army of pronuncia- 
mientos or insurrections. The whole last century was 
one of successive changes under the influence of mili- 
tary meetings. Those popular revolutions of which the 
rest of Europe saw an abundance never triumphed in 
Spain. One day it was a general who assumed the 
government, the next day a group of generals, the 
next, even the sergeants had their revolutionary move- 
ment. This cycle appears to have closed forever, 
thanks to the organization which put Alfonso XII on 
the throne ; but nevertheless there has always remained 
a political factor in the army, and the military disasters 
which preceded the loss of the colonies appear to count 
nothing against the prestige of the body. 

When the present war burst the Spanish army like 
the clergy was instantly seized with an epidemic of 
Germanism. Over the military mind the Kaiser ex- 
erted an influence almost divine; for them, Germany 
hardly existed and still less Austria, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey — only the Kaiser, the expression of force and 
grandeur, who overshadowed his country. In him they 
saw the Emperor Charles V come back to life, and for 
them German power, as in the sixteenth century, was 
Spanish power. 

Moreover the attitude of the army has been threat- 
ening in the last few years. The so-called juntas de 



302 THE WORLD WAR 

defensa (defense leagues) organized within the army 
interfered with the estabhshed miHtary discipHne. 
They began to show a restless spirit; they became 
exacting; they dictated new rules and regulations and' 
insisted that their demands, which it must be admitted 
were just, be recognized. Moreover they forced the 
presentation in the senate of a new and well drafted 
military law. This reform, however, has the grave 
defect of going too far for a country determined to 
remain neutral at any price, and falling short of the 
requirements for a country which might be about to 
enter a war. 

The state of mind we have indicated must have 
given rise to profound resentment, the full expression 
of which we are prevented from knowing by the ex- 
cessive prudence of the Spanish censor. In London 
and Paris, and later in Washington, there was no 
mystery as to Spain's attitude; therefore the limited 
allottment of coal and the restrictions on her exporta- 
tions. Furthermore certain incidents regarding sub- 
marines and espionage were well known to the Allied 
governments. As to these last the Spanish govern- 
ment has cleared itself but without putting in its 
promises any of that good will which alone could make 
them efficacious. 

One such incident, when it came up in the French 
Chamber, evoked a brief speech from ex-Premier 
Ribot. "I willingly admit the question/* he said, "and 



SPANISH NEUTRALITY 303 

reply that it is not admissible that enemy submarines 
should find refuge and protection in the ports of a 
country which calls herself neutral and friendly to 
France ; we therefore protested. The Spanish Govern- 
ment has signed, somewhat tardily, a decree prohibit- 
ing German submarines to enter Spanish waters in the 
future. The espionage organization should also have 
been prohibited but let us not ask too much. . ." * 

It appears that the international policy of the past 
has not been acceptable to Spain, and that, banished 
from America in the manner which her own lack of 
flexibility imposed upon her, her new political orienta- 
tion in Europe and Africa was not looked upon with 
much cordiality. To admit this much is mere justice; 
but it must be added that the lack of success in new 
ventures is due to Spanish cabinets rather than to those 
countries who were more skillful than she in defend- 
ing their own interests. To do so was their duty, 
and even Germany herself, though far removed from 
Spanish concerns, imposed her will on the Madrid cab- 
inet regarding the Caroline Islands. 

Today there opens before Spain a whole road of 
political renovation. She has a chance to follow a 
path which will unite the interests of the moment with 
the best traditions of her past. She can shake off the 
reactionary demagogism which has always swayed the 



* Session in the French Chamber of Deputies, July 31, 1915. 



304 THE WORLD WAR 

people and can hand over the directing of public 
affairs to more able minds. At this moment the in- 
stinct for scenting out such a path and following it 
would, if she possessed it, lay the foundations of fu- 
ture rehabilitation. But Garcia Prieto, Marquis of 
Alhucemas, says that he has again accepted the posts 
of premier and foreign minister in order to maintain 
Spain's neutrality; in other words, to follow in the 
footsteps of his predecessors and allow dogmatic neu- 
trality to be his policy. 

In the present crisis an alliance with France and 
England could revivify the international life of the 
land, stimulate commerce very considerably, obtain, 
very likely, compensation for the French occupation of 
Morocco, and heal forever the wound left by the Span- 
ish-American War of 1898. 

Any public man who knew how to formulate an ade- 
quate program along these lines and impose it upon the 
people could soon win them over by the demonstration 
of its utility; but he would first have to exclude from 
Spanish politics those two deep-rooted forces, the 
Army and the Church. Only thus could he rouse the 
people who for centuries have been sleeping narcotized 
by a religious regime which refused to confine 
itself to the moral sphere and insisted on invading 
politics. Only thus could he bring about that "revo- 
lution from above" which Don Antonio Maura, enam- 
ored of the phrase rather than what it means, has 



SPANISH NEUTRALITY 305 

talked about. Any public man wise enoug^h and strong 
enough to do this would be the second founder of the 
Spanish nation. 

Thus throwing off isolation and feeling the stimulus 
that comes from active contact with the world, Spain 
would be materially and morally renovated. Such an 
attitude would give the lie to the repeated affirmation 
that her moral solidarity with Germany in the present 
conflict is due to the identity of their psychology; 
that the ideal of might oppressing right inspired both 
in their respective periods of hegemony; that both 
nations have, at intervals of three centuries, conducted 
themselves in the same manner in the regions now so 
cruelly martyrized. When these statements are dis- 
proven by a radical change of policy, the high-sound- 
ing prophecy of a certain conservative newspaper in 
Madrid, "The hour of peace will be Spain's hour** 
will have meaning as well as sound. 

All who know the vigorous and industrious Iberian 
character, the highly personal artistic genius of the 
people, their extremely interesting literary efflorescence 
in latter years, love Spain and wish her well. They 
hope she may succeed in conquering her parasitic 
classes, and that the more wholesome forces of Span- 
ish life may have free play and establish a sound and 
respected international policy. 



CHAPTER XXVI 



Greece's double attitude 



AFTER Greece refused to fulfill her treaty obliga- 
tions toward Servia, the King and the Cretan 
statesman Venizelos became two opposed foci of pub- 
lic opinion. The abandonment of Servia was exoner- 
ated by Athens on the grounds that the Greco- Servian 
Treaty was eminently a Balkan treaty and that the 
war just broken out had assumed far more ample pro- 
portions than those provided for in the compact. 
Servia, already involved in the struggle, had no choice 
but to admit its rapid propagation, and the successive 
presidents of Greek councils, not omitting Venizelos 
himself, never reminded the people that an ally who 
had kept her faith with them was in the throes of 
death. 

Both Constantine and Venizelos were resting on the 
laurels of recent Balkan triumphs. These triumphs, 
still vivid in the public memory, being claimed by both 
men, their inability to satisfactorily divide the glory 
changed the two, who had stood so solidly for un- 

307 



3o8 THE WORLD WAR 

limited national expansion, into bitter enemies. Con- 
stantine especially was obdurate, and after his dis- 
course at Potsdam which he was forced to rectify in 
Paris, the breach between the two was beyond all 
bridging. 

It will be recalled that the King, still flushed with 
victory, went to visit his brother-in-law the Kaiser 
and his former comrades in the German Military 
School. Carried away by his cordial reception, no 
doubt, he told them that the Greek victories were due 
to the study of German methods. This statement 
could not but produce resentment in France where it 
was well known that French military commissions, the 
only ones of importance, in fact, that had ever trodden 
Greek soil, had taught the Greek armies the tactics 
which had enabled them to conquer not only the Bul- 
garians, but also the Turks in 1898. Furthermore, all 
France knew that it was the defeated armies that had 
been instructed by Germany. 

It had been arranged that Constantine was to go to 
Paris from Berlin, and thither Venizelos had to pre- 
cede him and announce that his king would rectify his 
wild statements. This he did, but with the natural 
result that the enmity deepened between sovereign and 
premier. 

But in spite of these personal differences the two 
were bound by a common political purpose. Both 
dreamed of unmeasured greatness for Greece ; both, at 
different times, cast longing eyes on Constantinople; 
both outlined a vast empire in Asia Minor; both 



GREECE'S DOUBLE ATTITUDE 309 

planned for Greek supremacy in the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean including possession of Albania and with it the 
key to the Adriatic. However, while the objective 
point, or rather points, were the same for both, the 
means of attainment were differently understood. Con- 
stantine believed that Germany would prove to be 
Greece's best champion; Venizelos, France and Eng- 
land. Venizelos even claimed a positive indebtedness 
on the part of his country toward the Allies, and 
urged that Greece would run great danger in ignoring 
the obligation. In France, Greece had met, for cen- 
turies, with such helpful moral support that it is hardly 
an exaggeration to say that Greek independence was 
conceived in the brains of French authors even before 
it was formulated in the brains of Greek leaders. 
Moreover France, with the hope of balancing the ever 
increasing Italian power, wished to elevate Greece into 
a first class power, and friendship of this scope should 
not have been despised. England too had favored 
Greek interests ever since Hellenism crossed the Chan- 
nel. With so much coast, so many islands, so many 
maritime interests to safeguard, England's protection 
was not to be esteemed lightly; and though a king of 
Danish origin might underrate it, not so a true-born 
descendant of Gorgias, like Venizelos. 

And yet the fact is that Constantine, not Venizelos, 
won out. French ascendancy waned speedily while 
Baron Von Schenck, the Berlin envoy, began his Ger- 
manizing work with unlimited audacity. Nearly the 
whole of the press was put at his service; Zaimis and 



3IO THE WORLD WAR 

Skoudolis were replaced by ministers of the king's 
choice without regard to constitutional procedure, and 
Venizelos and his adherents were persecuted. 

All this was a shock to the devotees of Hellenism. 
One disappointed admirer wrote "After the beginning 
of the nineteenth century Hellenism made a noble and 
judicious effort as manifested in the constitution of the 
Greek state, the occupation of different territories, and 
the whole expansion of the race outside of Greece 
proper; but unfortunately in recent days Hellenism 
has not evolved in accord with the political exigencies 
of modern Europe." * And with as much disappoint- 
ment, but less openly expressed, the author of Europe 
on Fire says **We all love and admire Ancient Greece, 
and that is one thing; we respect, and ask nothing 
better than to love. Modern Greece, but that is an- 
other thing." t In France, England, and Italy, the 
newspapers opened a rude campaign against the Greek 
monarchy, for treason was in the very air and though 
there was as yet no proof, the public felt intuitively 
that Greeks were preparing, outside of Salonica, some 
plot, in miniature, like the legendary one which Ulysses 
and Menelaus prepared outside of Troy. 

Thus it was that the same powers who created 
Greek independence had to oblige King Constantine 
to abdicate and permit the irregular succession of his 
second son. Venizelos was made arbiter of the public 
destiny and began his difficult task in as hostile an 
atmosphere as could be imagined. 



* Andre Duboscq ; "L'Of ient Mediterraneen," page 90. 
t Charles Benoit ; "L'Europe en Feu," page 14. 



GREECE'S DOUBLE ATTITUDE 311 

To the anti constitutional activities of the court there 
had been no limit. The railroads, private codes, army 
courriers, all were put at the disposal of Colonel Fal- 
kenhausen, Germany's military attache in Greece. 
Among the most zealous spies were the sovereigns 
themselves. Queen Sophia, sister to the Kaiser, gave 
vent, as will be seen in the following telegrams to her 
brother, to inelegant bitterness. The correspondence in 
cipher between Berlin and Athens is about to be pub- 
lished, but much of it is already known officially. The 
queen, for instance, telegraphed on December 2, 191 6, 
to the Greek ambassador in Switzerland, who was to 
transmit the message to the German Emperor, "I be- 
lieve the game is lost. War (by Greece) on the 
Entente must be given up for the present." * She 
had previously wired "I am in despair. I must have 
your opinion which is the only thing that can better 
the situation." In fact, she kept repeating that she 
was in despair, and on January 10, 19 17, she com- 
pletely lost the royal manner and became an irritated 
German woman. "How I suffer!" she wired again. 
"May those infamous pigs receive the punishment they 
deserve! I embrace you with all my heart. Your 
lonely and afflicted sister who hopes for better times." 

The court of Athens was hoping that the assault 
made on Sarrail's soldiers in Salonica would provoke 
an attack on the Greek troops, which would have made 
the French general's position extremely difficult. In 



♦This correspondence is obtained from the Stefani Italian 
Agency and is of unquestioned veracity. 



312 THE WORLD WAR 

the beginning the Greek army tried to act by itself but 
soon the lack of artillery and ammunition took all the 
enthusiasm out of it. In vain the German agents, 
who hoped at least to plant future discord between 
Greece and the AlHes, insisted. At court, up to the 
very day of the monarchs' flight, they kept urging the 
Bulgarians, Turks, and Austro-Germans massed in 
Macedonia to plunge into Greek territory and make 
war on the intruder. Even Constantine was under 
Hindenburg's orders if we are to judge from his tele- 
gram to the German generalissimo about the handing 
over of certain artillery should the Entente demand it. 
"His Majesty the King of Greece to Hindenburg with 
regard to his proposition, which is accepted. The fol- 
lowing measures will be taken to prevent said material 
from falling into the hands of the Entente: Armed 
resistance against a possible attempt to take it by force, 
or its destruction if necessary, in which case it would 
be replaced by Germany at an opportune moment." 

The Greek cabinet followed the lead of the court. 
It treated secretly with the Berlin cabinet and offered 
to destroy war material. The Greek minister in Ber- 
lin received orders from his king, queen, and cabinet 
alike. 

As all know, there were organized in Greece armed 
bands whose object was to keep attacking the Allied 
forces and doing all the damage possible, but without 
compromising the Greek government. The following 
telegram dated January ii, 191 7, shows how directly 
this was the work of the court. The message was sent 



GREECE'S DOUBLE ATTITUDE 313 

via Berne, and took a long and roundabout journey 
before reaching the person destined, who was no other 
than Falkenhausen, now in camp in Macedonia. ''In 
case the post should be late in reaching Presna I beg 
you to await it. It is most important that you should 
speak personally to Frankhizco, an officer of the re- 
serve, concerning the future organization of the 
bands." 

These and many similar episodes explain fully the 
last act of the drama — the journey of Constantine and 
his whole family, except the second son, out of 
Greece; also the leaving behind of the second son, he 
being considered the least dangerous of the family to 
place on the paternal throne. 

Greece's whole mistake has been her inordinate de- 
sires for expansion and her willingness to court what- 
ever power may favor those desires. If imperialism is 
a dangerous path for strong nations to follow, it is 
even more so for weak ones. To have accepted Sir 
Edward Grey's offers and ceded the port of Cavala 
to Bulgaria who needed an outlet on the Mediterra- 
nean, would have been the policy of wisdom. Bul- 
garia would then not have entered the war on Ger- 
many's side, and Greece would have remained one 
with the Balkan block. This cession would have been 
in accord with two letters written by Venizelos to 
the king on January 11 and 17 respectively, in the 
second of which he said "to give up Cavala is cer- 
tainly a great sacrifice and one that it grieves me to 
the depths of my soul to advise; but now that I see 



314 THE WORLD WAR 

what national compensations our sacrifices will bring 
us, I do not hesitate. I feel that the concessions in 
Asia Minor which Sir Edward Grey has indicated 
could, especially if we submit to other sacrifices in 
favor of Bulgaria, assume such proportions that an- 
other Greece, as large and certainly no less rich, would 
be added to the Greece already doubled as consequence 
of two recent victorious Balkan wars." 

But at that time the voice of Venizelos was not 
the voice of Greece. Greece saw two adversaries, 
Russia and Italy, opposed to her future aspirations. 
The first, by moving toward Constantinople, was bar- 
ring the road by which she hoped to reconstruct the 
Eastern Roman Empire under the sceptre of Con- 
stantine ; the second, by occupying the narrow entrance 
of the Adriatic was preventing her expansion in that 
direction. These two logical limitations appeared like 
spectres that made her forget what a grave danger 
the Austrian expansion would be, with its necesssjy 
seizure of Salonica and possibly a hinterland as v/ell. 

In addition to what has been described, dynastic 
interests and all the petty squabbling between indi- 
viduals and parties played their role in the recent 
drama. 

Greece was on the point of perishing. Today a new 
era is being initiated. Let us hope that she will 
understand that it is her favorable historic moment, 
and that favorable historic moments, like the wheel 
of Fortune, never turn back. 



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